

**External Evaluation of the Haiti  
Reconstruction Fund**

**Final Report**



*April 2015*



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## Acronyms

|                |  |
|----------------|--|
| <b>AE</b>      | Executing Agencies ( <i>Agences d'Exécution</i> )  |
| <b>AFD</b>     | French Agency for Development ( <i>Agence Française de Développement</i> )   |
| <b>ATL</b>     | Local Technical Authority ( <i>Autorité Technique Locale</i> )   |
| <b>AusAID</b>  | Australian Agency for International Development  |
| <b>BDS</b>     | Business Development Service   |
| <b>BMPAD</b>   | Office of Monetization of Aid and Development Projects ( <i>Bureau de Monétisation des Projets d'Aide au Développement</i> ) |
| <b>CAED</b>    | Framework for Coordinating External Development Aid ( <i>Cadre de Coordination de l'Aide Externe au Développement</i> )      |
| <b>CASEC</b>   | Municipal Districts Councils ( <i>Conseil d'Administration des Sections Communales</i> )                                     |
| <b>CCHC</b>    | Haiti-Canada Cooperation Centre ( <i>Centre de Coopération Haiti-Canada</i> )  |
| <b>CECI</b>    | Centre for International Studies and Cooperation ( <i>Centre d'étude et de coopération internationale</i> )                  |
| <b>CEPA</b>    | Environmental and Agricultural Promotion Commission ( <i>Commission environnement et promotion de l'agriculture</i> )        |
| <b>CIAT</b>    | Inter-Ministerial Territorial Development Committee ( <i>Comité Interministériel d'Aménagement du Territoire</i> )           |
| <b>CIDA</b>    | Canadian International Development Agency  |
| <b>CIRH</b>    | Interim Haiti Reconstruction Commission ( <i>Commission Intérimaire pour la Reconstruction d'Haïti</i> )                     |
| <b>CNIGS</b>   | National Geospatial Information Centre ( <i>Centre National de l'Information Géo-Spatiale</i> )                              |
| <b>CRC</b>     | Community Resources Centre ( <i>Centre de Ressources Communautaires</i> )  |
| <b>DAC</b>     | Development Assistance Committee   |
| <b>DFID</b>    | Department for International Development (UK)  |
| <b>DINEPA</b>  | National Directorate of Water Supply and Sanitation ( <i>Direction Nationale de l'Eau Potable et de l'Assainissement</i> )   |
| <b>DRR</b>     | Resettlement and Rehabilitation Division ( <i>Division Relogement et Réhabilitation</i> )                                    |
| <b>EDH</b>     | National Power Utility Company ( <i>Électricité d'Haïti</i> )  |
| <b>PE</b>      | Partner Entity   |
| <b>EPPLS</b>   | Public Enterprise for Promoting Social Housing ( <i>Entreprise Publique de Promotion de Logements Sociaux</i> )              |
| <b>M&amp;E</b> | Monitoring and Evaluation  |
| <b>FAES</b>    | Economic and Social Assistance Fund ( <i>Fonds d'Assistance Économique et Sociale</i> )                                      |
| <b>FAO</b>     | The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations  |
| <b>MDTF</b>    | Multi-Donor Trust Fund   |

## Acronyms

|                 |   |
|-----------------|---|
| <b>FGCP</b>     | Partial Credit Guarantee Fund ( <i>Fonds de Garantie de Crédit Partiel</i> )  |
| <b>HRF</b>      | Haiti Reconstruction Fund   |
| <b>GCS</b>      | Advisory and Supervisory Group  |
| <b>GOH</b>      | Government of Haiti   |
| <b>ID</b>       | Development Initiative ( <i>Initiative Développement</i> )  |
| <b>IDA</b>      | International Development Agency  |
| <b>IDB</b>      | Inter-American Development Bank   |
| <b>IHSI</b>     | Haitian Statistics and Information Institute ( <i>Institut Haïtien de Statistiques et d'Informatique</i> )  |
| <b>ILO</b>      | International Labour Organization   |
| <b>IOM</b>      | International Organization for Migration  |
| <b>MEF</b>      | Ministry of Economy and Finance ( <i>Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances</i> )  |
| <b>MENFP</b>    | Ministry of Education and Vocational Training ( <i>Ministère de l'Éducation et de la Formation Professionnelle</i> )                                |
| <b>MGAE</b>     | Module for the Management of External Assistance ( <i>Module de Gestion de l'Aide Externe</i> )   |
| <b>MICT</b>     | Ministry of the Interior and Local Governments ( <i>Ministère de l'Intérieur et des Collectivités Territoriales</i> )                               |
| <b>MPCE</b>     | Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation ( <i>Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe</i> )                                 |
| <b>MPME</b>     | Micro, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises   |
| <b>MTPTC</b>    | Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communications ( <i>Ministère des Travaux Publics, Transports et Communications</i> )                  |
| <b>NGO</b>      | Non-Governmental Organization   |
| <b>Norad</b>    | Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation  |
| <b>OECD</b>     | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  |
| <b>PAO</b>      | Performance and Anti-Corruption Office of the IHRC ( <i>Bureau de performance et de l'Anti-corruption de la CIRH</i> )                              |
| <b>PARDH</b>    | Action Plan for Haiti National Recovery and Development ( <i>Plan d'Action pour le Relèvement et le Développement d'Haïti</i> )                     |
| <b>PARLQ</b>    | Housing Support Project ( <i>Projet d'Appui à la Reconstruction des Logements et des Quartiers</i> )  |
| <b>PREKAD</b>   | Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction Project in Port-au-Prince ( <i>Projet de Logement et de Reconstruction de Quartiers à Port-au-Prince</i> ) |
| <b>PRODEPUR</b> | National Participative Urban Community Development Project ( <i>Projet de Développement Participatif Urbain</i> )                                   |



## Acronyms

|              |  |
|--------------|--|
| <b>PSUGO</b> | Universal, Free and Compulsory Primary Education Program ( <i>Programme de scolarisation universelle gratuite et obligatoire</i> ) |
| <b>SILQ</b>  | Housing and Neighbourhood Information System ( <i>Système d'Information du Logement et des Quartiers</i> )                         |
| <b>SME</b>   | Small and medium-sized enterprises   |
| <b>SMS</b>   | Short Message Service  |
| <b>SC</b>    | Steering Committee   |
| <b>UCLBP</b> | Housing and Public Building Construction Unit ( <i>Unité de Construction de Logement et de Bâtiments Publics</i> )                 |
| <b>UCP</b>   | Project Coordination Unit-MEF ( <i>Unité de Coordination des Projets</i> )   |
| <b>UTE</b>   | Project Implementation Unit-MTPTC ( <i>Unité Technique d'Exécution</i> )   |
| <b>UN</b>    | United Nations   |
| <b>UNDP</b>  | United Nations Development Program   |
| <b>UNFPA</b> | United Nations Population Fund   |
| <b>WB</b>    | World Bank   |
| <b>WFP</b>   | World Food Program   |



## Table of contents

|       |  |    |
|-------|--|----|
| 1     | Introduction   | 1  |
| 1.1   | Context of the Evaluation  | 1  |
| 1.2   | Nature and Objectives of the Evaluation                            | 2  |
| 1.3   | Structure of the Report  | 3  |
| 2     | Approach and Methodology Used                                      | 4  |
| 2.1   | General Approach   | 4  |
| 2.2   | Methodological Tools and Techniques                                | 4  |
| 2.2.1 | In-depth Document Review   | 4  |
| 2.2.2 | Semi-Directed Interviews   | 5  |
| 2.2.3 | Focus Groups   | 5  |
| 2.2.4 | Review of the Portfolio of HRF-funded Projects                     | 6  |
| 2.3   | Data Analysis  | 9  |
| 2.4   | Methodological Limits  | 9  |
| 3     | Results of the Evaluation  | 10 |
| 3.1   | Mobilization of Financing  | 10 |
| 3.2   | Allocation and management of financing                             | 18 |
| 3.3   | Governance of the HRF  | 41 |
| 3.4   | Results of the HRF   | 57 |
| 3.5   | Future of the HRF  | 67 |
| 4     | Conclusions and lessons learned                                    | 72 |
| 4.1   | Conclusions  | 72 |
| 4.2   | Lessons learned  | 72 |
| 4.2.1 | Mobilization of funding  | 73 |
| 4.2.2 | Allocation and management of funding                               | 74 |
| 4.2.3 | Governance of the HRF  | 74 |
| 4.2.4 | Results  | 75 |
| 5     | Recommendations  | 76 |
| 5.1   | Recommendations to the Steering Committee                          | 76 |
| 5.2   | Recommendations to the Government and the community of fund donors | 76 |
| 5.3   | Recommendations to the Secretariat and the HRF Trustee             | 77 |

## Tables

|            |  |    |
|------------|--|----|
| Table 2.1  | Sample of HRF-financed projects  | 7  |
| Table 2.2  | Portfolio review – Proxy questions and variables   | 8  |
| Table 3.1  | Pledged amounts by type of donor   | 12 |
| Table 3.2  | Co-financing with the HRF from 2010 to 2014  | 15 |
| Table 3.3  | Overview of Donors’ Preferences as at June 30, 2014  | 20 |
| Table 3.4  | PARDH budgets for the first 18 months and breakdown of HRF funding at June 30, 2014                                | 25 |
| Table 3.5  | Amount and share of HRF financing by sector as at June 30, 2014  | 26 |
| Table 3.6  | Actual timeframe for each step of the funding approval process and related performance standards                   | 28 |
| Table 3.7  | Timeframe for funds transfer between Partner Entities and Implementing Agencies                                    | 34 |
| Table 3.8  | Number of projects completed, in progress and approved but not started as at June 30, 2014 for each Partner Entity | 39 |
| Table 3.9  | Frequency of participation of observers at the HRF Steering Committee meetings                                     | 47 |
| Table 3.10 | Objectives and results of the HRF communication effort   | 55 |
| Table 3.11 | HRF communication expenditures for the year 2013-2014  | 57 |

## Figures

|            |   |    |
|------------|---|----|
| Figure 1.  | Donors’ contributions and cumulative amount of financing for the HRF                            | 11 |
| Figure 2.  | HRF grant approval process  | 27 |
| Figure 3.  | Timeframe for each step of approval process by project (in days)                                | 29 |
| Figure 4.  | Timeframe for transfer of funds by Trustee to Partner Entities (in days)                        | 30 |
| Figure 5.  | Timeframe for preparation of final project document by project (in days)                        | 31 |
| Figure 6.  | Average timeframe for preparation of final project documents for each Partner Entity (in days)  | 32 |
| Figure 7.  | Breakdown of cumulative approved funds for each fiscal year between the Partner Entities (in %) | 38 |
| Figure 8.  | Percentage of disbursements made by each Partner Entity by fiscal year                          | 38 |
| Figure 9.  | Secretariat and Trustee budget trends for fiscal years 2011-2015 (in \$)                        | 40 |
| Figure 10. | Date and number of monthly approvals of HRF-financed projects                                   | 53 |

## Appendices

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| Appendix I Terms of Reference   | 91  |
| Appendix II Minutes of the first meeting with the ASG                                 | 91  |
| Appendix III Evaluation matrix  | 95  |
| Appendix IV Sources of Information for Each Evaluation Question                       | 115 |
| Appendix V Partner Entity Disbursement Details (2014)                                 | 117 |
| Appendix VI Outputs of the HRF-funded Debris and Housing projects as of June 30, 2014 | 119 |
| Appendix VII List of Findings   | 123 |
| Appendix VIII List of Recommendations   | 125 |
| Appendix IX List of People Interviewed  | 127 |
| Appendix X List of Documents Consulted (French)                                       | 133 |
| Appendix XI Portfolio Review  | 143 |
| Appendix XII Comparisons among MDTFs  | 143 |



## Executive summary

### Introduction

**Context** – Following the January 12, 2010 earthquake, the Government of Haiti was considerably weakened and required support in rebuilding the country, both at the material level with the construction and repair of infrastructures and at the institutional level with strengthening the government’s capacities.

Therefore, the Government of Haiti, working in collaboration with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank (WB), decided to create the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF). The HRF constitutes an array of contributions that are pooled in order to ensure financing of the priority activities identified and/or undertaken by the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation (MPCE) and approved by the Council of Ministers, after consulting with the Prime Minister.

The goal of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) is to “support the mobilization, coordination and allocation of resources in the form of contributions to improve basic living conditions and help strengthen the Government of Haiti’s long-term capacity, in keeping with the Plan d’Action pour le Relèvement et le Développement d’Haïti (PARDH) (Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti)”. In order to achieve this goal, the HRF coordinates its activities with the Government of Haiti. At the outset, the HRF collaborated in particular with the Interim Haiti Reconstruction Commission (IHRC) and later with the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation (MPCE) the Government of Haiti entity to serve as a counterpart to the HRF.

**Nature of the evaluation** – The HRF’s situation in late June 2014 showed that the Fund was at a crossroads. It is hoped that reserved funds in the amount of \$40 M will be allocated to projects before the end of 2014<sup>1</sup> and that all available resources will be exhausted. Also, during the Steering Committee’s twelfth meeting, on May 28, 2014 in Port au Prince, it was suggested that the HRF consider shutting down its activities unless it was entrusted with new missions and/or provided with new resources. During this meeting, it was decided that the situation would be evaluated in late November 2014, in light of: (i) the progress in preparing ongoing projects; and (ii) the recommendations of the review to be initiated before September 2014.

**Objectives of the evaluation** – The purpose of the external evaluation of the Haiti Reconstruction Fund is to determine to what extent the HRF has achieved its objective, which is to support the mobilization, coordination and allocation of resources to improve basic living conditions in Haiti and assist in strengthening the capacity of the Government of Haiti (GoH). The central goal of this evaluation is to assess the effectiveness, efficiency and added value of the HRF in order to draw lessons from the experience for the donors and the government and to contribute to the reflection on the future of the mechanism during the next Steering Committee meeting, which is scheduled for November 2014. The evaluation is complementary to the study pertaining to the feasibility of starting up an investment fund, which will be conducted at the government’s request and financed by the IDB.

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<sup>1</sup> Funds in the amount of \$56M are reserved for the Projet de Ligne Électrique Peligre (Peligre Electrical Line Project) (\$16 million), for which approval is anticipated during the final quarter of 2014 and for various projects (\$40 million) being prepared by the government, which are aimed at financing activities in the agriculture, vocational training and health sectors.

**Methodology of the evaluation** – The external evaluation of the HRF is based on a methodological approach that combines a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods. Data was gathered using methodological tools and techniques, including an in-depth document review, semi-directed interviews and focus groups.

The team of consultants carried out a two-week ground mission in Haiti to meet the main participants in the HRF. More than 110 individual interviews and focus groups were conducted with the HRF's main stakeholders, including program managers, representatives of the Haitian government, population groups and beneficiaries of HRF-financed projects.

## **Main Findings and Recommendations of the Evaluation**

The findings are presented in four categories that group together the evaluation criteria: mobilization of financing, allocation and management of financing, governance and results. These findings are followed by options and recommendations pertaining to the future of the HRF.

### ***Mobilization of financing***

Nineteen (19) donors have contributed a total of \$396 million to the HRF, which represents 78% of the \$495 million pledged during the March 2010 "Toward a New Future for Haiti" conference in New York. The pledges made to the HRF represented 6% of the total pledges for reconstruction. From 2010 to 2012, the HRF represented 12.7% of donors' total reconstruction disbursements. There is no evidence that the start-up of the HRF encouraged donors to give more to Haiti. Rather, they chose to divide their overall contributions between the HRF and their usual channels, which were given preference. Compared with other post-disaster multi-donor funds, the HRF has mobilized a relatively similar proportion of contributions from donors.

Funds allocated to the projects as at June 30, 2014 totaled \$341 million and the total budget for these projects was \$744 million, with \$403 million in co-financing, mainly from two Partner Entities: the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. Although these entities have significant financing for Haiti at their disposal, contributions from the HRF were included in some of their projects.

### ***Allocation and management of financing***

The main donors expressed preferences concerning the use of their contributions. Consequently, 80% of the contributions to the HRF were allocated to the financing of sectors and in certain cases, to specific projects. This situation runs counter to several of the Fund's basic principles and contributed to reducing its flexibility, the lack of concentration with respect to the financing of strategic projects and in certain cases, undue delays in the allocation of project financing.

Close to 53% of that financing has gone to what can be considered strategic projects that meet critical needs that are directly linked to the earthquake aftermath: the clearing of debris, housing, development of poor neighbourhoods that were severely affected by the quake and disaster prevention. The other 47% of the financing has gone toward "classic development" projects that are still warranted with respect to the Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti (PARDH), on which the HRF's orientations are based.

**The formal approval process** for project financing has been efficient and the HRF compares favourably to other multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs). However, significant delays have been noted in the disbursing of financing for project start-ups by the Partner Entities (notably the World Bank and the IDB) to their Implementing Agencies.

**The Partner Entities** have been relevant and have played a useful role within the context of a country where the earthquake contributed to a significant weakening of government institutions. However, their performance has not been uniform, particularly in terms of responding quickly. The



United Nations reacted quicker than the two banks in the preparation and start-up of projects targeting critical needs in terms of clearing debris and resettling victims. The World Bank has also been diligent, particularly in implementing two forms of budgetary support for very precarious public finances. The IDB has reacted more slowly and received financing from the HRF to co-finance projects that already make up part of its large development-support portfolio. As of June 30, 2014, the United Nations had disbursed 89% of received financing and many of its projects had already been completed. The World Bank had disbursed 56% of allocated financing and the IDB, 15%.

The HRF has prudently managed its staff and administrative costs: 1.4% of disbursements for Trustee and Secretariat expenses and 3% for the costs of the Partner Entities. However, the management costs of the Implementing Agencies, which stand at 11%-15%, must also be taken into account. Therefore, total management costs range from 15% to 19%.

### ***Governance***

Generally speaking, the main elements of the HRF's **governance structure** have played their roles adequately, even though a number of shortcomings have been identified. The **Steering Committee** (SC) has fulfilled the responsibilities that fell upon it to lead the Fund. The SC is mainly comprised of donor representatives, which certainly does not facilitate government ownership of the mechanism. It would have been preferable for the Committee to give more attention to monitoring project results. **The Secretariat** has shown itself to be highly efficient in implementing the HRF. It has been proactive in seeking consensus during Steering Committee meetings. In addition, it has produced numerous relevant and well-illustrated documents for stakeholders and has generally provided information that is appropriate to decision-making by the Steering Committee. Communicating with the public has probably been its weak point within a context of ambiguity as to the relevance of promoting the HRF. The Trustee has also carried out its responsibilities well, except in following up on the interest earned by the Partner Entities. Government leadership has not been fully exercised, either during the lifecycle of the IHRC or even subsequently. Most projects have been identified and prepared jointly by the Partner Entities and the various donors, with the appropriate government institutions later endorsing them.

**The end of the IHRC** and the government's long delay in naming a GoH counterpart to the HRF created uncertainty and handicapped the HRF's operations for a year, creating both positive and negative effects. The positive effect is that the HRF has been equipped with a formal government counterpart. The negative effect is that this change may have diminished the interest of donors in this shared mechanism, because they see no political stake, as was the case with IHRC.

### ***Results of the HRF***

The mandate of the evaluation was not to provide an in-depth assessment of the various projects, but rather to identify the overall results based on existing project reports and evaluations. So far, **the most significant results** have been obtained in the housing and urban management sector. The debris-collecting and -recycling projects constituted essential operations prior to reconstruction. This one-of-a-kind task had never before been carried out on such a scale and it allowed for the development of a series of lessons learned and better practices. Thanks to the housing and neighbourhood development projects that were undertaken, thousands of families have been resettled, it has been possible to close most of the makeshift emergency camps and the urban planning and development process has begun on a community and participatory basis. Significant needs remain, however. Some 85,000 individuals are still living in tents and other temporary shelters. Furthermore, a percentage of earthquake victims have relocated from camps in municipal public spaces to immense habitats that have sprung up on the periphery of Port au Prince, without the minimal planning and development of infrastructures and services. This "shantytownization" phenomenon is disturbing, because people are living under very difficult conditions. The

participatory processes that were introduced with a view to preparing and implementing neighbourhood development plans show potential, but their continuation depends on the will of the municipalities concerned and executing development projects depends on the financial means of these municipalities, which are unfortunately very limited.

**The two forms of budgetary support** that were introduced under the auspices of the World Bank have contributed significantly to balanced public finances. An additional objective was for the government to spearhead urgent reforms in order to improve management of public finances and other government mechanisms. Their results are evaluated as “moderately satisfactory” with respect to the first objective and “unsatisfactory” with respect to the second.

The projects in the housing, neighbourhood development and risk-and-disaster prevention sector have made a substantial contribution to **strengthening the capacities** of numerous Haitian public bodies, including the Unit for the Construction of Housing and Public Buildings (UCLBP) and municipal governments. Neighbourhood groups, such as community platforms, have been created and could become valuable partners of municipalities in the area of neighbourhood development. Finally, many small construction businesses and their workforces have benefited from training in new construction techniques.

### **Options and Recommendations Pertaining to the Future of the HRF**

The evaluation recommends that **donors continue to consider contributing additional funds to the HRF** earmarked for pursuing strategic housing and neighbourhood development projects in order to meet ongoing pressing needs in this area: housing for the 85,000 individuals who are still living in emergency camps, continuation and sustainability of development programs already underway for disadvantaged neighbourhoods and support for urban housing and development in the makeshift neighbourhoods that have risen up on the outskirts of Port au Prince.

If no new donor contributions are forthcoming, the evaluation **recommends closing down the Secretariat in 2015 and** transferring some of its responsibilities to the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation (MPCE), while keeping both the Trustee and the Steering Committee running until complete closure of the various projects.

**The evaluation recommends that the government and donors consider setting up sector-based MDTFs**, drawing lessons from the HRF in areas such as health and education, where solid national plans are already in place.

## 1 Introduction

The purpose of this evaluation Report is to present the results of the External Evaluation of the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF) that was conducted by the Universal Management Group Limited (UMG) consulting firm between September and December 2014.

### 1.1 Context of the Evaluation

The devastating earthquake that occurred on January 12, 2010 underscored and exacerbated the fragility of the Haitian state. Following this tragic event, the Government of Haiti was considerably weakened and required support in rebuilding the country, both at the physical level with the construction and repair of infrastructures and at the institutional level with strengthening the government's capacities.

Donations pledged to Haiti in 2010 for humanitarian aid and reconstruction reached more than \$16 billion<sup>2</sup>. These donations came from a variety of parties around the world, including governments, private firms, non-government organizations (NGOs), multilateral agencies and private individuals<sup>3</sup>. Some of these contributors have the required resources at their disposal and have expressed the desire to manage their own donations on the ground, in collaboration with the Haitian government. Other contributors prefer to coordinate their efforts through an MDTF in order to help finance the reconstruction process.

Therefore, the Government of Haiti, working in collaboration with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank (WB), decided to create the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF) following the international conference and call for donations that took place in New York on March 31, 2010. The objective of this MDTF has been to support the Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti (PARDH), as defined by the GoH immediately after the earthquake.

Administered by the International Development Agency (IDA) of the World Bank Group, at the request of the GoH, the HRF, like any other MDTF, has sought to offer five main advantages. First, it improves coordination within the international community and between development partners and the government. Second, it builds on comparative advantages of partners that are experienced at the international level (the IDB, the UN and the World Bank) and at the local level (GoH, NGO, private enterprise). Third, it lowers transaction costs linked to development aid, because the government and donors deal with a single partner within the framework of a single financing structure. Fourth, it can help prevent the overlapping of initiatives and duplication of efforts. Fifth, the HRF allows for the strategic financing needs of the reconstruction process as identified by the Haitian government to be met.

As indicated in the Operations Manual, the HRF's goal is to support the mobilization, coordination and allocation of resources in the form of contributions to improve basic living conditions and help strengthen the Government of Haiti's long-term capacity, in keeping with the Plan d'Action pour le Relèvement et le Développement d'Haïti (PARDH) (Action Plan for Haiti National Recovery and Development)". In order to achieve this goal, the HRF coordinates its activities with the Government of Haiti. At the outset, the HRF collaborated in particular with the Interim Haiti Reconstruction Commission (IHRC) and later with the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation (MPCE) as the

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<sup>2</sup> The dollar amounts used throughout the report are in USD.

<sup>3</sup> Source: International assistance to Haiti. Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti: [www.lessonsfromhaiti.org](http://www.lessonsfromhaiti.org)

entity named by the Government of Haiti to serve as a counterpart to the HRF. The HRF constitutes an array of contributions that are pooled in order to ensure financing of the priority activities identified and/or undertaken by the MPCE and approved by the Council of Ministers, after consulting with the Prime Minister.

## 1.2 Nature and Objectives of the Evaluation

**Nature of the evaluation** – The HRF’s situation in late June 2014 showed that the Fund was at a crossroads. It is hoped that reserved funds in the amount of \$40M will be allocated to projects before the end of 2014<sup>4</sup> and that all available resources will be exhausted. Also, during the Steering Committee’s twelfth meeting, on May 28, 2014 in Port au Prince, it was suggested that the HRF consider shutting down its activities unless it was entrusted with new missions and/or provided with new resources. During this meeting, it was decided that the situation would be evaluated in late November 2014, in light of: (i) the progress in preparing ongoing projects; and (ii) the recommendations of the review to be initiated before September 2014.

As stipulated in Paragraph 6.13 of the HRF’s Operations Manual, the “Steering Committee may order independent evaluations, such as a midterm review of the portfolio and possibly other evaluations, to assist in analyzing the quality of the implementation process and the results.”

**Objectives of the evaluation** – The goal of this evaluation is to assess the effectiveness, efficiency and added value of the HRF in order to draw lessons from the experience for the donors and the government and to contribute to the reflection on the future of the mechanism during the next Steering Committee meeting, which is scheduled for November 2014. The evaluation is complementary to the study pertaining to the feasibility of starting up an investment fund, which will be conducted at the government’s request and financed by the IDB.

The Terms of Reference of the Evaluation objective is to determine to what extent the Fund has achieved its objective (mobilize, coordinate and allocate resources to improve basic living conditions in Haiti and help strengthen the capacity of the Government of Haiti). This involves four sub-objectives:

- How has the HRF mobilized, coordinated and allocated resources?
- To what extent have the activities funded by the HRF contributed to improving basic living conditions for Haitians?
- To what extent have these activities and the HRF’s operating method supported the strengthening of the capacity of the Haitian government?
- What has been the added value (if any) of the HRF’s operating method in reconstruction financing compared with other financing assistance mechanisms within the Haitian context?

However, following the first meeting with the advisory and supervisory group (ASG) that was held on September 12, 2014 via videoconference, the ASG clarified the objectives of the evaluation. It confirmed that Objective 1 is the most important of the four mentioned in the Terms of Reference. Objective 3 remains essential. Meanwhile, Objective 2, which relates to improving living conditions for Haitians, must be limited. There should be less focus on this objective than on the other three, knowing also that certain projects have been designed with their own internal evaluation

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<sup>4</sup> Funds in the amount of \$56M are designated for the Projet de Ligne Électrique Peligre (Peligre Electrical Line Project) (\$16 million), for which approval is anticipated during the final quarter of 2014 and for various projects (\$40 million) being prepared by the government, which are aimed at financing activities in the agriculture, vocational training and health sectors.

mechanism by the Partner Entities and/or the Implementing Agencies. A summary of this meeting is attached in Appendix 2.

**Scope of the evaluation** – In order to achieve these objectives, the scope of the review seeks to cover the internal functioning of the HRF, the portfolio of activities funded by the HRF and the management of the HRF's finances. Internal functioning includes the performance of the HRF's Steering Committee, the Partner Entities, the Trustee and the Secretariat, which fulfill their obligations as defined in the HRF's Operations Manual. The overall development impact of the HRF's portfolio is considered at the level of the beneficiaries in the HRF's main areas of intervention with respect to reconstruction objectives.

However, an evaluation of the individual project development results is not part of this review and remains the responsibility of the Partner Entities and Implementing Agencies, in keeping with their respective internal procedures and policies. The effectiveness and efficiency of the HRF's financial structure will be reviewed with the HRF's contributors, the Trustee, the Secretariat and the Partner Entities. The added value of the HRF's functioning must be determined on the basis of the information provided by the parties concerned and through a comparison with other MDTF mechanisms, taking into account constraints and opportunities within the Haitian context.

### 1.3 Structure of the Report

This report is structured in five sections. After this opening introductory section, the second section presents the general approach and methodology followed by the team of consultants in order to answer the evaluation questions. The methodological techniques and tools used are presented and justified with respect to the context and objectives of the evaluation. This section also presents the limits encountered during the evaluation, both in terms of data gathering and analysis.

The third section deals with the principal findings of the evaluation. These findings are themselves structured into five sub-sections, corresponding to the HRF's central objective, namely, the mobilization of financing, the management of financing, the allocation of financing, the ensuing results and the future of the HRF.

The fourth section of the report presents the main conclusions of the evaluation and sets out a number of lessons learned, with a view to informing the design and implementation of future MDTFs.

The fifth and final section is devoted to recommendations intended to contribute solid information that will help the HRF Steering Committee to make an enlightened decision concerning the future of the HRF and to provide the government and donors with food for thought concerning the possible set-up of other MDTFs.

This report contains 12 appendices, which complement the information presented in the first four sections.

## 2 Approach and Methodology Used

### 2.1 General Approach

The external evaluation of the HRF is based on a methodological approach that combines a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods. This approach has been guided by the four questions linked to the sub-objectives set out in the Terms of Reference of the evaluation, namely:

- How has the HRF mobilized, coordinated and allocated resources?
- To what extent have the activities funded by the HRF contributed to improving basic living conditions for Haitians?
- To what extent have these activities and the HRF's operating method supported the strengthening of the capacity of the Haitian government?
- What has been the added value (if any) of the HRF's operating method in reconstruction financing compared with other financing assistance mechanisms within the Haitian context?

### 2.2 Methodological Tools and Techniques

Data was gathered using methodological tools and techniques, including an in-depth document review, semi-directed interviews and focus groups.

These methodological tools allowed for both qualitative and quantitative data to be gathered from various sources. The team of consultants took care to draw upon multiple sources of information as much as possible in order to ensure the validity of the findings of the evaluation.

#### 2.2.1 In-depth Document Review

During the start-up phase, a preliminary review of the basic documents was conducted in order to evaluate the quantity and quality of the available information, sort this information based on its relevance with respect to the evaluation questions listed in the evaluation matrix and identify the possible gaps to be filled during the later stages of the mandate.

Next, an in-depth document review was carried out. The data extracted from this document review were coded and organized around criteria and sub-questions. This technique of classifying by key criteria and questions greatly facilitated the sorting, analysis and validation of the data and the writing of the final report. This approach was also used to organize other sources of information gathered during the evaluation using other data collection tools, such as semi-directed interviews and focus groups.

The main documents that were reviewed include the HRF's annual reports, financial reports, quarterly project reports, concept notes and project documents, along with any other document explaining the HRF's key mechanisms and functions, including monitoring and evaluation, financial systems, the responsibility of trustees, knowledge pool and communication and quality assurance products (Appendix 10).



### 2.2.2 Semi-Directed Interviews

In addition to the document review, our team conducted interviews with more than 110 key individuals in the HRF by telephone or in person during the mission in Haiti<sup>5</sup> in order to gather all relevant information to meet the objectives of the evaluation (Appendix 9).

More specifically, these interviews were intended to fill the gaps in the data and explore points more deeply. These consultations dealt with both the overall performance of the HRF and all of the financed projects. This approach was especially beneficial in acquiring a more precise overall view of the HRF's programming and the procedures that govern its functioning.

The selection of the individuals to be interviewed was discussed with the HRF's managers. A preliminary list of approximately 30 respondents was given to our team at the beginning of the start-up phase and was expanded during the evaluation.

In preparing these interviews, the team wrote interview protocols using the evaluation matrix as a reference methodological framework. Given the variety of profiles and their roles within the HRF, the team developed specific instruments for each type of stakeholder, namely:

- Present and past members of the HRF Secretariat
- Partner Entities
- Implementing Agencies and front-line actors
- Donors
- The Government of Haiti
- Beneficiaries of HRF-financed projects
- Steering Committee observers
- External independent observers (recognized figures, journalists)
- Members of the Interim Haiti Reconstruction Commission (IHRC)

In terms of logistics, the team was able to rely on the assistance of HRF program managers for identifying and establishing initial contact with the key individuals to be questioned, in order to present the evaluation and the team.

### 2.2.3 Focus Groups

In addition to semi-directed interviews, the team of consultants conducted approximately 10 focus groups with project managers, members of the Local Technical Authorities (ATL), representatives from neighbourhood community associations and beneficiaries of HRF-financed projects.

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<sup>5</sup> The team carried out a ground mission in Haiti between September 24, 2014 and October 7, 2014. The main objective of this mission was to gather data by meeting with as many key individuals as possible among those who were or still are involved in the HRF. In addition to meetings that were held at the offices of managers of HRF-funded projects, the mission in Haiti included visits to neighbourhoods of Port au Prince, the capital. In all, approximately 40 interviews and four focus groups were held during the mission, which was extended thanks to the active participation of two national consultants in collecting data. These two individuals conducted focus groups, individual interviews and supplementary neighbourhood visits in order to further deepen the data collection until October 27, 2014.

#### 2.2.4 Review of the Portfolio of HRF-funded Projects

The Review of the portfolio of HRF-funded projects is intended to evaluate the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the projects. In view of the number of HRF-funded projects, a sample of 9 projects was selected from among the 23 projects that make up the HRF portfolio (Table 2.1).

A set of criteria was established in order to accurately evaluate the performance and functioning of these projects. These criteria are: type of Partner Entity, type of Implementing Agency, percentage of disbursement, degree of completion, type of intervention sector and geographical area.

Based on these criteria, the sample projects are particularly representative of the HRF's portfolio for the following reasons:

- Among the 9 projects selected, 5 are administered by the UN, 3 by the World Bank and 1 by the Inter-American Development Bank;
- The 9 projects represent \$215 million, or 66% of the \$326 million approved and disbursed by the HRF to the Partner Entities, according to the financial report dated June 30, 2014;
- The 9 projects represent \$177 million, or 89% of the \$198 million disbursed to the Implementing Agencies or beneficiaries by the Partner Entities, according to the financial report dated June 30, 2014;
- 5 projects have been completed and 3 of the other 4 are more than 61% completed;
- The 9 projects include a diversity of Implementing Agencies;
- The 9 projects involve areas affected by the earthquake or have a national scope.

The review of the portfolio's performance used documents pertaining to each sample project. The main documents used include the quarterly reports, end-of-project reports (if any) and internal and/or external evaluation Reports (if any). The portfolio performance review was completed through in-person semi-directed interviews with managers that were conducted during the mission in Haiti.



**Table 2.1 Sample of HRF-financed projects**

| Name of project   | Partner Entity | HRF budget disbursed/ total (in \$ millions) | Date of closure or degree of advancement | Implementing Agency  | Intervention sector                   | Geographic area              |
|---|----------------|--|--|--|---------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| Emergency Development Policy Operation                      | WB             | 25/25  | 30/09/11                                 | Ministry of the Economy and Finance                          | Strengthening of capacity / emergency | National                     |
| Debris 1  | UN             | 16.95/16.95                                  | 30/06/13                                 | UNDP, UN Habitat, ILO, MTPTC                                 | Emergency                             | Port au Prince               |
| Debris 2  | UN             | 25/25  | 30/06/13                                 | Development Initiative (ID) + Municipality of Port au Prince | Emergency                             | Port au Prince               |
| Budget Support  | WB             | 10/10  | 30/06/14                                 | Ministry of Economy and Finance                              | Strengthening of capacity             | National                     |
| Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction (PREKAD)           | WB             | 39.80/65                                     | 61% beneficiary disbursement             | Office of Monetization of Aid and Development Projects       | Reconstruction                        | Port au Prince               |
| Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction                    | UN             | 17.55/24.67                                  | 71% beneficiary disbursement             | UNDP, ILO, UNFPA, MPCE, MICT, MTPTC, CNIGS, IHSI             | Preparation for reconstruction        | Areas affected by earthquake |
| 16 neighbourhoods / 6 camps                                 | UN             | 28.63/30                                     | 95% beneficiary disbursement             | ILO, IOM, UNDP, UNOPS  | Reconstruction                        | Port au Prince               |
| Rebuilding of the Education System                          | IDB            | 6.08/10                                      | 32% beneficiary disbursement             | Ministry of Education, FAES, UCP, UTE                        | Basic education                       | National                     |
| Reduction of Risks and Disasters in the Southern Department | UN             | 8/8  | 31/08/12                                 | UNDP, WFP, FAO   | Agriculture, watersheds               | South                        |

The portfolio review was guided by the following proxy questions and variables (Table 2.2).

**Table 2.2 Portfolio review – Proxy questions and variables**

| Proxy questions   | Variables  |
|---|--|
| What are the general characteristics of the HRF portfolio?  | Project phases, state of the project, sector/type of support provided (technical assistance, strengthening of capacity, infrastructures, provision of basic services, community development, environmental protection, income generation, budgetary support, debris management, housing, etc.), average size of contributions, types of Implementing Agencies, geographic location of beneficiaries and Implementing Agencies, types of cooperation agreements, completion of projects within specified timeframes |
| Which types of outputs are produced by the HRF portfolio?   | Types of products and services obtained by HRF-funded projects   |
| To what extent have HRF-funded projects met their objectives?   | Types of results obtained that meet the HRF’s objectives   |
| Planning and approval phases: How does the HRF evaluate the quality of its projects?  | Description of a clear justification, project-selection logic, respective roles of HRF/Steering Committee/Government of Haiti, demonstration of the project-completion capacity of Implementing Agencies, the presence of M&E in the final reports of projects, content of budgets, reasonable diligence approach, project risks   |
| Project execution: Which management activities are carried out by HRF personnel during the execution of projects?                                     | Management activities of HRF personnel during project execution, preparation of reports by Implementing Agencies, availability of final reports, content of final reports, demonstration of project results  |
| Project-completion phase: When completed, Do HRF-funded projects suggest sufficient progress toward results and sufficient contributions to learning? | Demonstration of lessons learned, demonstration of evaluations conducted, attention given to results and sustainability  |

The results of the portfolio performance review informed the findings, the conclusions and the recommendations of this evaluation.

## 2.3 Data Analysis

The team of consultants analyzed and synthesized all of the information collected during the data-gathering phase.

Generally speaking, data analysis was based essentially on the data-triangulation technique, which consists of drawing upon two or more sources of information in order to validate a finding. Within the context of this evaluation, data triangulation was possible after a number of data analyses.

- **A descriptive analysis** was conducted in order to understand the contexts within which the HRF has operated in Haiti. This analysis mainly describes the processes and strategies of the HRF with respect to planning, implementation, monitoring, evaluation and reporting progress.
- **A content analysis** was also carried out. To some degree, this constitutes the core of a qualitative analysis, because the documents and notes related to the interviews were analyzed with a view to identifying recurring themes and shared trends for each evaluation area. The content analysis was also used to understand divergent views and opposing trends. Analysis of the issues and trends constituted the primary material for formulating preliminary observations, which were then refined and informed this report.
- **A quantitative/statistical analysis** was used to interpret the quantitative data, in particular the length of each step of the grant-approval process and the volume and financing share for each sector. This analysis was required in order to evaluate the mobilization and allocation of financing by the HRF, along with the length of each step of the financing approval process and to draw comparisons with comparable MDTFs.

Use of the triangulation technique reinforces the validity and credibility of the evaluation's conclusions through the convergence and overlapping of different methods.

## 2.4 Methodological Limits

No major obstacles were encountered in carrying out this evaluation. However, it should be noted that the profile of this evaluation remains more formative than summative in nature. It is limited in that independent external evaluations of the closed projects were not conducted at both mid-term and end-term. Therefore, the document review and especially the portfolio performance review were limited to the quarterly and end-of-project reports, which were prepared by the Implementing Agencies and the Partner Entities themselves and on occasion, to external evaluations during the project. Finally, in the absence of a midterm evaluation of the HRF's funded projects, which would have allowed for an analysis that was more focused on the results of the projects, there is no baseline and references for measuring the progress of projects still ongoing. These are the main constraints, which in large part guided the preparation of the sampling of projects provided in Universalialia's start-up evaluation.

### 3 Results of the Evaluation

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The third section of this report presents the main results of the evaluation. The following findings have been synthesized and systematically relate to one or more evaluation questions, as presented in the evaluation matrix (Appendix 3).

The structure of this section focuses on the HRF's four functions: mobilization of financing, allocation and management of this financing, governance and results. It also includes a fifth and final section on the Future of the HRF.

#### 3.1 Mobilization of Financing

**Finding 1: THE HRF has received 78% of the pledges made by donors at the United Nations conference in March 2010. Overall, the HRF has followed up on pledges made. However, these represent only 6% of all financing pledged specifically for reconstruction during the New York conference.**

During the March 2010 "Toward a New Future for Haiti" conference in New York, 55 donors made pledges to financially support Haiti<sup>6</sup>. 23 (42%) of these donors pledged to contribute to the HRF. The total value of pledges made during the conference for reconstruction was \$8.338 billion ("New York Conference Recovery Pledges"). This amount does not include pledges for humanitarian aid and debt relief. The total value of pledges made specifically by these 23 donors was \$2.432 billion, including \$495 million for the HRF<sup>7</sup>, or 20% of the pledges from these 23 countries. It should be noted that these pledges made to the HRF represent only 6% of the pledges made by all donors combined (\$495 million out of a total of \$8.338 billion) for reconstruction. Nineteen (19) countries actually entered into agreements with the HRF, representing a total amount of \$396.05 million, or 80% of pledges and the amount actually received by the HRF as at June 30, 2014 totaled \$386.05 million, which represents 78% of pledges<sup>8</sup>.

Therefore, the majority of countries have respected their pledges and some have surpassed them, including the United States, which pledged \$100 million and contributed \$125 million. The four countries that have not delivered on their pledges are Saudi Arabia (\$50 million), Qatar (\$20 million), the Republic of South Korea (\$10 million) and Georgia (\$50,000). However, Saudi Arabia did contribute to emergency aid via another channel and Qatar implemented its own mechanism. Colombia made a contribution that was significantly lower than its pledge (\$4 million compared to the \$30 million that was pledged). Spain must still contribute \$10 million in order to comply with the agreement signed with the Trustee.

The monitoring by the Trustee has been rigorous. The dates of signing of the agreements are available, as are the dates and amounts of the contributions that were actually made. The Secretariat of the HRF has not had to take many steps with donors in order to encourage them to respect their pledges (Figure 1). Follow-up with Colombia and South Korea has not borne fruit.


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<sup>6</sup> Source: International Assistance to Haiti, Key facts as of December 2012, Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti: [www.lessonsfromhaiti.org](http://www.lessonsfromhaiti.org)

<sup>7</sup> Source: HRF website, corrected. Norway had indicated a range between \$30 million and \$100 million. The evaluation considered a median amount of \$65 million for the purposes of this calculation: [www.haitireconstructionfund.org/fr](http://www.haitireconstructionfund.org/fr)

<sup>8</sup> Source: HRF 2013-2014 Annual Report

**Figure 1. Donors’ contributions and cumulative amount of financing for the HRF**



**Finding 2: There is no evidence that the HRF has contributed to mobilizing additional financial resources for Haiti in response to the earthquake. Instead, the traditional donors chose to divide their contribution between the HRF and their usual channels, reserving a larger share for these channels. Meanwhile, the HRF may have prompted some small “non-traditional donors” to contribute to financing Haiti’s reconstruction. It certainly facilitated the use of their contributions by offering them a practical and appealing tool. The HRF mobilized a proportion of contributions relatively similar to other MDTFs.**

Of the 23 countries that made pledges to the HRF during the New York conference, 11 are “traditional donors”, or members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and 12 are “non-traditional donors”, or non-members of the DAC of the OECD.

Table 3.1 presents the respective pledges and contributions of these two types of donors, along with the total amounts pledged.

<sup>9</sup> The eleven traditional donors to the HRF are Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Ireland, Japan, Norway, Peace and State Fund, Spain, Sweden and the United States of America.

<sup>10</sup> The twelve non-traditional donors to the HRF are Brazil, Colombia, Cyprus, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia and Thailand.

**Table 3.1 Pledged amounts by type of donor**

| Types of donors          | Total pledged amounts |      | Amounts pledged to HRF |     | Agreement amounts |     |
|--------------------------|-----------------------|------|------------------------|-----|-------------------|-----|
|                          | In \$ millions        | %    | In \$ millions         | %   | In \$ millions    | %   |
| “Traditional donors”     | 2,179                 | 89.5 | 325                    | 66  | 323               | 82  |
| “Non-traditional donors” | 253                   | 10.5 | 170                    | 34  | 73                | 18  |
| TOTAL                    | 2,432                 | 100  | 495                    | 100 | 396               | 100 |

During the New York conference, the 11 “traditional donors” pledged a total of \$2.179 billion<sup>11</sup> for Haiti, including \$325 million for the HRF, which represents 13% of their total pledges for Haiti. They actually entered into agreements with the HRF for a total of \$323 million, or 99% of the value of their pledges to the HRF.

The 12 “non-traditional donors” pledged a total of \$253 million, including \$170 million for the HRF, which represents 67%. They actually entered into agreements with the HRF for a total of \$73 million, or 43% of the value of their pledges to the HRF.

The amounts pledged to the HRF by the “traditional donors” and “non-traditional donors” represent 66 % and 34% of the total amounts pledged respectively. “Traditional donors” account for 82% of the amounts officially entered in the agreements, “non-traditional donors” for 18%. As for the total amounts pledged for reconstruction by the 23 donors, traditional donors account for 89.5%, non-traditional donors for 10.5%.

The total amount disbursed in Haiti from 2010 to 2012 by all traditional and non-traditional donors, including multilateral donors, totaled \$6.433 billion<sup>12</sup>. The total amount disbursed specifically for reconstruction during this same timeframe by the various types of donors was \$3.007 billion<sup>13</sup>. During this same period, the financing actually given to the HRF by the 19 contributors totaled \$381 million, which represents 6% of the total amount disbursed and 12.6% of the amounts specifically disbursed for reconstruction.

For instance, some countries like Cyprus, Oman or Nigeria have not their own international development agencies. However, contributions from these countries remain significantly less than those of “traditional donors”.

Among the “non-traditional donors”, Brazil occupies a privileged position, having pledged and contributed \$55 million to the HRF, or 20% of the amounts pledged by this group of countries and 75% of the total amounts they disbursed. The HRF is definitely an appealing channel for “non-traditional donors”, which do not always have all of the tools required to implement a major international cooperation program.

Many important donors who are present in Haiti have not contributed to the HRF. The European Union initially considered doing so, but after receiving internal legal opinions pertaining to the structure of the HRF, concluded that it was institutionally impossible to contribute. Other donors have abstained, deeming the HRF a “management mechanism that is heavy, complex and inappropriate”, as one of them told us. These donors have continued their programs on a strictly bilateral basis. The evaluation has no indication that either the HRF or the Government of Haiti has

<sup>11</sup> Source: International Assistance to Haiti, Key facts as of December 2012, Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti: [www.lessonsfromhaiti.org](http://www.lessonsfromhaiti.org)

<sup>12</sup> Source: *ibid*

<sup>13</sup> Source: *ibid*

negotiated with these non-contributing countries in order to try to persuade them or to make the HRF's mechanisms more acceptable to them.

During certain discussions between donors and the Haitian government prior to the implementation of the HRF, the possibility was raised of a \$100 million minimum contribution in order to be a member of the Steering Committee. In the case of the Aceh Fund, which served as a reference for the HRF's set-up, the minimum contribution was \$10 million. The amount was finally set at \$30 million. According to many people, this decision played a part in turning around the momentum that had been in the HRF's favour and in reducing contributions to the Fund made by many major donors.

Those interviewed in charge of the cooperation programs for a number of the countries could not clearly explain the rationale behind the amount pledged and/or given to the HRF, compared with the total amounts pledged and/or given to their programs in Haiti. It seems that the will existed to make a show of visible shared solidarity for Haiti after the earthquake. Many also thought it would serve as an instrument that would allow for quickly making financing available for reconstruction in a concerted manner, based on a model often used in the wake of a disaster. Here can be seen a sort of ambivalence among donors, who on the one hand wanted to stand with Haiti and on the other hand wished to essentially go on individually, identifying, their contributions and their achievements as clearly as possible.

It can be seen that the HRF had difficulty dealing with the situation described above and persuading donors to contribute more to the shared mechanism. However, in agreeing that donors could express preferences and link their financing to specific areas or projects, the HRF certainly caused itself problems. However, in some cases, this also enabled it to attract sources of financing that it would not likely have secured otherwise.

The HRF suffered from the poor coordination of donors in Haiti, as compared to the approaches in effect in other countries and this helps to explain the comparatively low contributions offered. The IHCR, which wanted to play part of this role, never really succeeded in doing so. Nor did the Government of Haiti, through the MPCE or the MEF. In addition, the donors' internal coordination mechanisms revealed their limits. There is no doubt that the government and the donors must share responsibility in this regard. Similarly, the G12, which is a group gathering the major technical and financial partners in Haiti, has resumed its operations through the organization of meetings on preparation and monitoring aligned with IHCR's meetings. The weaknesses of the IHCR could not have been compensated by the G12's dynamism. Besides, IHCR had belatedly developed a strategy document defining targets for priority sectors. This document should have been available earlier so as to guide the approval process for projects and encourage donors to work more consistently and oriented to priority targets.

Under the circumstances, many respondents – donors and members of the government – stated that the HRF, through its mechanisms and the Steering Committee in particular, played a positive coordinating role among donors and between donors and the government. However, the HRF was unable to exercise sufficient leadership to create momentum toward greater collaboration/coordination among donors. A number of respondents said that only the Government of Haiti was able to eventually drive such momentum by defining a clearer vision and clearer objectives for the HRF and insisting that it become a primary tool for the government.

Finally, it is in part thanks to the HRF that certain “non-traditional donors” were encouraged to contribute to Haiti's reconstruction. However, there is no evidence that the HRF contributed to increasing the contributions of traditional donors. These donors decided, on a rather undeclared basis, to divide their contribution between the HRF and their other channels, reserving a greater share for the other channels.



### **Comparison with other MDTFs constituted after conflicts or natural disasters with respect to the overall reconstruction process**

In the case of commitments made following the 2004 South Asian tsunami<sup>14</sup>, where donors pledged to disburse approximately \$9 billion between 2005 and 2009, 6% of total contributions were earmarked for the MDTF created for the purpose. This financing represented 15% of the contributions by bilateral and multilateral donors. In the case of the special Multi-Donor Trust Fund for East Timor, with a much lower value (\$177 million), the known value of the fund for the years 2000-2002 represented approximately half of the total contributions for reconstruction of East Timor during this same period. This difference can probably be explained by the fact that, in light of East Timor's new-state status, donors likely had better recourse to an MDTF in the absence of local diplomatic representations and a well-established government and given the fragile local institutions. Within the context of the Iraq Trust Fund, which was instituted in 2004 and comprised two entities (a World Bank trust fund and a UN trust fund), from commitments totaling \$25 billion between 2004 and 2007, close to 6% of total financing had been placed in the two funds in August 2006. In all three of these situations, observers aligned their contributions to match the capacity of trust entities to disburse the grants, which seems to have proven especially difficult – essentially for legal reasons – in the case both of Iraq and Indonesia.

#### **Finding 3: Barely two-and-a-half years after the fund was set up, HRF fund donors quickly demonstrated their intention to no longer contribute additional funds to the HRF.**

The HRF Operations Manual states that “the Haiti Reconstruction Fund came into effect upon the signing of the first Administration Agreement with Brazil on May 11, 2010”. It took no more than two-and-a-half years for all of the HRF's donors to formally decide to no longer mobilize financing for its benefit.

In February 2013<sup>15</sup>, the Program Manager prepared and presented the options available with respect to the future of the Fund namely: Option 1 – Mobilize more funds for the HRF; Option 2 – Continue with the present arrangement; and Option 3 – Move toward closing down the Fund. The Program Manager thought that this mobilization might involve not only donors around the table but also “those who have not yet discussed the possibility of additional contributions”. He also thought that “the donors were reluctant to give because \$119 million was still being held by the HRF”, but that henceforth, the HRF was “in a better position to mobilize more resources in the international community”. The Steering Committee chair, the Minister of Economy and Finances, contended that, up until now, “reconstruction has not really begun” and thus, “the Fund is justified as a financial instrument in a country such as Haiti, where it is very difficult to mobilize resources”. In light of this, the reaction of fund donors has been highly mitigated. The United States declared that it did not foresee “contributing additional funding”, because it had “other means of supporting Haiti's reconstruction” (and that it intended to increase its support more “ambitiously” through another MDTF in the health sector). Spain said it was “unlikely” that it would make other contributions before 2017. The World Bank pointed out that the HRF should be a “fungible fund”, but that the last two years had led to a different scenario, where “almost all of the main donors have requested financial reserves or specific preferences”. Japan wanted to “consult”, while Canada said that, “in its

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<sup>14</sup> The following analysis is based on a study conducted by Scanteam (Norway) in February 2007, “Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds”, Country Study Appendices, February 2007. Commissioned by the World Bank, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad), in cooperation with DFID and CIDA.

<sup>15</sup> Source: Minutes of the October 2013 Steering Committee meeting, pp. 11-13



current form, Canada does not foresee another investment in the Fund.” France openly wondered whether it was “necessary to have this institutional organization” (openly questioning the presence of multilateral institutions as Partner Entities – a situation that it attempted to change by proposing the French Development Agency as a Partner Entity). Finland, a minor donor, thought it necessary to “readapt (the Fund) according to the needs of reconstruction.” Within this context of skepticism and by virtue of the consensus rule, three states also contended that a midterm evaluation could not identify the results obtained so far and propose avenues for further action, so clear was it to them that the HRF would not have additional resources to continue its work.

The fact that, in early 2013, the Fund’s donors shared a relatively homogenous position with respect to the future of their financial commitments to the HRF – but for different reasons, namely governance, other opportunities, orientations – conveyed the message, as of that year, that the Fund’s sustainability was henceforth permanently in question.

**Finding 4: The HRF claims that it has had a “significant lever effect” on invested resources by attracting additional resources. The reality is less ideal and requires a readjustment of the positions proposed by the Fund.**

Within the context of their mobilization, whether for the purpose of participating in the decisions of the Steering Committee (which involves a \$30 million contribution) or because the Fund was seen as a timely, flexible and efficient “vehicle”, during the first months, some donors (Norway, Canada, France, USA, Spain) pledged to make additional contributions to those they initially made.

Soon afterwards, the HRF commented on its financial performance, stating in its latest annual report (2013-2014) that the “HRF has always been understood to be a *lever* to mobilize additional resources” in that “the projects financed by the HRF in general generate significant co-financing that, for the most part, translates into programs with a broader scope”. The previous reports made the same finding, pointing out that the HRF has been “a significant source of seed funding and has added value in leveraging co-financing from various other funding sources to support larger-scale projects.” In 2013-2014, the HRF estimated that, with a \$342.1 million contribution from the Fund, “the total amount mobilized by the projects concerned is evaluated at approximately \$744 million, which is a ratio of more than one US dollar in co-financing for each US dollar contributed by the HRF” (Table 3.2).

**Table 3.2 Co-financing with the HRF from 2010 to 2014**

| Project name   | HRF contribution (in \$ millions) | Total project cost (in \$ millions) | Co-financing (% of total project cost) |
|--|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--|
| IHRC Capacity Building Program                                     | 1.0                               | 1.0                                 | 0%                                     |
| Emergency Development Policy Operation Project (budgetary support) | 25.0                              | 55.0                                | 55%                                    |
| Debris management program  | 17.0                              | 17.0                                | 0%                                     |
| Disaster Risk Reduction in the Southern Department                 | 8.0                               | 11.0                                | 27%                                    |
| Southwest Haiti Sustainable Development Program                    | 8.0                               | 12.6                                | 36%                                    |
| Disaster Risk Reduction Capacity Building Program                  | 2.0                               | 2.0                                 | 0%                                     |
| Demolition and Debris Removal Using Heavy Machinery                | 25.0                              | 25.0                                | 0%                                     |

| Project name   | HRF contribution (in \$ millions) | Total project cost (in \$ millions) | Co-financing (% of total project cost) |
|--|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--|
| Establishment of a Partial Credit Guarantee Fund – RESTRUCTURED  | 12.5                              | 35.0                                | 64%                                    |
| Macaya National Park Environmental Protection  | 9.0                               | 12.4                                | 59%                                    |
| School Canteen Program   | 15.0                              | 15.0                                | 0%                                     |
| Port au Prince Neighborhood Housing Reconstruction Project   | 65.0                              | 65.0                                | 0%                                     |
| Housing Support Project  | 24.7                              | 30.8                                | 20%                                    |
| Seismic Risk Reduction Plan for Northern Haiti   | 10.0                              | 10.0                                | 0%                                     |
| Budgetary Support Program – Economic Reconstruction and Development Policy Subsidizing   | 10.0                              | 30.0                                | 50%                                    |
| 16 Neighborhoods/ 6 Camps  | 30.0                              | 79.0                                | 62%                                    |
| Development of Milk Production and Processing in Haiti   | 2.0                               | 2.0                                 | 0%                                     |
| Support for implementation of the 2010-2015 operational plan and for TVTE education reform in Haiti, rebuilding of the education sector, assistance in implementing the education system reform plan | 18.7                              | 250.0                               | 92%                                    |
| Institutional strengthening and reform of the transportation sector  | 7.0                               | 19.0                                | 63%                                    |
| Sustainable Energy in Haiti  | 2.0                               | 3.0                                 | 33%                                    |
| Institutional strengthening and reform of the water and sanitation Sector  | 14.0                              | 29.0                                | 51%                                    |
| Budgetary support program – education, water and sanitation  | 17.6                              | 17.6                                | 0%                                     |
| Institutional transformation and modernization program for the energy sector   | 2.0                               | 3.0                                 | 33%                                    |
| Péligne Transmission Line Project  | 16.0                              | 20.0                                | 20%                                    |
| Co-financing average   | 341.4                             | 744.4                               | 53%                                    |

The evaluation finds that the HRF presents an optimistic view of its additional funding mobilization activities – a view that prompts us to question whether the HRF has a “lever effect” or a simple intrinsic “co-financing” value.

- Semantic divergence:** The first divergence stems from the dimension of the word “mobilization”. The Fund’s Secretariat is not mandated to “mobilize” external funds, even though some more or less direct steps were taken in 2010-2011 to encourage certain donors to translate pledges made during the March 2010 New York conference into disbursements or to facilitate the disbursement of announced contributions. However, the Fund is not an investment fund and in this respect, it was not intended to “mobilize” new contributions.

- Of the three Partner Entities, it is clear that both the World Bank and the IDB had their own financing provided within the context of regular financing processes (through their head offices) or found themselves having to organize other announced contributions, the donors of which wanted them made through their financing channel (budgetary support processes). Locally, the Implementing Agencies of the United Nations System can also “mobilize” new resources among potential donors in order to co-finance certain of their activities, both at the head office and local levels. The fact remains that it was not *a priori* the HRF’s actions that “mobilize” additional resources, but rather, the individual or institutional actions of each of the Partner Entities or the donors themselves.
- Pre-allocated funds: All donors acknowledge that a certain number of contributions that serve to benefit the Fund constitute contributions already pledged by some of them, who deemed it timely to use the flexibility of the HRF channel to finalize commitments and actions that might have been more difficult to carry out through bilateral channels. While this is not a bad thing in itself, we cannot speak here of “additional fundraising” – because the funds already existed – but rather of co-financing, at most.
- Assessment errors: The third comment concerning the presentation of additional financing mobilization by the Partner Entities stems from the need to cross real information with hoped-for or projected information. Subject to new allocation decisions (Brazil’s \$40 million contribution and a possible \$10 million contribution by Spain) or own funds mobilized by the Partner Entities, some projects will simply not have the budget that was projected in the HRF’s calculations:
  - Based on interviews with FAO officials, it seems clear enough that the “ Development of Milk Production and Processing in Haiti” project will not generate the additional \$16 million required and presented as fundraising<sup>16</sup>;
  - Even though the HRF was the first entity to quickly support the “16/6” project, a reading of the real vs. hoped-for financing related to the 16 Neighbourhoods/6 Camps project suggests that the project will be unable to fill the “financial gap”, which represents \$49 million in hoped-for co-financing. The project summary (2013-2014 Report) identifies \$21.5 million in fundraising (Canada, South Korea) over and above the \$30 million from the HRF. The shortfall cannot be presented as “additional fundraising” or co-financing. Rather, it is an objective that, by all current indications, will not be met;
  - The Partial Credit Guarantee Fund (IDB): Over a three-year period following the earthquake, the Partial Credit Guarantee Fund (FGCP) served as a priority support program for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs). Because the quake’s effect on Haiti’s financial system was less than projected, as of August 2012, it was deemed that “businesses recuperated quicker ,and consequently the uptake from the PCGF was less.” Haitian officials also told the evaluation that the banks’ unwillingness to commit to corporate loans might also explain this absence of lending commitment. Accordingly, the IDB sought to transform the Fund into a new Business Development Service (BDS) in the new amount of \$5 million and a new “operation under development” with the goal of “channeling public funds to support the private investments” in question. The representation of \$64 million in additional fundraising for an as-yet undefined project constitutes an overrepresentation that does not reflect the HRF’s present reality. The presentation of a \$95 million project amount also appears to be unrealistic;

<sup>16</sup> Source: 2011-2012 and 2012-2013 Annual Reports

- On the other hand, there seems to be at least one contradiction between the presentation of the total project cost and the cost presented in the project summary. The Institutional Transformation and Modernization Program of the Energy Sector project is presented as costing \$15 million, counting on a \$12 million contribution from the IDB, while the co-financing is reported at only \$3 million (Table 3.2).

In summary, in certain cases, HRF funds have made up additional funds and not the opposite. A final illustrative example is that of the \$9 million commitment for the Macaya Park Protection project. These funds ostensibly led to the mobilization of an additional \$3.4 million. In fact, the \$9 million was added to already-available funds.

These considerations suggest that, in order for the parties concerned to have an updated view and understanding of the real or supposed commitments of the Fund's activities, it would have been useful for the HRF Secretariat to be able to clearly report the following in the financing mobilization tables:

- The *confirmed* contributions from the Partner Entities (WB, IDB);
- Updating of contributions lost or amended budgets.

This would allow for updating of: a) the budgets for projects underway; b) the HRF's "lever effect"; and c) the reality of the co-financing of projects undertaken by the HRF.

### 3.2 Allocation and management of financing

**Finding 5: Donors' preferencing for the allocation of their contributions has run counter to the HRF's basic principle of national ownership, reduced the Fund's flexibility and contributed to tying up financing. This practice varies among MDTFs. For example, the Aceh Fund in Indonesia did not accept preferencing, while funds implemented in Iraq did.**

Eight (8) out of nineteen (19) HRF donors, including the seven largest donors – members of the Steering Committee – expressed complete or partial preferences with respect to the allocation of their financing. Eighty percent (80%) of the financing received by the HRF as at June 30, 2014 had been targeted by the donors. Some financing was earmarked for a specific project, such as the building of a hydroelectric plant for Brazil, while other financing was simply designated for investment sectors, leaving the HRF and the Partner Entities a certain degree of manoeuvring room.

The evaluation finds that the preferencing situation generated negative consequences, in particular weak ownership of the Fund by the government, dispersal of investments and less flexibility in allocating financing.

Total contributions received by the HRF as at June 30, 2014 totaled \$386.05 million, of which \$309.12 million (80%) involved preferencing (Table 3.2). Total contributions received from the eight donors that expressed complete or partial preferences amounted to \$353.89 million, of which \$309.12 million (87%) was earmarked.

The HRF was set up with nothing stated about donors being able to express preferences as to the use of their contributions. The Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti (PARDH), which proposed setting up the HRF, says nothing in this regard: "[The HRF] is a facility that makes it possible to assemble funds for programmes whose scale exceeds the capacities of a single donor. It is ultimately a mechanism that should in principle make it easier to co-ordinate external aid [...]"<sup>17</sup>. When questioned, a number of individuals who actively participated in creating

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<sup>17</sup> Source: Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti, p. 55, Section 7.2.

the HRF confirmed that the possibility of preferencing was not envisioned at the Fund's inception.

Nevertheless, a number of donors soon expressed preferences, either formally or informally. A letter dated June 17, 2010 from the Government of Norway to the HRF's Steering Committee stipulates: "The Norwegian Government wishes to state its interest in seeing the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF) support programmes within environment, agricultural development and disaster risk management with a focus on the South Department [...]"<sup>18</sup>. In a letter dated October 6, 2010, France states its preference for budgetary support for a portion of its contribution<sup>19</sup>. Brazil followed with a letter dated October 8, 2010, specifying it wished its contribution to be allocated to a hydroelectric project<sup>20</sup>. The amount of \$40 million was set aside to this effect. For its part, in a letter dated November 15, 2010, the United States expresses its preference for use of its \$125 million contribution in five different areas: "*\$65 million for housing reconstruction [...], \$25 million for debris removal [...], \$12.5 million to the IDB for its Partial Credit Guarantee Fund [...], \$10 million in support of IDB's Haiti Education reform plan [...] and up to \$12.5 million [...] against budget support line items*"<sup>21</sup>. One after another, the seven largest donors that contributed more than \$30 million expressed complete or partial preferences.

By comparison, the Aceh Fund in Indonesia did not accept preferencing. On the other hand, the MDTF in Iraq accepted preferencing: 89% of the amounts allocated to the UN-managed fund involved preferencing, as did 6% of the World Bank-managed fund.

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<sup>18</sup> Source: Appendix 3 of the Steering Committee Meeting 1/2010 Minutes

<sup>19</sup> Source: Appendix 3 of the Steering Committee Meeting 3/2010 Minutes

<sup>20</sup> Source: Appendix 4 of the Steering Committee Meeting 3/2010 Minutes

<sup>21</sup> Source: Appendix 5 of the Steering Committee Meeting 3/2010 Minutes

**Table 3.3 Overview of Donors' Preferences as at June 30, 2014<sup>22</sup>**

| Donor   | Total contributions (in \$ millions) | Contribution with preference (in \$ millions) | Contribution without preference (in \$ millions) | Preference details   | Preferred projects  |
|---------|--------------------------------------|---|--|--|---|
| Brazil  | 55.00                                | 55.00   | -  | Budgetary support (\$15 million)<br>Artibonite 4C dam (\$40 million)                       | Emergency Development Policy Operation (\$25 million)<br>Financial reserve for health projects – vocational training and agriculture, under development (\$40 million)  |
| Canada  | 45.50                                | 15.00   | 30.50  | Earmarked budgetary support – Education and agriculture (\$15 million)                     | School Canteen education project (\$15 million)   |
| Finland | 1.84                                 | 1.84  | -  | Earmarked budgetary support – Teacher salaries (\$920,000)<br>Education sector (\$920,000) | School Canteen education project (\$15 million)<br>Education sector reconstruction (\$10 million)   |
| France  | 32.28                                | 32.28   | -  | Budgetary support (\$28.57 million)<br>Education (\$3.79 million)                          | Emergency Development Policy Operation (\$25 million)<br>Support for implementation of the Education Plan and Reform in Haiti (\$5 million)<br>Budgetary support: Education / Water and Sanitation (\$17.6 million)<br>Budgetary support: Transportation (\$7 million); Water and Sanitation (\$14 million) |

<sup>22</sup> Source: Table provided to the evaluation team by the Secretariat of the HRF

| Donor  | Total contributions (in \$ millions) | Contribution with preference (in \$ millions) | Contribution without preference (in \$ millions) | Preference details  | Preferred projects  |
|--------|--------------------------------------|---|--|---|---|
| Japan  | 30.00                                | 30.00   | -  | Education and Capacity development (\$15 million)<br>Health and Medical Care, Food and Agriculture, Debris Removal (\$15 million) | Education sector rebuilding (\$10 million)<br>Support for implementation of the Education Plan and Reform in Haiti (\$5 million)<br>Development of Milk Production and Processing in Haiti (\$2 million)<br>School Canteen education project (\$15 million)<br>IHRC Capacity- Building Program (\$1 million)<br>Demolition and removal of debris with heavy machinery (\$25 million)<br>Debris Management Project (\$16.95 million) |
| Norway | 44.27                                | 30.00   | 14.27  | Support for Southwestern Haiti (\$15 million)<br>Budgetary support (\$15 million)   | Disaster Risk Reduction in the South department (\$8 million)<br>Natural Disaster Mitigation in the South Department (\$14 million), restructured<br>Southwest Haiti Sustainable Development Programme (\$8 million)<br>Emergency Development Policy Operation (\$25 million)   |
| Spain  | 30.00                                | 20.00   | 10.00  | Budgetary support (\$20 million)  | Budgetary support (\$10 million)<br>Education/Water and Sanitation budgetary support (\$17.6 million)<br>Transportation (\$7 million) and Water/Sanitation (\$14 million) budgetary support   |

Evaluation of the Haiti Reconstruction Fund

| Donor                   | Total contributions (in \$ millions) | Contribution with preference (in \$ millions) | Contribution without preference (in \$ millions) | Preference details   | Preferred projects  |
|-------------------------|--------------------------------------|---|--|--|---|
| United States           | 125.00                               | 125.00  | -  | Housing reconstruction (\$65 million)<br>Debris (\$25 million)<br>Partial Credit Guarantee Fund (\$12.5 million)<br>Education reform (\$10 million)<br>Energy (\$12.5 million) | Port-au-Prince Neighborhood Housing Reconstruction Project (\$65 million)<br>Demolition and removal of debris with heavy machinery (\$25 million)<br>Program to Establish a Partial Credit Guarantee Fund, restructured (\$12.5 million)<br>Education sector rebuilding (\$10 million)<br>Financial reserve for an energy sector project (\$12.5 million) |
| Equivalent dollar total | 363.89                               | 309.12  | 54.77  |  |   |



## Reasons for preferencing

There are many reasons for donors to specify preferences. For example, the United States is bound by internal statutes and regulations to specify which sectors its contribution is for. In the case of other countries, such as Norway, development support sectors were already planned for before start-up of the HRF. However, according to the evaluation of the Norway Agency for Development Cooperation in Haiti, Norway did wish to contribute to the HRF in order to share its viewpoints on reconstruction and development in Haiti in general: “Influencing the effectiveness of international aid to Haiti was a key ambition.”<sup>23</sup> Other nations, such as France and Spain, were concerned about the precarious state of Haiti’s finances after the earthquake and desired continuation of essential state services. Therefore, they wanted part of their contribution to go to budgetary support. In other cases, the comments received indicate that the donors wished to be clearly identified with specific projects, apparently for reasons of visibility and accountability both in Haiti and at home. This was true for Brazil, which set aside \$40 million for development of the Artibonite 4C dam project. It was also true for Canada, which earmarked \$15 million of its \$45.5 contribution for the School Canteen project after considering education sectoral budgetary support, which proved impossible to carry out.

Preferencing was facilitated by the fact that the HRF did not have specific priorities. It was based on the PARDH, which comprises a wide range of priorities covered by the Rebuilding Haiti concept: “We will rebuild Haiti by turning the disaster on January 12, 2010 into an opportunity to make it an emerging country by 2030.”<sup>24</sup> However laudable this intention, it opened the door to numerous development support projects in general without necessarily being closely linked to post-earthquake reconstruction. This is especially true because the government had not developed a specific reconstruction strategy and neither the IHRC nor the HRF had conducted its own prioritization exercise.

## Positive aspects of preferencing

The first positive aspect of preferencing is that the HRF apparently received more funds than it would have if it had prohibited this operating method. For example, because it is bound by statutes and regulations to specify which sectors its contribution is for, the United States would likely not have contributed to the HRF otherwise. Secondly, this earmarking of financing had the effect of reassuring the donor country’s population that the funds were being used properly. Thirdly, it eventually allowed donors to begin supporting a sector with a view to a long-term commitment in areas in which they have specific expertise or where they hope to achieve significant synergies with their ongoing programs. This is true of Norway, with its Southwest environmental protection program. It is also probably true of Brazil favouring the hydroelectric production sector (this initiative proved impossible), Spain in water and sanitation and France in vocational teaching.

## Negative aspects of preferencing

The main negative aspects of preferencing are: (1) weak ownership by the Government of Haiti, (2) dispersal of investments and (3) problems for the HRF and the Partner Entities in terms of using funds promptly.

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<sup>23</sup> Source: Evaluation of Norway’s support to Haiti after the 2010 earthquake. p. 30. Section 4.2.3.

<sup>24</sup> Source: Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti, p. 8, Section 3.

- The Government of Haiti, through the resolutions of the Council of Ministers, formally approved all of the projects presented to the Steering Committee<sup>25</sup>. In addition, given the presence of two government representatives on the SC, it also approved fund granting by the HRF to the projects presented to the extent that the committee functioned on a consensus basis. Nevertheless, the relevant government bodies did not really take the initiative in most projects. In most cases, the donors and the Partner Entities, together or in cooperation with one another, identified the projects and negotiated them with the sectoral ministries and the IHRC and/or the MPCE. This method did not favour ownership of the mechanism by the GoH. The government likely could and should have exercised stronger leadership. Perhaps it did not because the HRF represented only approximately 6% of the combined pledges made by the donors and it may have seen the issue of owning the HRF as secondary. Moreover, some earmarking of funds also reflected certain donors' desire to respect existing agreements with the government.
- As mentioned, the HRF financed a wide range of projects related to donors' diverse priorities. This created a vast sectoral and even geographical dispersal of investments. Without preferencing, or with reduced preferencing, the HRF could have funded more targeted, strategic and coherent initiatives with more interconnected synergies, at least if the GoH and the Steering Committee had resolved from the outset to identify more specific priorities, rather than simply referencing the range of choices represented by the PARDH.
- Preferencing also caused important undue delays in the use of certain funds. The most glaring example is the financing from Brazil, whose contribution was largely earmarked for an investment in hydroelectric production. Unfortunately, this investment proved impossible and the funds have yet to be used, even though Brazil's contribution was the first received by the HRF in 2010. Many other examples of lesser scope have been brought to our attention. Therefore, it has been impossible to finance various projects identified as highly relevant by the Steering Committee. The required funds existed, but were put aside, as in the case of the Canaan-Jerusalem project, additional funding for the 16/6 project, etc.

In short, the strong preferences expressed by donors have contravened, in whole or in part, certain principles that should guide the HRF: (1) The government's leadership has been partially undermined; (2) The strategic financing sought, although present in some cases (debris, housing), has not been systematically obtained; (3) Implementation speed has been reduced and funds that should have been promptly used for urgent needs have remained blocked.

There have often been objections raised with respect to donors' earmarking of their funds during Steering Committee meetings. For example, during the fourth Steering Committee meeting on December 15, 2010, the Minister of Economy and Finance and Committee Chairperson issued this appeal to donors: "The Chairperson explained that he understood the Brazilian position, but with many donors preferencing their contributions, the IHRC and HRF were merely functioning as pass-through window. If funds were non-preferenced, they could be used by the IHRC for the most urgent priority activities. The Chairperson confirmed that [...] it was decided that a letter signed by the Chairperson of the Fund and the Co-chairs of the IHRC addressing the preferencing issue would be sent to donors and that the Prime Minister intended to talk to donors [...]"<sup>26</sup>. During the fifth SC meeting on March 1, 2011, the World Bank representative "made an appeal to donors to make their contributions in the spirit of a Multi-donor Trust Fund without preferences in order to take

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<sup>25</sup> The grant approval step by the Council of Ministers was adopted in the new HRF grant approval process, in which the MPCE is the new governmental counterpart. At the time of the IHRC, the Council of Ministers was not involved in this process.

<sup>26</sup> Source: Minutes of the 4/2010 Steering Committee meeting, p. 2.

advantage of the flexibility of a multi-donor Trust Fund to allocate funds to priorities identified by the government.”<sup>27</sup> During the ninth SC meeting in February 2013, the World Bank representative added, “this Fund could finance Government priority projects that were not programmed by the bilateral donors. The Fund was also meant to be flexible and not destined for specific projects. The Representative suggested that the SC keep in mind the multilateral character and country ownership principles of the Fund.”<sup>28</sup> Despite these appeals and many others by the GoH and Partner Entities, most donors have continued to specify preferences and maintain those they expressed at the outset of the HRF.

The evaluation adopted this conclusion of the evaluation of Norway’s program: “The overall consensus is that international aid to Haiti was extraordinarily uncoordinated, biased by national interests of big donors, with limited impact overall despite a huge amount of funding.”<sup>29</sup>

A high-ranking Haitian representative echoed this conclusion in a subtle and colorful way, using this Creole proverb: “Kabrit ki gen ampil met mouri lan kod.”<sup>30</sup>

**Finding 6: HRF-financed projects come under the four ‘rebuilding’ themes defined by the Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti. However, because this plan has a wide range of objectives, HRF-financed projects are also highly diversified, if not scattered.**

The HRF’s Operations Manual states that the HRF’s role is to support initiatives in keeping with the March 2010 Action Plan for the Recovery and Development of Haiti (PARDH) that was presented during the New York conference. This document presents a vision and guidelines for rebuilding Haiti. This plan comprises four major programs, or “worksites”: territorial rebuilding, economic rebuilding, social rebuilding and institutional rebuilding. The table below compares the breakdown of the PARDH’s planned budgets and the breakdown of HRF funding (Table 3.4).

**Table 3.4 PARDH budgets for the first 18 months and breakdown of HRF funding at June 30, 2014**

|                          | PARDH budget, first 18 months <sup>31</sup> |     | HRF allocated amounts <sup>32</sup> |     |
|--------------------------|---|-----|-------------------------------------|-----|
|                          | In \$ millions                              | %   | In \$ millions                      | %   |
| Territorial rebuilding   | 1329  | 26  | 103.60                              | 30  |
| Economic rebuilding      | 817   | 16  | 32.50                               | 9   |
| Social rebuilding        | 2125  | 42  | 128.70                              | 38  |
| Institutional rebuilding | 782   | 15  | 77.58                               | 23  |
| TOTAL                    | 5053  | 100 | 342.38                              | 100 |

Forms of budget support are listed under Institutional Rebuilding, because they are general in nature, even though they have sectoral performance indicators. The 16/6 and PREKAD projects are listed under Social Rebuilding, in keeping with the subdivisions indicated in the PARDH, while the

<sup>27</sup> Source: Minutes of the 5/2011 Steering Committee meeting, p. 4.

<sup>28</sup> Source: Minutes of the 9/2013 Steering Committee meeting, p. 5.

<sup>29</sup> Source: Evaluation of Norway’s support to Haiti after the 2010 earthquake. December 2014. p.xx.

<sup>30</sup> Liberal translation: “A goat with many masters dies at the end of its rope.”

<sup>31</sup> Source: Data from Action Plan for the Recovery and Development of Haiti

<sup>32</sup> Source: Data from the HRF 2013-2014 Annual Report

Debris and PARLQ projects are listed under Territorial Rebuilding. In its reports, the HRF Secretariat has adopted a different classification of projects by sector, as follows<sup>33</sup> (Table 3.5).

**Table 3.5 Amount and share of HRF financing by sector as at June 30, 2014**

| Sector  | Allocated amounts (in \$) | %   | Geographical location  |
|---|---------------------------|-----|--|
| Housing, debris, disaster management / prevention | 182.58                    | 53  | Seismic zone: North Department (Prevention) and South Department |
| Budget support                                    | 73.58                     | 22  | National   |
| Education   | 33.70                     | 10  | National   |
| Energy  | 21.02                     | 6   | National   |
| Environment                                       | 17                        | 5   | Southwest Department   |
| Other sectors                                     | 14.5                      | 4   | Other  |
| TOTAL   | 342.38                    | 100 |  |

All HRF-funded projects comply with the PARDH's orientations. This is not surprising, because the PARDH comprises a wide range of sectors and the HRF did not conduct a thematic prioritization. The HRF-funding breakdown does not differ significantly from the breakdown of the PARDH's forecasts. However, a substantially lower proportion of the HRF's budget is set aside for Economic Rebuilding and a higher proportion is set aside for Institutional Rebuilding. This last finding stems from the fact that we have listed budget support under this category, which may be debatable.

According to the HRF's classification, 53% of funds have gone toward projects directly related to the consequences of the earthquake. However, this amount includes the Disaster Risk Reduction in the South Department project (\$8 million), which is actually a classic environmental protection project. If this project is excluded, 51% of funding has gone toward this priority and the remaining 49% toward other priorities.

The HRF has responded in part to critical needs, especially concerning debris removal and transformation and in part to housing issues. Few donors were interested in financing debris processing. In fact, there has been no co-financing for the two Debris projects. Therefore, the HRF has responded to an urgent, critical need. With respect to housing, there remain critical non-financed needs, as well as consolidation needs concerning improved sustainability of actions undertaken in disadvantaged neighborhoods by the 16/6 and PREKAD projects (see findings related to results). The relevance of funding less than half of the 16/6 project's budget is questionable with respect to the critical needs in this area. The seventh Steering Committee meeting on July 22, 2011 recognized the soundness of this project and its budget totaling \$90 million.

In terms of geographical breakdown, the majority of funding has gone to the seismic zone. The Southwest Department has also been supported in environmental protection, while the North Department has received risk-reduction and prevention support. 42% of HRF amounts cannot be specifically allocated to a particular region. The PARDH did not comprise a geographical breakdown and the HRF has not formally determined geographical priorities, notwithstanding that a significant portion (22%) of its funding comes under budgetary support, making geographical focusing nearly impossible.

<sup>33</sup> Source: HRF 2013-2014 Annual Report


At the outset, the GoH did not develop a precise policy and specific strategies with respect to strictly post-earthquake reconstruction: resettlement, the land question, development of new and existing neighborhoods, etc. Therefore, there was much trial and error on the part of various actors and many policies and strategies were developed by government bodies supported by HRF-approved projects, particularly with respect to the following projects: Debris, PARLQ, 16/6 and PREKAD: National Debris Management Strategy, National Housing and Habitat Policy (October 2013), etc.

**Finding 7: Overall, the grant approval process has proven efficient, even though there have been significant delays related to disbursements by the Partner Entities to their Implementing Agencies. The HRF compares favourably to other MDTFs in the efficiency of the contribution approval process.**

### Approval process

The general grant approval process has been efficient in that timeframes for deciding on the allocation of initial resources by the Steering Committee are in keeping with the performance standards set out in the Operations Manual. Figure 2 depicts the main stages of the HRF’s operational cycle<sup>34</sup>.

**Figure 2. HRF grant approval process<sup>35</sup>**



<sup>34</sup> Source: As indicated in the minutes of the 12<sup>th</sup> Steering Committee meeting, the relevant performance standards were set by the MPCE with the support of the Secretariat. In addition, the HRF grant approval process was aligned with the process for reviewing MPCE projects in order to facilitate smooth processing of funding requests.

<sup>35</sup> Source: Figure excerpted from the 2012-2013 HRF Annual Report.

As indicated in the minutes of the May 2014 Steering Committee meeting, the average processing time from submission of a Project Concept Note to the HRF by the Government of Haiti to the transfer of funds by the Trustee to the Partner Entity is estimated at 115 days <sup>36</sup> (Table 3.6).

**Table 3.6 Actual timeframe for each step of the funding approval process and related performance standards**


| Required steps/actions   | In charge                                     | Performance standards                                      | Planned timeframe    | Actual timeframe |
|--|---|--|----------------------|------------------|
| Approval of Concept Note   | MPCE, Prime Minister and Council of Ministers | 10 working days  | 10 days              | 9.1 days         |
| Preparation of Final Project Document by Partner Entity            | Partner Entity                                | Standards of Partner Entity, Implementing Agency and GoH   | No planned timeframe | 60 days          |
| Approval of Final Project Document by IHRC/MPCE                    | IHRC/MPCE                                     | 5 working days   | 5 days               | 6.4 days         |
| Approval of Final Project Document by HRF Steering Committee       | Steering Committee                            | 10 working days after receipt of completed proposal        | 10 days              | 8.3 days         |
| Timeframe between final approval and request for transfer of funds | Steering Committee and Partner Entity         | Standards of GoH and Partner Entity                        | No planned date      | 27.8 days        |
| Transfer of funds by Trustee to Partner Entity                     | Trustee                                       | 10 working days after grant decision by Steering Committee | 10 days              | 4.6 days         |
| Total processing timeframe   |   | Respective standards of actors involved                    | No planned timeframe | 115.4 days       |

It should be noted that the approval process varies significantly from one project to another. The timeframe for the IHRC Capacity Building Program was 11 days, while the Milk Production and Processing Project timeframe was 258 days (Figure 3). This delay seems to have resulted from an internal difference between the MPCE and the project's Implementing Agency: (the FAO).

<sup>36</sup> This average includes only the 18 projects for which all of the steps had been completed as of May 22, 2014. Therefore, it does not include the 4 projects approved by the Steering Committee in May and June 2014, because funds for those projects were transferred to the Partner Entity after May 22, 2014.



**Figure 3. Timeframe for each step of approval process by project (in days)**



According to the operational cycle of the activities financed by the Haiti Reconstruction Fund, as presented in the Operations Manual, the performance standards set for the transfer of funds to the Partner Entities call for a 10-day timeframe, beginning with the Steering Committee’s decision to allocate the initial resources to the approved project.

The average timeframe for transfer of funds by the Trustee to the Partner Entities for the 22 projects approved by the Steering Committee as at June 30, 2014 was 3.8 days. Of these 22 projects, the transfer of funds by the Trustee to the Partner Entities took place within the set timeframe in 21 cases (Figure 4). Among these 21 projects, the transfer timeframe varied from 0 days for the Port-au-Prince Neighborhood Housing Reconstruction Project (PREKAD) to 7 days for the Strategy for Rebuilding the Education System and the Demolition and Debris Removal with Heavy Machinery project (Debris II).

In other words, the Trustee complied with the performance standards set out in the Operations Manual for all HRF-funded projects, with the exception of 16 Neighborhoods/6 Camps, which involved a 13-day timeframe, or 3 days above the set maximum. This slight delay is explained by the employees’ vacation period.

With respect to the timeframe for preparation of the final project document, the Operations Manual sets no maximum timeframe for compliance with performance standards. However, it is interesting to note that the average timeframe recorded for all HRF-funded projects combined is approximately 60 days. Certain projects, such as the IHRC Capacity Rebuilding Program, required 0 days to prepare this document. Conversely, the Milk Production and Processing Project required 234 days (Figure 5).

By comparison, the Partner Entities have required a varying number of days to prepare the project document. The average timeframe for preparation of documents for projects headed by the United Nations is approximately 72 days, 14 days for the World Bank and 47 days for the Inter-American Development Bank.

Figure 4. Timeframe for transfer of funds by Trustee to Partner Entities (in days)








Figure 5. Timeframe for preparation of final project document by project (in days)



**Figure 6. Average timeframe for preparation of final project documents for each Partner Entity (in days)**



The Operations Manual stipulates that the HRF Steering Committee has a maximum of 10 working days from receipt of the complete project proposal to make a grant decision. As indicated in Table 3.6, the average approval timeframe was 8.3 days for the 17 projects approved by the SC as at June 30, 2014. Of these 17 projects, 12 complied with the established timeframe, requiring between 1 and 10 days. The 5 projects that did not comply exceeded the timeframe by a total of no more than 12 days.

### **Comparing the HRF to other funds in terms of rapidity of approval of projects**

In every case, the HRF appears to compare favorably to other funds in terms of the efficiency of the funding approval process. File processing statistics indicate an average time of 82 days between approval of the Concept Note and approval of the final project document by the IHRC (even less time since the disappearance of the latter). In the case of the tsunami, it took an average of 11 days before project agreements were signed. In Sudan, the estimated average time between project design and disbursement of funds to the Implementing Agencies was 18 months, with the slow process being explained by complex bank procedures and the government's lack of familiarity with these procedures. In the case of East Timor, project approval should have taken five weeks, but the average time was actually 3.8 months. In Iraq, the project approval process time was 8 to 10 months.

In terms of disbursement, the time between final approval and the request for transfer of funds followed by the transfer of funds by the Trustee to the Partner Entity took the HRF slightly more than 30 days on average (31.2). In the case of the tsunami, the process is estimated to have averaged 29 days. By contrast, disbursements in both in Sudan and Iraq are deemed to have been made slowly, even though observers rated the performance of the United Nations agencies clearly superior to that of the World Bank. One explanation for this discrepancy in performance is that the UN funds did not depend on the public sector for their disbursement and went directly to national and international firms, consultants and NGOs. Also, the Implementing Agencies were able to follow their own rules and procedures, thereby minimizing red tape.

A comparative analysis is limited by the nature of the complex situations that arose in each of the cases mentioned. However, in simply analyzing certain objective and measurable criteria pertaining to the rapidity of approval, it seems clear that the HRF compares favorably to other funds involving similar situations.

### **Disbursement by the Partner Entities to the Implementing Agencies**

Going beyond the HRF funding approval process as strictly defined in the Operations Manual, it should be noted that the transfer by the Partner Entity to Implementing Agencies has required an average of 33 days for the UN, 507 days for the IDB and 524 days for the WB (apart from budget support).

For the UNDG Partner Entity, the Implementing Agencies are specialized agencies of the United Nations. For the World Bank and IDB Partner Entities, they are relevant government bodies. The UN agencies and government bodies call upon "Delegated Implementing Agencies", which may be government institutions, national and international NGOs or private firms.

Table 3.7 illustrates the time needed to transfer funds between the Partner Entities and the Implementing Agencies for each HRF-financed project.

**Table 3.7 Timeframe for funds transfer between Partner Entities and Implementing Agencies<sup>37</sup>**

| Project name   | Partner Entity | Date of transfer by Trustee to Partner Entity | Date of first transfer by Partner Entity to Implementing Agency | Number of days |
|--|----------------|---|---|----------------|
| 16 Neighborhoods/6 Camps   | UNDP           | 2011-09-20                                    | 2011-09-22  | 2              |
| Earthquake Prevention Plan for the North of Haiti                                      | UNDP           | 2011-06-06                                    | 2011-06-10  | 4              |
| Housing and Neighborhood Reconstruction Project  | UNDP           | 2011-07-28                                    | 2011-08-01  | 4              |
| Institutional rebuilding – Economic Reconstruction and Growth Development Policy Grant | WB             | 2013-09-25                                    | 2013-09-30  | 5              |
| Debris Management Project  | UNDP           | 2010-12-02                                    | 2010-12-17  | 5              |
| Disaster Risk Reduction in the South Department  | UNDP           | 2011-01-20                                    | 2011-01-25  | 5              |
| Disaster Risk Management Capacity Building Program                                     | UNDP           | 2011-02-13                                    | 2011-02-28  | 15             |
| Development of Milk Production and Processing in Haiti                                 | UNDP           | 2011-11-04                                    | 2011-12-07  | 33             |
| Southwest Haiti Sustainable Development Programme                                      | UNDP           | 2011-02-13                                    | 2011-03-25  | 40             |
| Demolition and Debris Removal with Heavy Equipment                                     | UNDP           | 2011-04-18                                    | 2011-06-28  | 71             |
| IHRC Capacity Building Program   | UNDP           | 2011-04-08                                    | 2011-10-03  | 150            |
| TVTE Education Project   | IDB            | 2012-02-02                                    | 2012-11-19  | 290            |
| Education Sector Rebuilding  | IDB            | 2011-06-13                                    | 2012-05-02  | 323            |
| Port-au-Prince Neighborhood Housing Reconstruction Project                             | WB             | 2011-03-31                                    | 2012-09-07  | 524            |
| Natural Disaster Mitigation in the South Department                                    | IDB            | 2011-03-02                                    | 2013-08-28  | 909            |
| Program to Establish a Partial Credit Guarantee Fund                                   | IDB            | 2010-12-14                                    | Not started   | -              |
| Support for the Implementation of the Education Plan and Reform in Haiti               | IDB            | 2013-12-17                                    | Not started   | -              |
| Haiti Emergency Development Policy Operation   | WB             | 2010-08-03                                    | Not available   | -              |

<sup>37</sup> The evaluation calculated the timeframes for the transfer of funds between the Partner Entities and the Implementing Agencies for the initial disbursement marking the official start of the project. This calculation has been made for the projects approved by December 31, 2013. The same exercise was not possible for later timeframes for the transfer of funds between the Implementing Agencies and the Delegated Implementing Agencies and the start-up of activities for these agencies.

For the United Nations, the average timeframe for a transfer from its UNDG Trustee to its specialized agencies for its 10 projects is 33 days, with a maximum of 150 days and a minimum of 2 days.

For the IDB, the average timeframe is 507 days for the three ongoing projects, with a maximum of 909 days (the initial Natural Disaster Mitigation in the South Department project restructured into three new projects, one of which has begun – the Energy Sector Modernization Project) and a minimum of 290 days. Two other projects for which funds have been transferred from the HRF Trustee to the IDB have not started up. The first – the Credit Guarantee Fund, which was approved in December 2010 and for which funds were transferred to the IDB that same month – is being restructured. The second was the TVTE Education Project, for which funds were transferred to the IDB in December 2013.

As for the World Bank, apart from the two budget support projects, only one project is ongoing: the Port-au-Prince Neighborhood Housing Reconstruction Project (PREKAD). The timeframe between the transfer of funds by the Trustee to the WB and the first disbursement to the Implementing Agency – the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF)/Office of Monetization of Aid and Development Projects (BMPAD) – was 524 days. The two budget support timeframes were only a few days.

The significant timeframes involved in disbursements by the IDB and the WB to the Implementing Agencies can be explained in particular by the complex negotiations between the banks and the relevant Haitian government bodies and by the major changes in the environment for projects in a post-earthquake context. However, it is regrettable that certain projects were not restructured more rapidly, that negotiations with government bodies had not progressed further at the time of project planning and that funds were disbursed in full to the Partner Entities upon approval of the projects, thereby tying up significant amounts.

Consequently, major sums remained tied up for lengthy periods in bank accounts belonging to these Entities. As at June 30, 2014, the IDB had disbursed only 15% of the funds received from the Trustee, 56% from the World Bank and 89% from the UN<sup>38</sup>. Therefore, the IDB retained \$56 million in the bank, the World Bank \$57 million and the UN \$14 million, for a total of \$127 million on stand-by.

With some projects, there was a very short timeframe between approval of the Concept Note and the project itself. The Program to Establish a Partial Credit Guarantee Fund had only a three (3)-day preparation period. However, it could not be implemented and was restructured. This likely means inadequate analysis in planning such a complex program. Likewise, preparation time for the Port-au-Prince Neighborhood Housing Reconstruction Project (PREKAD) was 21 days, but the first disbursement by the responsible entity to the Implementing Agency marking the project start-up took 524 days. This tends to show that major factors were probably not taken into account during the short project-preparation timeframe. These examples demonstrate that it is important to consider not just the timeframe for approval of projects by the HRF mechanisms in assessing system efficiency, but also the timeframes throughout the process, especially those related to the start-up of projects following their formal approval.

**Finding 8: The Partner Entities have played a useful role within the context of a country whose earthquake contributed to significantly weakening government institutions. A de facto relative complementarity was established among the Partner Entities. The United Nations moved more swiftly in getting projects**

<sup>38</sup> Source: HRF 2013-2014 Annual Report, Section III 3.

**approved and implemented. The World Bank and particularly the IDB, acted more slowly, having planned or undertaken few “post-emergency” projects, and also having prioritized use of their own substantial budgets.**

## **History and relevance of the Partner Entities**

Interviews revealed that the start-up of the HRF led to major negotiations between the Government of Haiti, the United Nations, the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the main donors with a view to determining the type of fund and the management processes to be implemented. The three multilateral organizations wanted to serve as Trustee and manage the Secretariat. The World Bank was finally chosen. At the same time, it was decided that the same three candidate organizations would serve as intermediaries between the selected Trustee and the Implementing Agencies, thereby becoming “Partner Entities”. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) – a member of the World Bank Group – was then accepted as a Partner Entity in April 2011 for a specific project that did not materialize. The criteria for consideration as a Partner Entity, as set out during the second Steering Committee meeting, are based on the minimum Trustee standards adopted by the council of the Global Environmental Fund (GEF).

These decisions are explained by the judgment that the government bodies, severely weakened by the earthquake, would be unable to implement and manage such a fund or act as the direct managers of the approved projects. The setting up of the Partner Entities was also attributable to the desire of the three organizations to assume leadership of the fund: considering them as “Partner Entities” – required intermediaries between the Fund and the Implementing Agencies – would have constituted a type of acceptable compromise.

This arrangement reassured donors concerned by the need to justify the granting of substantial funds to Haiti to their country’s people and to demonstrate the sound management of this money in a nation ranked 168<sup>th</sup> out of 180 on the Corruptions Perceptions Index in 2009 by Transparency International<sup>39</sup>.

During the sixth Steering Committee meeting on April 9, 2011, France proposed that the Agence française de développement (AFD) should be considered as a Partner Entity. Following France’s request: “The Chair requested that the procedures for accepting a new Partner Entity be outlined by the Trustee with the least delay.”<sup>40</sup>. In the end, France did not pursue its attempt to have the AFD accredited, in line with reservations expressed by other donors.

Many of the Haitian partners who were questioned, while acknowledging in particular the soundness of HRF management by a multilateral organization, contended that Haitian institutions could have been considered as a Partner Entity, including the Office of Monetization of Aid and Development Projects (BMPAD)<sup>41</sup>, which is the product of a former USAID (PL480) food aid monetization program and is accustomed to managing major international cooperation funds, including the funds from Venezuela’s PetroCaribe program. However, we are not aware of any official document indicating that the GoH officially asked that a Haitian body be considered as a Partner Entity.

In the absence of Partner Entities, the Secretariat of the HRF had to be substantially expanded in terms of project planning, monitoring and evaluation. The World Bank possesses expertise in these areas and if necessary, could have made it available to the Fund. This has been done with respect to

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<sup>39</sup> Source: Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2009 Results.

<sup>40</sup> Source: Minutes of the sixth Steering Committee meeting, Point 39, p.13.

<sup>41</sup> Source: BMPAD: <http://www.bmpad.gouv.ht/>

certain other MDTFs. In the case of Haiti, there was a clear willingness among the stakeholders to compromise in order to divide these functions among the three international organizations.

### **Sharing among the Partner Entities**

There seems to have been little formal coordination between the Partner Entities. During the fifth Steering Committee meeting on March 1, 2011: "The IDB representative suggested that the Partner Entities could possibly come to an agreement as to which would be best placed to be the Partner Entity for the operations that the IHRC submitted."<sup>42</sup> The evaluation has found no indication that such coordination subsequently occurred. However, it should be noted that there was a certain de facto sharing between the United Nations and the banks, in accordance with their respective areas of expertise. The UN focused in large part on resettlement and neighborhood development, drawing upon the know-how of its specialized organizations (notably UN Habitat, IOM, ILO and UNOPS), while the banks concentrated primarily on their existing priority sectors in Haiti, including education, economy, energy, water and sanitation, using budget support in part as an operating method.

However, it has also been observed that the UN and the World Bank have been active in resettlement, with \$47.5 million for the 16/6 and PARLQ projects from the UN and \$65 million for PREKAD from the WB. According to those questioned, coordination and exchanges between the two Entities in implementing these initiatives have been weak. In addition, there has been little complementarity between the two banks. Therefore, we see that the two banks are Partner Entities for projects in the same areas: education, water and sanitation.

Generally speaking, in the name of the principle of "complementarity" discussed in the Paris Declaration, it would have been more fitting for the Partner Entities and in particular the two banks, to cooperate more and develop more synergies in order to determine which had the better comparative advantage, as stipulated in the Declaration: "Donors commit to make full use of their respective comparative advantage at the sectoral or country level by delegating authority to lead donors for the execution of programmes, activities and tasks, where appropriate."<sup>43</sup>

### **Performance of the Partner Entities**

The evaluation considered the comparative performance of the Partner Entities from the standpoint of planning timeframes and rapidity of start-up of the projects.

In Finding 8, we saw the differences between the Entities regarding project preparation timeframes and the timeframes for the transfer of funds to the Implementing Agencies.

Figure 7 presents the percentage breakdown of cumulative approved funds between the Partner Entities as at June 30 each year.

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<sup>42</sup> Source: Minutes of the fifth Steering Committee meeting, Point 36, p. 11.

<sup>43</sup> Source: OECD: <http://www.oecd.org/fr/cad/efficacite/34579826.pdf>

**Figure 7. Breakdown of cumulative approved funds for each fiscal year between the Partner Entities (in %)**




Figure 8 presents the cumulative disbursements made by the Partner Entities as at June 30 each year.

**Figure 8. Percentage of disbursements made by each Partner Entity by fiscal year**




Table 3.8 below illustrates the advanced state of the HRF-financed projects, looking more closely at the number of projects completed, in progress and approved but not started as at June 30, 2014.



This table clearly depicts a one-third, one-third, one-third division between these three distinct states of advancement.

**Table 3.8 Number of projects completed, in progress and approved but not started as at June 30, 2014 for each Partner Entity**

| Partner Entity                 | Projects completed | Projects in progress | Approved projects not started at 30/06/2014 | Total |
|--------------------------------|--------------------|----------------------|---|-------|
| UN                             | 6                  | 4                    | 0   | 10    |
| World Bank                     | 2                  | 1                    | 2   | 5     |
| InterAmerican Development Bank | 0                  | 3                    | 6   | 9     |
| Total                          | 8                  | 8                    | 8   | 24    |
| Percentage                     | 33%                | 33%                  | 33%   | 100%  |

The following conclusions can be drawn from the above tables and figures:

- 1) The World Bank quickly obtained approval for projects, notably the \$10 million emergency budget support project and the \$65 million Port-au-Prince Neighborhood Housing Reconstruction Project (PREKAD). However, the latter project only started up in September 2012. Bearing this in mind, the United Nations was the organization that most quickly implemented the HRF, particularly in terms of disbursements to the Implementing Agencies and the start-up of projects, followed by the World Bank and the IDB. As of June 30, 2014, the UN had disbursed 89% of the funds received, the World Bank 56% and the IDB only 15%. The UN had completed 6 out of 10 projects, the WB 2 out of 5 and the IDB 0 out of 9. The majority of IDB projects – 6 out of 9 – had not yet started up.
- 2) The nature of the projects partially explains this difference. Most United Nations projects have been of the “post-emergency” type related to the earthquake: debris removal, resettlement and disaster prevention. Certain World Bank projects were also “post-emergency” in nature, notably two budget support projects linked to the urgent need to support Haiti’s public finances and one housing reconstruction project. For its part, the IDB did not undertake essentially earthquake-response projects, but rather classic development support projects that had apparently already been planned for in its general programming. The only IDB project in response to the consequences of the disaster was the Program to Establish a Partial Credit Guarantee Fund, which was finally restructured because it no longer met the needs of the beneficiaries and the banks.
- 3) The complexity of the approval and project management procedures for the two banks also explains their slowness. However, it appears that the World Bank used “simplified methods” that have been permitted for countries in crisis since 2011, the year of publication of the *Conflict, Security and Development* report<sup>44</sup>. In the opinion of WB employees themselves, this approach remains complicated.
- 4) Another factor that might explain the different reactions of the Partner Entities involves the availability of their own financing. The agencies of the United Nations have limited basic financing and therefore, must find other sources of funding to finance their projects. Many


<sup>44</sup> Source: World Bank (2011), WDR 2011, online at: [siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/.../WDR2011\\_Full\\_Text.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/.../WDR2011_Full_Text.pdf)

agency members confirmed to the evaluators that the HRF’s financial resources represented a major opportunity for the agencies. For their part, the two banks, as their names indicate, are financing entities and did not require outside contributions to finance their programs. This was especially true for the IDB, whose budget for Haiti was considerably increased after the earthquake. Consequently, it was faced with a major challenge in terms of planning and starting up new projects to use these new funds and the HRF’s funds were probably not a priority. However, this is changing somewhat, because the IDB has gotten more projects approved in the past year, thereby securing 24% of the funds granted by the HRF.

**Finding 9: The HRF has continued to prudently manage its workforce and its administrative costs, which represent 1.4% of project allocations. Partner Entities’ costs represent 3% of allocations, to which 11% to 15% of Implementing Agencies’ management expenses is added.**

Administrative costs incurred by the Secretariat and the Trustee have continued to decrease since the Fund was introduced, with these costs staying contained at 1.4% of total allocations made to projects by the HRF. This downward trend is largely explained by the drop in the number of individuals required to manage the Fund and the declining number of tasks inherent in its management, particularly in terms of reporting and communications. It should also be noted that part of the salaries for some Secretariat staff members are charged to other World Bank budget lines by virtue of services rendered to other entities and in order to avoid any potential conflicts of interest. The cumulative budgets of the Secretariat and the Trustee have been decreasing since the HRF’s inception<sup>45</sup> (Figure 9).

**Figure 9. Secretariat and Trustee budget trends for fiscal years 2011-2015 (in \$)**



<sup>45</sup> Source: HRF 2013-2014 Annual Report, p. 34

The decline in undertakings will continue over time. In the past four years, the budget has been divided by three, dropping from \$1,685,000 for fiscal year 2011 to \$481,000 for fiscal year 2015<sup>46</sup>.

Management costs average 3% for the Partner Entities, 8% for the UN channel (1% for the Trustee and 7% for the agencies) and 0% for the banks. In fact, the two banks have decided not to charge the HRF when projects are considered to form part of their portfolio, within which they usually have co-financing.

However, management/administrative costs are not limited to those discussed above and presented in HRF documents (annual reports prepared by the Secretariat and financial reports prepared by the Trustee). The Implementing Agencies and the “Delegated Implementing Agencies” also have management costs, which are budgeted in the project expenses and discussed in the contractual understandings or agreements. However, there is no standardized definition of “management/administrative costs”. The definition differs from agency to agency and the allocated rates also differ. Therefore, it is possible to only provide certain general indicators in this respect.

In the case of United Nations system projects, based on the agreements that were consulted, the management/administrative costs paid by UN agencies to the “Delegated Implementing Agencies” represent 11% to 15% of project budgets. However, it is not possible to precisely determine the total management/administrative costs of the UN channel, because the UN agencies carry out certain project components directly, without recourse to the “Delegated Implementing Agencies” and without taking more than the 7% of costs already allocated to them. Furthermore, management costs are sometimes difficult to identify, because they are handled differently according to the particular contracts/agreements.

For the World Bank’s PREKAD project, these costs stand at 15%: 2% for the BMPAD, the Implementing Agency and 13% for the “Delegated Implementing Agencies”. The costs of the IDB’s Implementing Agencies (administrative public structures) represent 10% of project costs, on average.

Generally speaking, the total management/administrative costs can be considered to stand at 15% to 9%: 1% for the Trustee/Secretariat, 3% for the Partner Entities (including the UN agencies) and 11% to 15% for the Implementing Agencies.

### 3.3 Governance of the HRF

**Finding 10: Generally speaking, the main components of the HRF governance structure fulfilled their roles. Nevertheless, the Steering Committee could have spelled out the priorities for the Fund and more closely monitored the results of the projects. The Trustee and the Secretariat generally fulfilled their responsibilities with diligence, to the satisfaction of the other members of the HRF structure. A formal but minimal involvement of the government authorities was observed.**

The roles of all of the components of the structure are clearly set out in the Operations Manual.

<sup>46</sup> For the 2015 budget, the Secretariat proposed two scenarios with two amounts – \$481,800 and \$431,000 – the difference, an estimated \$50,000, represented by the inclusion or non-inclusion of communications activities. 12/2014 Steering Committee minutes, p. 9. The SC voted for an extension of communications activities for a period extending at least to the end of 2014.

## Steering Committee

The Steering Committee met 12 times between June 17, 2010 and May 28, 2014, for an average of 3 meetings per year, which exceeds the minimum requirement of 2 per year under the HRF by-laws. However, the meetings were held on an irregular basis: 7 meetings, or 3.5 per year, were held from June 2010 to July 2011, while there were only 5 from July 2011 to June 2014, or 1.7 per year. There was an 8-month absence of meetings from the end of the IHRC to the appointment of a new counterpart. The first period saw the approval of 15 projects, while 8 were approved during the second period. The meetings were called when it was necessary to approve projects after consultation between the members of the Steering Committee and the Secretariat.

The Operations Manual sets out 14 responsibilities for the Steering Committee. They can be grouped into 4 categories: (1) strategic orientation and approval of projects; (2) allocation, monitoring and control of budgets; (3) monitoring the progress and results of projects; (4) approval of management tools.

(1) The Steering Committee did not define a precise strategic orientation for the HRF. It contented itself with confirming the Action Plan for the Recovery and Development of Haiti as a reference for its activity. Given that most of the projects were initiated by the donors and the Partner Entities and endorsed by the IHRC and/or the MPCE, the fact that a more precise strategy was not defined was in itself a kind of "strategy", which made it possible to fund a very wide range of projects. This default "strategy" also made it possible to fund projects characterized as "orphans" by virtue of the absence of bilateral or multilateral cooperative initiatives prepared to fund them through their own channels. It follows from the above that very few projects were rejected.

The Project for the Development of Milk Production and Processing was the subject of numerous discussions and a minimal portion of its total budget was funded. It was not until meetings 9 and 10, held on February 6 and 20, 2013 respectively, that in-depth debates took place pertaining to choices to be made among 5 projects within a context where there were not sufficient financial resources to fund them all. In short, it was difficult for the HRF to have more precise strategic orientations, because it had to take account of the sometimes divergent directions of the Government, the donors and the Partner Entities.

(2) With respect to the allocation, monitoring and control of budgets, the Steering Committee had to deal with complications resulting from the preferences expressed by donors. There were numerous discussions concerning this during the meetings (see Finding No. 5).

(3) During its meetings, the Committee reported on the progress of the already-funded projects. The Partner Entities were invited to report on the implementation status of the projects directly during the meetings. However, this monitoring of the projects remained at a superficial level, in that the Committee was satisfied with the brief presentations by the representatives of the Entities, without examining or discussing key project reports, such as annual reports, end-of-project reports and in some cases, external evaluation Reports. Therefore, the minutes of the meetings do not generally report in-depth discussions of the difficulties or results of the funded projects. In particular, completed projects did not undergo any review or discussion with respect to results achieved and lessons learned. For example, it would have been of interest to all of the members of the Committee to have the World Bank present the results of the budget supports, in particular the second one, which had an "unsatisfactory" rating. In addition, the Committee did not commission any independent study of the results of the projects, either during the projects or after their completion, while not a single completed project was subjected to a true external end-of-project evaluation. However, an external evaluation of the 16/6 project is currently underway.

Members of the Committee expressed a desire to see the projects progress more rapidly on a regular basis. The intervention by the Committee Chair during the 8th meeting in March 2012 gives

expression to this expectation: "The SC chair expressed the need to identify and address the constraints related to implementation in order to ensure more rapid execution and suggested that a review of the projects be planned."<sup>47</sup> The minutes of the subsequent meetings do not show that any action plan was implemented in order to ensure that projects were executed more rapidly.

(4) The management tools were quickly approved during the first two meetings of the Steering Committee, following a motion by the Secretariat. This was done in a good spirit of cooperation and efficiency.

## Trustee

The Trustee was invited to present a report during each Steering Committee meeting. These reports were generally very well received and the Trustee earned congratulations. The information presented in the reports is clear and accompanied by illustrations. The only major question to have been raised during the fifth Steering Committee meeting on March 1, 2011 pertained to the payment of the entirety of the funds for a project to the Entities as soon as it was approved: "The representative from the United States returned to a question raised earlier by the Director of the IHRC, namely whether the funding must be disbursed in accordance with the stage of the project, given that some projects do not require the entirety of the funds during the first years. Staggering the funding in this way would allow the Fund to do more with these funds, rather than leave them in a bank account for a number of years."<sup>48</sup> It was agreed that this question would be brought up during the next Steering Committee meeting, but this did not happen. According to the Manager of the HRF at the time, the members let it be known during the preparation of the agenda for the next Steering Committee meeting that discussing this was not a priority.

The evaluation shares the view of the US representative with respect to the HRF's practice of disbursing the entirety of the allocated funds immediately upon approval of the projects, when the conditions for launching these projects were possibly not yet in place. This has limited the flexibility in terms of managing the HRF funds. The funds then sit idle for months and years at the Partner Entity level (Appendix 5). The more usual practice in international development aid is that the donors disburse the funds in tranches, as needed by the projects.

The funds held by the Partner Entities generate interest income for which the Partner Entities do not provide an accounting, unlike the Trustee, which clearly identifies the amounts generated, which are turned over to the HRF. The agreements between the HRF Trustee and the three Partner Entities include the following provision: "*Except for investment income earned on administrative fees, any investment income earned on the transferred funds will be returned from the Partner Entity to the Trustee annually or such other frequency as may be agreed between the Trustee and the Partner Entity*".<sup>49</sup> The Trustee confirmed to the evaluation team that no investment income was paid to it by the Partner Entities. There are also no reports to this effect on the part of the Partner Entities reporting on interest earned. It should be noted that the agreements between the United Nations Trustee (the "*Multi-Donor Trust Fund Office*", or MDTF) and the UN Agencies stipulate that they must turn over investment returns to the MDTF so that the latter can turn them over to the HRF Trustee. We were unable to verify whether the Agencies do so.

<sup>47</sup> Source: Minutes of the eighth Steering Committee meeting, 8/2012, p. 9.

<sup>48</sup> Source: Minutes of the sixth Steering Committee meeting, 6/2011, p. 11.

<sup>49</sup> Source: "Transfer agreement" between the Trustee and the United Nations system (Section 8) and the IDB and the WB (Section 7).

## Secretariat

The Secretariat has four main functions: (1) Developing and updating the HRF mechanisms in collaboration with the Trustee; (2) Preparing and following up on Steering Committee discussions; (3) Reporting on the functioning of the HRF and the results of implementation; (4) Informing the public about HRF activities.

(1) The Secretariat demonstrated effectiveness in setting up the HRF. The process of designing the Fund mechanisms was facilitated by the knowledge and experience of the Secretariat Manager, who had previously been the *"founder/first manager of the \$650 million Multi Donor Fund for Aceh and Nias following the tsunami"*. Therefore, he was able to propose a model inspired by this other post-disaster Fund and based on the lessons learned. Haitian officials were even sent to Indonesia to study how the Aceh Fund had worked.

(2) The Secretariat displayed a good deal of flexibility and proactivity during or after the Steering Committee meetings in terms of proposing formulations that would create a consensus. However, some criticisms were received from members of the Committee to the effect that documents were not presented sufficiently in advance of the Committee meetings. Mention was also made of situations where there was confusion as to the actual availability of funds remaining for the projects. However, in defence of the Secretariat and the Trustee, their task was not made easy by the preferences exercised by the donors and the insistence of the latter that all or part of their contribution be put in reserve. Under the circumstances, it is reasonable to consider their performance to have been good.

(3) The Secretariat produced numerous documents for HRF stakeholders: nine quarterly bulletins, six Secretariat reports and four annual reports. The information contained in these reports is varied and well presented. However, reading these documents does not allow one to really know whether the projects actually achieved the results expected at the time of their approval. For example, the annual reports present significant quantitative results, without providing a comparison with the initially established targets. As a result, in order to obtain information pertaining to the effectiveness and efficiency of the projects, it is necessary to refer to the project documents themselves and in some cases, to conduct the missing analysis comparing plans and results. The reports only rarely mention the difficulties encountered. In the final analysis, these are reports that generally provide a very positive portrayal of the activities and results of the HRF, but do not necessarily reflect the actual situation.

## Government counterparts

The HRF did not have any true governmental counterparts until April 2012, with the MPCE being designated as formal counterpart and the Council of Ministers being designated to approve projects before their presentation to the HRF Steering Committee. The IHRC, which previously served as counterpart, cannot be considered a government entity, because it was co-chaired by the Prime Minister and by Bill Clinton, representing the donors. The long delay between the windup of the IHRC and the designation of the MPCE as counterpart to the HRF was detrimental to the functioning of the latter.

The MPCE and the Council of Ministers carried out their responsibilities in a formal sense. However, as mentioned in the finding related to preferences, the initiative for projects was completely in the hands of the donors and the Partner Entities.



**Finding 11: Taken as a whole, the 6 HRF principles were only partially respected.**

The HRF has six principles: (1) Government leadership; (2) Strategic funding; (3) Norms and standards; (4) Building on existing capacity; (5) Good governance; (6) Rapidity and risk management.

**(1) Government leadership:** "The governance structure and the process for approving grants will be led by the Government of Haiti as Chair of the HRF's governing body."

**Government leadership was not fully exercised**

During the period of coexistence of the IHRC and the HRF, government leadership was weak. The IHRC was led by two Co-Chairs: Haitian Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive and Bill Clinton, representing the donors. Although the IHRC had a Haitian manager, the main positions of responsibility within it were occupied by foreign assistants. Based on the evidence gathered, the roles and responsibilities of the MPCE and the technical ministries were relatively weak with respect to the analysis and selection of projects to be presented to the HRF. Some partners account for this situation by the major disorganization of the Haitian government in the wake of the earthquake, in which 20% to 25% of managers and professionals apparently were killed or seriously injured and in which the majority of public buildings were destroyed.

Government leadership has apparently been more evident since the windup of the IHRC. Projects are approved or validated by the technical ministry concerned, the MPCE and the Council of Ministers and are presented to the HRF Steering Committee for grant approval. It is true that the Steering Committee is chaired by the Minister of Economy and Finance and that a representative of the MPCE also sits on the Committee. However, the majority of the voting members of the Steering Committee consists of donors. Therefore, there are seven donor representatives and two Government representatives. In practice, decision-making is by consensus. In order to favour more government leadership, it would have been possible to envisage parity on the Committee between members of the government and donors.

However, in reality, government leadership remains weak. Many projects have been identified by the donors and the Partner Entities and validated by the Haitian authorities. Based on the evidence gathered, the concept notes for many projects were prepared by the Partner Entities in collaboration with the donors or otherwise, with little consultation with the beneficiary entities in the government (sectoral ministries or Ministry of Economy and Finance). There has been little ownership by the national administrations concerned with these HRF-funded projects, which quite often were even perceived and treated as projects of the Partner Entity rather than as projects of the government. Therefore, the HRF has perhaps even been perceived by the government as an instrument that primarily serves to allow funding of the Partner Entities.

This does not call into question the intrinsic value of the projects on an individual basis, but they do not necessarily correspond to the vision and priorities of the Government, even though they are justified within the framework of 2010 PARDH or the 2012 Strategic Development Plan. However, these plans are extremely broad and the Government has not established more precise specific objectives for the HRF, thus allowing it a maximum of latitude.

**(2) Strategic financing:** "The HRF resources can increase flexibility by providing reconstruction funding that is not being furnished through earmarked funding from other sources."

**In fact, there have been certain "strategic" financings, such as in the area of debris removal, but most of the projects cannot claim to be structuring projects for their sectors.**

Certain projects directly related to post-earthquake reconstruction should be considered to be strategic investments. This applies to the Debris I and II projects, PREKAD, the HNRSP and 16/6 and the Earthquake Prevention Plan for the North of Haiti. The Debris, PREKAD and Earthquake

Prevention for the North projects were entirely funded by the HRF and the HRF's shares in the funding of the HNRSP and 16/6 were 80% and 58% respectively. The majority of the funding for these projects was provided by the preferential funds from the United States and Japan. It would seem that there were no other sources of funding available for these crucial and necessary projects. It should be noted that Canada, separately from the HRF, directly funded the 16/6 project for the relocation of displaced individuals in the Champ de Mars camp, while ensuring that its intervention could be based on the same implementation methodology as already initiated by the 16/6 project.

We can also consider the first two budget supports provided through the World Bank to be "strategic financing". In the case of the first one, in 2010, the HRF contributed \$25 million of the \$55 million, or 45% and in the case of the second one, in 2013, \$10 million of the \$30 million, or 33%. These supports are strategic in the sense that they were aimed at maintaining the operation of services provided by a government facing major budget problems as a result of the earthquake.

Many other financings by the HRF hardly qualify as strategic, even though they may make a generally useful contribution to the development of the country. Therefore, the HRF's contribution of \$19 million to the Project for Reconstruction of the Education Sector (IDB), which represents 7.5% of a total budget of \$250 million, does not play a central role. It seems likely that the IDB, which has very large budgets at its disposal, could have increased its own contribution and managed without the HRF. In this case, the HRF's contribution cannot be considered to have been a determining factor, or even "seed money", given the ready availability of funds from the IDB and other donors for education in Haiti.

It is difficult to deem projects that can be qualified as "classic" in the area of development support as "strategic" projects, For example: the "Southwest Haiti Sustainable Development Program", "Environmental Protection of Macaya National Park", "Sustainable Energy for Haiti", "School Feeding Program", "Development of Milk Production", etc. Of course, this does not call into question their merits and usefulness, but one may wonder what made the HRF funding indispensable. The untargeted approach of the HRF meant that it could fund any development project and satisfy the desire of certain donors to use the Fund as a pliable and flexible funding mechanism, allowing them to finalize their particular sectoral investments.

**(3) Rules and standards.** The rules and standards applied are those of the World Bank, the IDB and the United Nations and these organizations are responsible for ensuring compliance by their "authorized principal contractors". It had been indicated during the pre-mission videoconference with the members of the Advisory and Supervisory Group for the evaluation that the mission did not consist of verifying and auditing the standards and procedures. However, Findings 7 and 8 analyzed certain comparative parameters among the Partner Entities.

**(4) Building on existing capacity:** "The HRF will seek to work with and finance existing successful programs, including those building social capital, such as through community-driven development programs and enhance the capacity of line ministries, local governments, private enterprises and NGOs with a proven track record."

**Some projects adroitly built on pre-existing projects and most of them largely collaborated with and obtained the participation of government, civil society and private sector institutions, although it would have been desirable to have the Implementing Agencies do so to a greater extent.**

A large number of projects were actually planned and implemented in connection with pre-existing projects. This was particularly true of the World Bank's PREKAD, which adopted methodologies from the PRODEPUR (Projet de développement participatif urbain) project with the same partner, the Bureau of Monetization of Development Aid Programs (BMPAD). The Reconstruction of the Education Sector support project (IDB) is complementary to the Universal Education Program,



funded by a number of donors, including the World Bank, within the framework of the Government of Haiti's Universal, Free and Compulsory Education Program (PSUGO).

Implementation of the projects mobilized a wide range of public and private partners. The HRF did not have an overall vision or strategy for that, but rather pursued a case-by-case approach depending on the project. Finding 17 related to the strengthening of capacities provides an overview of the Haitian partners involved that benefited from the strengthening of capacities.

**(5) Good governance:** "The HRF and its financed activities will facilitate the participation of different levels of government, civil society, the private sector, the Diaspora and development partners and will promote a transparent and accountable reconstruction process."

**The HRF's procedures gave the impression of not being very transparent and accountable in the eyes of a segment of Haitian society; in particular, the HRF was unsuccessful in getting the observers on the Steering Committee to play their roles as interfaces with and communication channels to their respective sectors.**

The Steering Committee includes five observers who are normally responsible for maintaining connections with the social sector from which they are drawn: local governments, mayors and municipal district councils [(Conseil d'Administration des Sections Communales, or CASEC)], the private sector, the Diaspora, Haitian civil society and international NGOs. Except at the very beginning, participation among these observers in the Steering Committee meetings was weak. Beginning with the fourth meeting at the end of 2010, attendance was sporadic except for the international NGOs, whose representative participated on a regular basis. The table below presents the frequency of attendance of observers at the meetings (Table 3.9).

**Table 3.9 Frequency of participation of observers at the HRF Steering Committee meetings**

| Observer                                 | Number of Steering Committee meetings attended | Attendance percentage |
|--|--|-----------------------|
| Representative of the mayors             | 6  | 55%                   |
| Representative of the CASECs             | 5  | 45%                   |
| Representative of the Diaspora           | 3  | 27%                   |
| Representative of the national NGOs      | 5  | 45%                   |
| Representative of the international NGOs | 8  | 73%                   |
| Representative of the private sector     | 1  | 7%                    |

The private sector representative only attended the first meeting, and the representative of the Diaspora participated in three meetings. Unfortunately, it was not possible to meet with these observers, with the exception of the representative of the International NGOs. It seems that the HRF Secretariat did not cultivate close ties with these representatives. The representative for Haitian civil society became a Minister in 2012 and it was not possible to verify whether the Secretariat took steps to replace her. In addition, prominent members of Haitian civil society who are respected organization officials informed the evaluation that they were not aware that there has been a delegate to the Steering Committee who was meant to represent them. They were not aware of the procedures that led to her designation and had no information indicating that the NGO

representative reported to the recognized civil society authorities. On the other hand, the participation of the representative for the international NGOs was good and the evaluation was able to verify that the successive representatives had indeed been delegated by their associations.

Interventions by the observers during the meetings of the Committee were relatively infrequent and do not appear to have had an impact. It is possible that the increasing lack of interest by the observers in participating in the meetings can be explained by the limited attention paid to them, and by how little their infrequent interventions were taken into consideration. The regularity of meeting attendance by the representative for the international NGOs can be accounted for by the fact that many of these NGOs were involved as "delegated Implementing Agencies".

It seems that the observers did not play the role of interface or communication channel between the HRF and various sectors of Haitian society. Neither the Secretariat nor the Steering Committee seems to have paid any attention to this. This situation partially accounts for the poor image of the reconstruction programs within Haitian society, as attested by Raoul Peck's 2013 film "Fatal Assistance". Many of the individuals met with, players in civil society, journalists and independent figures, while not sharing the outlook of the Raoul Peck film, which they consider excessively partisan, feel that the reconstruction process is not transparent and they complain of a lack of information. This remark is not specifically directed at the HRF, which these interlocutors have very little awareness of, but to all of the reconstruction programs taken together.

The chapter devoted to strengthening capacities deals in detail with the effective participation of the various levels of government, civil society and the private sector in the implementation of these projects.

**(6) Rapidity and risk management:** "The HRF will ensure the rapid and efficient delivery of its activities while managing risks in order to produce high-quality results."

**The rapidity of approval of the projects met the established standards, but in the case of certain projects, start-up and implementation proceeded very slowly.**

As demonstrated in the section entitled "General Approval Process", the time required for approval by the Steering Committee seems to meet the established rules and can be measured in days. However, there are major delays between approval of the concept note for certain projects and final approval of the project. In addition, there are significant delays in the disbursements by the Partner Entities to the Implementing Agencies, notably in the case of the IDB and the WB. The issue of risk management was barely touched upon at the decision-making levels of the HRF. It can be assumed that if it had been, certain projects whose start-up conditions were not settled would have seen their approval delayed.

**Finding 12: Management of the monitoring, evaluation and knowledge management mechanisms did not function optimally.**

Management of the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms is one of the responsibilities of the Steering Committee, within the context of its function of "receiving and approving progress and financial reports and mid-term reviews from Partner Entities". The HRF had neither a mandate nor a particular capability for ensuring a mandate and independent monitoring of the operations. On the other hand, it fell to each Partner Entity to be responsible for the monitoring and evaluation of the activities funded by the HRF funds that were transferred to it, "in accordance with its regulations, rules, policies and procedures and in accordance with the Transfer Agreement". Therefore, each Partner Entity "provides to the donors and the Steering Committee a report through the Secretariat (...) on the progress of the activities funded by the contributions received by the Partner Entity and the results thereof". It is the responsibility of the Secretariat to "receive the periodic operational

reports submitted by the Partner Entities" and to "receive and consolidate the annual reports on the results of implementation".

In addition, each Transfer Agreement between the Fiscal Agent and the Partner Entity provides that "the Partner Entity may invite the Donor to participate in its supervision missions related to the Fund and that, if any Donor wishes to request a review or evaluation of the activities of the Partner Entity financed by the HRF, the Donor and the Partner Entity shall agree on the scope and conduct of such review or evaluation".

The Steering Committee reports mention such visits, but none of the interviews with donors or any of the Committee reports mention any such request for a review or evaluation of the activities of any of the Partner Entities. What became much clearer as the evaluation progressed is that, in addition to the Steering Committee meetings, the donors also favoured more informal meetings with the Partner Entities in order to validate the progress of projects (and clearer still when donors had indicated "preferences" for projects that did not come under the heading of budget support).

The Steering Committee rejected the proposal of commissioning a mid-term evaluation that would have made it possible to measure the progress achieved in the various projects two years after the Fund began its activities. Therefore, there is only a quite limited stock of evaluations carried out to measure the impacts of the HRF. In order to ensure monitoring of the implementation of the Emergency Development Policy Operation Project (budget support), the Bank was content to carry out a number of monitoring missions. The HRF and Multi Partner Gateway websites neither mention nor present any external evaluation Report that would make it possible to understand the progress of the initiatives undertaken by the Partner Entities or by the United Nations agencies. Fortunately, a broader evaluation conducted by the UNDP on the improvement of living conditions for populations vulnerable to crises (Haiti, Country Program 2010-2012) allows for a more critical look at the initiatives completed by the UNDP following the earthquake. The evaluation concludes that "the UNDP office pursued (from the very beginning of the response to the humanitarian crisis) a recovery strategy that adapted as the context evolved (...), an eminently pragmatic approach based on a response to needs that evolves over time (...) but also innovative in certain respects, including through the development of an integrated debris management cycle taking into account short-, medium- and long-term needs".<sup>50</sup>

It is not possible to measure progress toward results for the natural disaster mitigation project carried out in the South Department by a number of UN agencies, because a certain number of reference and target indicators in the results matrix are missing. For the IDB project involving reconstruction of the education sector, for which there has been only one disbursement, there is no evaluation measuring the gains in the various components. The Status Update includes neither reference nor target indicators, but only current values. As for the budget support programs, the literature available and the meetings conducted locally reveal that the implementation of the budget support programs is encountering certain difficulties in connection with the reforms of the procedures for contracting out services and for accountability reporting. The external evaluation of the budget support programs is only conducted once the project has been completed, one year after its official closeout.

In general, all of the projects provide explanations for variances between the targets and the results obtained, but the explanations are not always very detailed. For the 16/6 project in particular, the variances are not explained systematically (no explanation is offered at all for approximately half of

<sup>50</sup> Source: Evaluation of the effects "Improvement of the living conditions of populations vulnerable to crises": Haiti, Country Program 2010-2012, by Christian Bugnion, RSC-LAC, January 2014, p. 5.

the deviations). The analysis of performance provided in the narrative of the report does not always take the performance indicators into consideration.

With respect to the production of lessons learned, an effort was made by the HRF Secretariat throughout the implementation of its operations. Through the preparation of each of its annual reports, the Secretariat retains the privilege of presenting a certain number of Lessons Learned to the Fund stakeholders. Consolidating these over the entire series of annual reports brings the value added by the HRF into focus in the minds of the Fund stakeholders (see "Lessons Learned" in the fourth part of this analysis).

The information consolidated for the benefit of the Steering Committee in the form of project summary records makes it possible to read the Objectives and results obtained for each program in overview form. The fact that each of the "Project Summary" records incorporates an "Evaluation, Lessons Learned and Best Practices" component also makes it possible – for closed-out projects – to share more specific Lessons intended for wider application in similar programs. With respect to the "Natural Disaster Mitigation in the South Department" project (2010-2012), some of the lessons are put forward on the assumption of the possible occurrence of "any future repetition". Within the framework of the Emergency Policy Development Operations – Haiti (Budget support) – 2010-2011, some of the relevant lessons drawn are meant to "prove useful in the future for Haiti and other small countries".

Following the example of the UNDP, which finalized "a procedure for the review of all of the knowledge and data acquired in the area of debris management" upon completion of the implementation of the "Demolition and Debris Removal with Heavy Equipment (Debris 2)" project, the systematization of the lessons learned in connection with the response of all of the operational parties involved in such an exceptional exercise as the reconstruction process in Haiti should be an integrated and consolidated component of a Fund like the HRF. It seems constrained by the very exercise of the sovereignty of the operators, who have separate responsibilities for compiling the lessons learned, most often from a perspective that does not necessarily cover "the integral and immediate aspects of capacity building at the national level".

**Finding 13: Unfortunately, the Input Tracking System (ITS) for collecting the impressions, comments and/or suggestions of the beneficiaries targeted by the HRF's projects did not see the light of day.**

With respect to the monitoring of field operations by the operators and the Partner Entities, two levels must be considered. The donors reached an agreement with respect to the principle underlying the organization of supervisory missions accompanied by the Partner Entities fairly quickly, while at the same time ensuring that the latter were able to set a limit on the number of participants. Norway and Canada assisted the Steering Committee in defining the conditions governing participation, first by inviting the representative for the national NGOs on the SC to allow for the identification of the key players and organizations and second by suggesting that a certain number (preferably up to three members of the SC) be authorized to participate in the supervisory missions on a "first-come, first-served" basis.<sup>51</sup>

The second level is based on the principle of observation of field operations by the beneficiaries themselves. In March of 2011, the Secretariat of the Fund presented the setting up of an Input Tracking System (ITS), intended to be implemented in April 2011, which would provide a platform for Haitian citizens, project beneficiaries and others to share comments or complaints related to HRF-financed projects through SMS messages, letters, call centres and other communication

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<sup>51</sup> See for example the results of the visit organized by the HRF for the World Bank, Steering Committee, 12/2014, p. 4.

channels. Later on, the Program Manager would clarify that the ITS would not only serve to receive complaints, but also suggestions related to projects implemented through HRF funding. It was not intended to be a system for the evaluation of projects, but "a tool for communicating with the public". Consequently, a decision to create the ITS was taken by the Steering Committee when it met on April 9.

Against this background, the HRF selected the IOM as partner to retool an existing system used to track displaced persons. The IOM agreed, "with good grace", to create the system as a pilot project, with the possibility of extending the system "to cover all funding activities ", with one donor going one step beyond with the idea that the system should "be integrated with the Planning Ministry and the IHRC". The comments collected in this manner were to be analyzed by a local NGO, Noula and all of the information received through the ITS was to be made public. In addition, all complaints would be transmitted to and taken into consideration by the Partner Entities. The ambition, through the mechanisms of imitation and example-setting, would be that "this effort could be picked up on and extended to the broader reconstruction effort". The following July, at the request of Canada, the Fund had to acknowledge that "the ITS is still at the testing stage and that, to avoid duplications, discussions had been held between the Secretariat, the IOM and the PAO" (Performance and Anti-Corruption Office of the IHRC).

Approximately one year after the idea was made public, the Communications Officer of the Secretariat presented to the SC the "Input Tracking Mechanism", which would allow "beneficiaries to provide feedback related to HRF-funded projects". The mechanism "consists of a four-digit number (3747) that will allow beneficiaries to send the HRF free SMS messages. The Secretariat will evaluate and forward these messages and follow up on resolution of the situation by the Partner Entity concerned". It must also allow beneficiaries in the public to "react to spot announcements and videos". The cost of the mechanism was estimated at \$300 for installation and three (3) Gourdes per SMS. Unfortunately, the campaign never got off the ground "because of major delays by our service suppliers for the spots and the video" and the HRF Secretariat "contacted the company without success in an attempt to obtain the access codes".

The absence of the ITS eliminated the possibility of learning the value of a tool that would have allowed HRF stakeholders and local operators to assess public perceptions, in addition to what was learned from the CRCs and the base-level committees involved in monitoring the work of the HRF. Implementation of the ITS would also have made it possible to validate interest in the tool within the context of a reconstruction/rehabilitation process, following the example of what some major humanitarian agencies are developing in the area of accountability to beneficiaries.

**Finding 14: The termination of the IHRC and the lengthy delay before the Government named a government counterpart to the HRF gave rise to uncertainty and handicapped the operation of the HRF for almost a year and mortgaged its future as a collective funding instrument. The donors and the HRF Secretariat conducted active negotiations with the government to find a solution acceptable to the parties.**

The IHRC and the HRF had been established in a coordinated and complementary manner. The IHRC was the most visible "political" body placed above the HRF. The IHRC had a high degree of visibility, with Prime Minister Bellerive and former President Clinton as its Co-Chairs. The HRF had a lower-profile existence and was intended to play a more technical funding role. In addition, the independent personalities encountered in Haiti had certain difficulties relating the responsibilities of the HRF to those of the IHRC during the latter's existence. However, this design, with two separate institutions at the start, proved to be a wise and prudent decision. It meant that, after the IHRC disappeared, the HRF was able to continue and do useful work, which would not have been the



case if the IHRC had included a financial mechanism, which some raised as a possibility when the two institutions were conceived.

The disappearance of the IHRC had both positive and negative effects on the HRF. Among the positive effects was the fact of having a true national counterpart, which was not the case with the IHRC. It also achieved greater autonomy, because it was no longer subject to the proposals of the IHRC. On the other hand, the functions carried out by the IHRC, including the analysis and eventual evaluation of projects, were not completely picked up by the new national counterpart and the HRF did not acquire additional resources to assist in assuming these functions. It may also be true that the lack of interest among donors in continuing the HRF until its termination in 2017 can be explained by the fact that it is not regarded as a "political" instrument, as the IHRC was. It may be supposed that, if the IHRC had continued and eventually been transformed into a National Development Agency, as originally foreseen, the complementary financial instrument that is the HRF would also no doubt have continued to be used for needs going beyond reconstruction.


New President Martelly was elected on March 20, 2011 and officially took office on May 14. After a period of uncertainty, Parliament was unable to extend the IHRC and it ceased operation in October 2011. The MPCE was not officially designated as the new counterpart for the HRF until April 2012, with the addition of the Council of Ministers as a supplementary stakeholder for the approval of projects to be presented to the HRF Steering Committee.

Beginning in 2010, the Director of the HRF had held conversations with the Prime Minister in order to push for the designation of a new counterpart in the event that the mandate of the IHRC was not extended. However, the Prime Minister did not wish to consider that possibility. As a result, bringing about the designation of a new counterpart once the mandate of the IHRC was not extended proved to be a laborious undertaking for the Secretariat and the members of the Steering Committee. Many meetings and exchanges of correspondence between the Secretariat and the Office of the Prime Minister were required. A portion of the eighth Steering Committee meeting on March 30, 2012 was devoted to exchanges pertaining to possible counterparts. Curiously, based on the minutes of this meeting, it would seem that the Government left it to the Steering Committee to make proposals for the designation of a counterpart formula that was acceptable to the Government: officially, the MPCE, with the Council of Ministers playing an approval role.

This formula resulted in increased responsibility for two government bodies: one administrative and one political. On the other hand, the MPCE had not been strengthened earlier, because it had been relatively marginalized while the IHRC was in existence and therefore, it was ill-prepared to fully exercise these new responsibilities. However, we do not think that this situation hampered the operation of the HRF.

However, the change of government and the vacancy in the counterpart role for a period of almost 6 months did handicap the operation of the HRF. To begin with, during the meeting between the IHRC and the HRF on July 22, 2011, the Government asked that no additional funding be allocated until it identified its priorities for the use of the funds. As a result of these two decisions, no Steering Committee meeting was held for 8 months and no projects were approved for almost two years, from October 2011 to September 2013, as illustrated in Figure 10 below. However, when the Steering Committee meetings resumed, the Government still did not set out its expectations as to the priorities it wished to assign to the HRF in any greater detail.

Figure 10. Date and number of monthly approvals of HRF-financed projects



In conclusion, the Secretariat and the Steering Committee made a number of attempts to clarify the situation and obtain a new Government counterpart. It was a period of uncertainty that slowed the approval of new projects. However, this did not have any negative consequences for the projects already underway.

**Finding 15: Changes in the environment of certain projects were not followed by rapid restructuring, which resulted in the blocking of funds by some Partner Entities. The end of the so-called "humanitarian" period brought with it changes in the nature of the projects being funded while there were still unsatisfied major needs in the post-earthquake reconstruction projects (housing and urban development).**

### **Changes in the environment of certain projects**

Major changes took place in the environment and the critical conditions for the execution of certain projects, including the Program to Establish a Partial Credit Guarantee Fund (less demand than anticipated and little interest on the part of the banks); the Natural Disaster Mitigation in the South project (difficulties coordinating with public institutions); the Development of Milk Production project (lack of co-funding and difficulties coordinating with public institutions). There are procedures within the HRF for the reallocation of funds and the review of approved projects, as set out in the Operations Manual and the transfer agreements. In the case of major changes, a new project document must be submitted to the Steering Committee for approval. However, the Partner Entities have made little use of these procedures to date in order to reconfigure or transform projects experiencing implementation problems, or have done so with much delay. Two cases are particularly significant: (1) The Partial Credit Guarantee Fund (\$12.5 million) was restructured for the first time in February 2013 and is currently undergoing a second restructuring, which should be presented to the Steering Committee, but it is arising four years after the grant was awarded by the HRF; (2) The Natural Disaster Mitigation in the South project (\$14 million), which was restructured in February 2013 and a component of which got underway in August 2013 (Macaya), or 2.5 years after the HRF awarded the initial funding.

### **End of the so-called "humanitarian" period**

The projects directly related to post-earthquake reconstruction were approved in 2010 and 2011. The projects approved later are more in the mold of "classic" development support projects. Therefore, when project approvals resumed in late 2012, after an interruption of more than a year, it seems that the project selection criteria were implicitly modified, with the HRF reflecting a sort of consensus between donors and government, to the effect that the "humanitarian" period of reconstruction must give way to a more classic period of development support. An evolution can also be seen in the area of budget supports, given that 4 of them were approved in 2013 and 2014 compared to only one between 2010 and 2012. However, this change does not take into account some major needs that remain in the area of housing and neighbourhood reconstruction and underestimates the urban development, job creation and economic development aspects accompanying projects like 16/6 and PREKAD.

**Finding 16: The HRF communication effort did not achieve most of its desired objectives, due to the limited resources allocated and its lack of clarity.**

The HRF presented a draft communication strategy during the sixth Steering Committee meeting on April 9, 2011 (Table 3.10). According to the Fund Administrator, it was approved on the basis of there having been no objections after some electronic exchanges. However, there is no mention of it in the minutes of the following Steering Committee meeting (Meeting No. 7). The evidence and



statements gathered indicate that there was no unanimity among the stakeholders as to whether the HRF should develop its own communication tools. Some members of the Steering Committee felt that, rather than being necessary, it would be damaging for the HRF to be identified by the public/beneficiaries as a funding entity in its own right at a time when it was important to enhance the image and profile of the Government.

**Table 3.10 Objectives and results of the HRF communication effort**

| Objective   | Expected results  | Actual results   |
|---|---|--|
| <i>Maintenance of a well-defined institutional presence</i> | The HRF can carve out its own space in the media.   | The Partner Entities, the Trustee, the Secretariat and the donors of funds can identify the HRF as a separate entity and generally understand the nature of its mandate, despite the confusion with the IHRC.<br><br>On the other hand, the beneficiaries and the local population continue to have a very limited understanding and knowledge of the HRF. |
| <i>Visibility of HRF donors</i>                             | Projects funded by the HRF must demonstrate donors' commitment to Haiti in a visible, distinctive and effective manner. | Beneficiaries of the projects have a limited awareness of the contributions of HRF donors.   |
|   |   | The beneficiaries do not perceive the information concerning the Partner Entities and on project implementation as being clear. They are almost exclusively aware of the Implementing Agency.  |
| <i>Preventive approach in order to define the message</i>   | The HRF takes advantage of opportunities to convey its message in an innovative fashion.                                | The HRF used the appropriate media to promote its institutional message and its image. On the other hand, the effectiveness of these tools was unsatisfactory, because the radio and television spots were broadcast late, among other things.   |
| <i>Predefined approach in order to resolve crises</i>       | The HRF's communication strategy includes viable instruments for dealing with unforeseen events and misinformation.     | The HRF's communication strategy was strengthened by the disappearance of the IHRC, given that the majority of the players involved associated the IHRC with the HRF.  |
| <i>Message consistency</i>                                  | The message of the HRF is consistent, facilitating its acceptance by the various parties.                               | The message of the HRF is consistent everywhere and at all times.  |
| <i>Optimal flow of communication with stakeholders</i>      | The HRF maintains a high-quality and satisfying flow of communication with all stakeholders                             | The majority of the players involved confirm their level of satisfaction with respect to bilateral communication with the HRF.   |

In order to achieve these objectives, the HRF developed a number of communication tools, including a logo, a slogan, a website, a video clip, radio spots and promotional material. These various communication tools were intended to allow the HRF to define its own space in the media.

The logo, the slogan and the HRF song were developed by Haitian school children through a contest launched in the schools, as a way of giving the HRF a local identity. These tools reflect the innovative approach followed by the HRF in order to create an institutional image and define its message among stakeholders. As a complement to this, the HRF website delivers a lot of information that is helpful for understanding the operation of the HRF, its governance, its funding activities and the projects being implemented. The website also includes documents that provide information concerning the decisions made at the Steering Committee meetings and the monitoring of the progress of the projects funded. In addition, radio and television were identified by the HRF Secretariat as the most important communication vectors, because the oral tradition plays a predominant role in Haitian culture. In summary, the Secretariat demonstrated an interest in designing communication tools that reflect the local culture and it harnessed the most popular communication channels in Haiti.

In addition, the HRF Secretariat was careful to provide visibility for its donors by displaying the national flag of each donor on the communication tools (e.g.: video clip, promotional material, website). These communication tools demonstrated the commitments of the donors to Haiti in a visible, distinctive and effective manner. In summary, the HRF website is an effective communication tool for informing not only the stakeholders but also the public and ensuring the visibility of donors. However, some of the data presented on the site are not up to date.

With respect to the HRF's institutional presence, the various stakeholders are able to identify the HRF as a separate entity and have a general understanding of the nature of its mandate. The Haitian government, the ministries involved in the projects, the Partner Entities and some Implementing Agencies were readily able to identify the HRF. On the other hand, some delegated Implementing Agencies were unaware that their projects were funded by the HRF. In addition, the institutional presence of the HRF was much weaker among the local population and more specifically, among the direct beneficiaries of the projects. It was reported that the acronym HRF lends itself to confusion with the IHRC. In addition, the large number of organizations involved in implementing the projects did not facilitate identification of the HRF as one of the main players in the reconstruction effort. In the eyes of project beneficiaries questioned during the mission in Haiti, the Implementing Agencies were better known than the HRF. In summary, the visibility of the HRF was diluted from the time of the IHRC's existence, both in the field, among the other players involved and on the institutional level.

As for the flow of communication and the consistency of the information delivered, the majority of the stakeholders confirmed their satisfaction. In general, the flow of communication with stakeholders was satisfactory, even if a number of criticisms were directed at the HRF Secretariat. In fact, some stakeholders charge the HRF Secretariat with being unable to provide precise information concerning the availability and use of funds at certain points in the existence of the HRF. In particular, this was the situation for the \$40 million committed by Brazil.

Some criticisms are justified in order to provide some nuance pertaining to the results of the HRF's communication effort. In particular, these criticisms relate to the effectiveness of the media used, the resources allocated to HRF communications and the belated mobilization of the most popular media in Haiti.

First of all, it is clear that the media used to promote the HRF's institutional message and its image, in particular to beneficiaries, achieved only limited results in terms of effectiveness. Even though the HRF communication strategy called for the use of these media, radio and television did not deliver the expected results in terms of effectiveness. This result can largely be accounted for by the late application of these communication tools. By way of example, the video clip for television and the radio spots were run between November 2013 and May 2014, or more than 3 years after the creation of the HRF. As a result, the belated distribution of information through the most popular

media in Haiti contributed significantly to the fact that the Haitian public has a very limited knowledge and understanding of the HRF. Finally, the evaluation reprises the comments made by some of the individuals met with, to the effect that the video broadcast on television projects a rather inappropriate image of the Haitian context and does not contribute to enhancing the image of the HRF.

The second criticism of the HRF communication effort pertains to the resources allocated to the HRF team. In general, the budget allocated to the HRF communication effort is inadequate in relation to the objectives and the expected results, as defined in the communication strategy. In fact, the team had limited financial resources at its disposal, because the budget allocated to the HRF communication effort was \$20,000 for 2012-2013 and \$60,000<sup>52</sup> for 2013-2014 (Table 3.11).

**Table 3.11 HRF communication expenditures for the year 2013-2014**

| Expenditures                               | Amount (in \$) |
|--|----------------|
| Photography                                | 3,500          |
| Printing of calendars                      | 2,050          |
| Website                                    | 10,880         |
| Events (e.g.: photo exhibition)            | 5,550          |
| Design and broadcast of TV and radio spots | 34,629         |

### 3.4 Results of the HRF

Although measuring the results achieved by the HRF is not the main purpose of this evaluation, it is important to recall its inherent limitations, which take various forms. The first relates to the fact that a certain number of projects do not have final evaluations that would allow for an examination of results in relation to the objectives pursued. It was not the purpose of the mission to verify expected outputs or effects of the projects carried out and therefore, it did not pay visits to all of the project implementation sites. It also does not claim to have been able to take a critical look at a large number of projects in Port-au-Prince, partly because many of them were closed out. Finally, the very nature of some of the funding and in particular the budget supports extended by the HRF, does not make it possible to acquire external evaluations of these projects until a year after their execution. Beyond the literature available, the evaluation mission nevertheless had the opportunity to visit a certain number of physical products, especially in the area of construction of housing or local infrastructures. It also had the opportunity to meet with various local or economic governance structures in order to validate the efforts approved at these two levels of intervention.

**Finding 17: Overall, the HRF-funded activities had varying levels of performance. Some projects innovated and achieved a large proportion of their objectives, while**

<sup>52</sup> This amount of \$60,000 does not include the production costs for the annual report, the quarterly bulletins and the promotional material. It should be noted that the expenditures for the promotional material are part of the administrative budget and total approximately \$3,000. In addition, an amount of \$4,000 was set aside for the second spot announcement, which was not produced because the Steering Committee recommended limiting communication activities.

**others can simply not be assessed because of delays at start-up, belated preparation or the lack of an evaluation. The sustainability of some results is in question, in particular in the area of urban development, because of the absence of additional funding.**

As indicated in Section 2.4 of this report, Methodological limits, the profile of this evaluation remains more formative than summative in nature, because the majority of the projects funded by the HRF are still underway.

However, certain results can be established, complementing those presented in the 2013-2014 Annual Report (Appendix 6).

**Budget support operations**<sup>53</sup> (2010/2011 and 2013/2014): The first project finalized by the HRF a short time after its adoption was the Haiti Emergency Development Policy Operation, which provided the urgent funding required to make up the budget deficit for the 2009-2010 fiscal year. The objective of the program was to increase transparency and efficiency in the management of public resources within the context of Haiti's reconstruction (based on the following indicators: the increase in transparency with respect to budget transfers to the electricity sector; the reinstatement of budget controls and external and internal audit processes; improvement in the enforcement of the Law on Declaration of Assets; and the strengthening of regulations and transparency in procurement practices). The second budget support project, in 2013-2014, was the "Economic Reconstruction and Growth Development Policy Grant", which represented a continuation of the first.

The evaluation missions subsequently conducted by the World Bank made it possible to identify a certain number of substantial risks (stability of the macroeconomic framework, political and security situation, natural disasters, institutional capacity limitations) that could affect the sustainability of the measures adopted and the success in terms of spinoff benefits from development. These programs only partially achieved their objectives. In the case of the first project, the final evaluation by the World Bank was "Moderately satisfactory". As for the second Budget Support Project, the latest Implementation Status Report (May 14) considers that "progress toward results is quite simply unsatisfactory" and the final rating is "unsatisfactory", despite the intrinsic value of this type of project with respect to the rehabilitation of public finances in the post-earthquake context.

**Education sector:** The HRF's response in the education sector is substantial. The Overview of Donor Preferences table (June 30, 2014) presents the fact that six donors (of the eight having indicated preferences), namely (in alphabetical order) Canada, Finland, France, Japan, Spain and the United States, have decided to support the education sector in one form or another. This support has taken the form of financial support to the School Feeding Program (underway since April 2014, Canada, Japan – WB), the Reconstruction of the Education Sector program (Finland, Japan, United States, underway since 2010 – IDB), the Vocational Training Project (TVTE), the Support for the Implementation of the Education Plan and Reform in Haiti program (France, Japan, program included within the envelope of the Reconstruction Program – WB) and finally, the Budget Support Program, Education, Water and Sanitation (underway since June 2014, France and Spain – WB). None of the projects in the education sector have been completed (therefore, no evaluation will be available before 2015) and some have just begun.

The largest program within the "Reconstruction of the Education Sector", with an envelope of \$250

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<sup>53</sup> Under the title: "Emergency Development Policy Operation" (WB), August 2010 – September 2011; and "Budget Support Program – Economic Reconstruction and Growth Development Policy Grant" (WB), June 2013 – June 2014

million (including a \$150 million investment by the IDB) is in response to a request by the Haitian government for massive investment in this sector as part of a five-year plan aimed at focusing on five priority areas. Despite some gains in areas of immediate educational assistance (school kits, back to school grants), the Reconstruction Program has been experiencing disbursement and implementation problems for five years. In particular, it would appear that only half of the planned physical structures have been built.

## **Operations in the habitat and urban management sectors:**

### **Debris removal projects**

For evaluation purposes, we will break down the various activities carried out within the framework of the Debris I and II projects (closed out), then the 16/6 project (underway), the Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction Project (HNRSP)(underway) and finally, the "Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction Project in Port-au-Prince" (PREKAD) implemented by the World Bank, which constitutes the largest single investment by the HRF over the four years of its existence. The HRF's contribution to PREKAD makes it possible to follow up on PRODEPUR (National Participative Urban Development Community Project), a \$30-million program funded by the IDA (International Development Association/World Bank), which is already involved in the repair and reconstruction of damaged (yellow) and seriously damaged (red) dwellings in many Port-au-Prince neighbourhoods.

The two projects related to debris removal (Debris I and II) greatly surpassed the desired/anticipated results, both in terms of the number of cubic metres of debris (more than 900,000 m<sup>3</sup> of debris removed, out of about 10 million m<sup>3</sup> in total) and the number of individuals employed in the work. The two projects were part of a logical continuation of the efforts engaged in by the UNDP as coordinator of the "Early Recovery" cluster. The evaluation of the activities of the UNDP between 2010 and 2012, which was finalized in 2014, came to the conclusion that the UNDP intervention had not only been relevant, but also "innovative", particularly through the "development of a comprehensive debris management cycle" taking into account short-, medium- and long-term needs. The work, a one-of-a-kind effort never before carried out on such a scale, made it possible to develop series of lessons learned and best practices that were built upon in the form of "Debris Management" tools and a systematization document<sup>54</sup> that will likely find use in similar exercises in Haiti or elsewhere. Recycling, sorting, processing and reuse are all practices suitable to the context, the magnitude of the needs and the need to look at reconstruction in an "integrated" manner based on the "raw material" available.

### **The "16/6", Neighbourhood and Reconstruction Support project (HNRSP) and PREKAD construction projects**

These three projects represent the largest physical investments carried out under the aegis of the HRF. The first two projects were carried out under the aegis of the United Nations (with a minimum of four parties per intervention), while the last differs in being under the aegis of the World Bank.

In an ideal world, all of the construction projects would have required the opportunity of being based on the multi-sectoral efforts of the Neighborhood Reconstruction Support Project (HNRSP), because this project has made it possible for the national and local authorities to reacquire the tools needed for a physical reconstruction process carried out in an urban environment: census of neighborhoods and populations, housing and neighborhood reconstruction information system, strategic urban and regional planning and creation of the Community Resource Centres (CRCs) and the Local Technical Authorities (ATLs). By strengthening the capabilities of the main players (IHSI,

<sup>54</sup> Source: Debris Management: The Door to Development. UNDP 2013.



CNIGS, MICT – see the following finding) and putting the interests of displaced persons at the centre of the reconstruction process in a democratic and participative manner, the HNRSP laid the foundations for a strategic and methodological "recasting" of the implementation of the community planning projects in Haiti, a torch that will be picked up by the Housing and Public Buildings Construction Unit (UCLBP) created by the Government when the HNRSP began its activities. The impact of this project was reduced by the fact that it did not get off to a quicker start, but rather partly in parallel with the 16/6 and PREKAD projects, to which it was supposed to provide data.

Beginning in September 2011, the 16/6 project had the ambition of rehabilitating 16 neighborhoods in order to improve basic conditions through community participation, while closing six priority camps in Port-au-Prince, Delmas and Pétienville. The objective is to offer displaced persons and neighborhood residents sustainable housing solutions and improved living conditions through better access to basic services. The beneficiaries and local players were mobilized for the implementation of 16/6 by the creation of 8 community platforms aimed at facilitating the identification of needs and the prioritization of public investments. The platforms themselves made it possible to carry out many small projects in the neighborhoods. A number of community centres were created to support these efforts with a view to assisting platforms in better "establishing their authority at the community level by having a work space".

The activation of the HRF funds made it possible for more than 10,500 displaced families to find sustainable housing solutions. At the same time, 6 camps were gradually closed, allowing for the reopening of public spaces. By way of example, a visit organized to the Morne Hercule zone revealed that almost 50% of the houses were destroyed in the earthquake. Through the 16/6 project, 90% of the destroyed houses were rehabilitated or rebuilt. The owners of the remaining 10% had their doubts about the intervention and/or were capable of rebuilding on their own. Another visit organized by the evaluation to the Nérette zone showed the involvement of the community platform in performing the technical diagnosis. In both cases, there were major changes locally in terms of urban development and in the creation of temporary jobs and the strengthening of capabilities for income-generating activities. During the reconstruction works, jobs were created for several months, allowing many families to meet their needs and repay their debts.

The last of the projects (but the first to have been approved), the Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction in Port-au-Prince Project (PREKAD), is aimed at supporting the residents of selected neighbourhoods in the Haitian capital that were severely affected by the earthquake to return to their communities by assisting them in repairing and/or rebuilding their homes and improving the basic community services infrastructures. After a late start, the project encountered a certain number of problems (security, land tenure issues). The latest implementation report from the World Bank indicates that fewer than half of dwellings are currently finished, resulting in a progress status rating for the project of "*moderately satisfactory*" (an improvement over 2013, when it was rated as "*moderately unsatisfactory*").

### **Sustainability of the mechanisms and results of the reconstruction projects**

The sustainability of the mechanisms and results produced by certain HRF-funded projects is limited. Some project results, such as those of the HNRSP and 16/6, show a significant potential for sustainability, but lack the additional funding needed to consolidate them. The participative processes that were introduced as part of the development and implementation of urban development plans are major assets. However, the implementation of these plans could only be carried out in the medium term by the municipalities, which lack the financial resources to implement them.

In addition, the lack of adequate funding as requested by the 16/6 project has not allowed the rehabilitation of half of the neighbourhoods to be completed at this point. On the other hand, an additional funding initiative by the Canadian government – outside of the HRF – has made it

possible to deploy the same efforts and methodologies used in the Bel Air neighbourhood and to contribute to the relocation of the disaster victims who had settled in the Champ-de-Mars, which is the largest and most emblematic site in Port-au Prince. The lack of additional funding can be accounted for in part by the fact that the initial funds were committed by the donors in response to the earthquake, within the context of a humanitarian emergency. More than four years after the catastrophe, the HRF fund donors no longer perceive the HRF's projects as humanitarian activities, but rather as development projects.

In addition to the issue of additional funding, the sustainability of the HRF projects is reflected in the extent to which the beneficiaries take ownership of them. In this respect, some HRF-funded projects have generated useful and potentially sustainable mechanisms. By way of example, the HNRSP and "16 neighbourhoods/6 camps" projects are based on methodologies that encourage the participation of the local population in housing reconstruction and neighbourhood development. The community platforms are new structures that consist of individuals elected within the communities, who become interfaces with the neighbourhood development projects and the municipalities. The members receive no remuneration and the continuing existence of the structure is not directly tied to continued funding, but rather to the space the communal authorities allow them. For certain local politicians, another potential risk would be the "transformation" of these local participative structures into "politicized" bodies that could entertain notions of acting as opposition forces within the communal democracy. For their part, the platforms worry about becoming political tools for the municipal authorities. A review of the status of the platforms is underway in order to more clearly define their relationships with the local authorities.

The Community Resource Centres (CRCs) and the Local Technical Agencies (ATLs) are entities installed in the municipalities and funded by the HNRSP. The ATLs – ten in number – were created to assist the beneficiary communes in their legal, social or technical decision-making. Each commune with an ATL has six professionals recruited to provide services or advice. For their part, the Community Resource Centres (CRCs) – also ten in number – are commune-level interfaces with the community platforms. They act as "upward conduits" for information at the community base level in order to disseminate and share their vision of municipal development

The communal officials have all recognized the fact that the CRCs and the Platforms have allowed them to align their interests with those of the public and to have their Development Plan validated on more of a consensus basis, or even to develop a municipal budget and the Municipal Investment Plan, on a transparent and responsible basis. Finally, the ATLs and CRCs were funded on the basis of a "Municipal Budget Support" granted to the municipalities by the HNRSP, which in itself represents remarkable methodological and conceptual progress.

The question arising from the upcoming end of the operations – and funding activities – of the HNRSP remains that of the continuing existence of these community-level communal participation tools. Notwithstanding the apparent inadequacy of the resources granted to them by the MICT, some elected officials recognize that the CRCs work (for example, in the municipality of St. Marc) to "revitalize local taxation" with the objective of finding the means to increase local tax revenues. In other situations, following the example of the Cité Soleil commune, the future survival of the ATLs and CRCs seems more problematical and the sustainability of the investment seems to be compromised by the shut-off of funding from the HRF to the HNRSP. There is also another risk in all of these situations, that of the "risk of a salary gap between the ATLs/CRCs and city hall employees, which gives rise to tensions between them".

Finally, in terms of replicability, it should be noted that the approach and methodology used by UN Habitat for the "16 neighbourhoods/6 camps" project were picked by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) for its own housing reconstruction projects in Haiti. The logical intervention model created and implemented for this project shows great potential for replicability

by the government (national or local), the Implementing Agencies and the other players involved in national reconstruction efforts.

**Finding 18: The implementation of ambitious reconstruction projects through HRF funding has made possible the strengthening – as it did the creation – of Haitian capabilities necessary for reconstruction, disaster risk management and the organization of housing and neighbourhood development.**

The matter of strengthening the capabilities of the Haitian government is central to the evaluation of the Haiti Reconstruction Fund. The Government was shaken to its core after the 2010 earthquake, having lost a portion of its national and municipal managers in a single day.<sup>55</sup> This dramatic event profoundly altered Haiti's immediate response capability compared to the intensive international response that was set in motion. It also brought about a realization of how important it was to attempt to capitalize on the strengthening of human resources capabilities as an orientation for all of the investments to come. The evaluation team is not aware of any analysis carried out by the government, the IHRC or any other organization with respect to the impact of the earthquake on the capabilities of the principal government institutions in Haiti. It would have been desirable for this to have been done in such a way as to facilitate the design and implementation of a program and specific projects aimed at strengthening institutional capabilities. Such a process would have been perfectly consistent with the "Institutional Rebuilding" included in the PARDH.

In this chapter, we will analyze various initiatives aimed at strengthening capabilities: strengthening of the governance and management mechanism of the IHRC as the first entity to receive a strengthening of capabilities (\$1 million, with the UNDP as Partner Entity); strengthening of the capabilities of Haitian governmental institutions within the framework of the implementation of the HRF's portfolio of projects; strengthening of community organizations and micro-enterprises.

### **The Interim Haiti Reconstruction Commission (IHRC)**

An allocation of \$1 million was approved in April 2011 for strengthening of the IHRC's capabilities through improvement of its communication (national awareness-raising campaign) and legal (recruitment of a law firm to establish a legal framework consistent with the laws of Haiti; creation of a procedures manual) components, as well as its information management processes for the review and monitoring of projects.

When it came along, the Steering Committee was able to identify the structural deficiencies of the IHRC: lack of personnel and staff absences,<sup>56</sup> multiple assignments of other-sector officers: of eight strategic IHRC sectors, three are full-time and "the four other sectors have sector heads who can allocate only 20% of their time to the IHRC", which greatly limited "collaboration with the ministries and other partners".<sup>57</sup>

Finally, within the context of political uncertainty surrounding the IHRC, especially after the election of President Martelly and the issue of the legal renewal of the IHRC and until the end of the project, "there was no possibility of setting up a systematic and seamless transfer of the activities of the IHRC Secretariat to the government agencies identified as being in charge of these functions". The

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<sup>55</sup> Statistical estimates shared with the evaluation team, necessarily hit or miss, indicate losses of 20% to 25% of managers in certain ministries.

<sup>56</sup> Source: "The Strategy and Planning Department is headed by a manager who spends half his time in Haiti, and as if by coincidence, [he] is out of the country during the month of the Council meeting", Minutes of the Steering Committee meeting of 5/11, p. 6

<sup>57</sup> Source: Minutes of the Steering Committee meeting of 5/11, p. 7



matter of the handover or transfer of powers and activities demonstrates a very limited level of efficiency, even though part of the contribution was intended for the purpose of "transferring powers and responsibilities to the Government of Haiti". The funds received should have been used in particular for the design and management "of a decentralized database (External Aid Management Module – EAMM) that would make it possible, 1) to monitor all of the projects and not only those approved by the IHRC and 2) to further develop the implementation of external aid in the country". The Final Report of the program for the strengthening of the operational capabilities of the IHRC judges that the EAMM had "positive effects on the Government's capabilities for capturing the aid flows and using them to do a better job of planning the development of the country".<sup>58</sup> The evaluation did not have a mandate to evaluate the impact and credibility of this very optimistic analysis.

### **The Housing and Public Buildings Construction Unit (UCLBP)**

At the time of the January 2010 earthquake, Haiti did not have ministries of housing, community planning or public buildings. After the election of President Martelly, the new government decided to create a Housing and Public Buildings Construction Unit (UCLBP) that would be able to "conduct a comprehensive reflection exercise pertaining to reconstruction, based on which it would propose a post-earthquake reconstruction policy to the government".<sup>59</sup> The establishment of this institution made it possible to meet the challenge posed by the municipalities affected by the earthquake through the coordination and organization of the public reconstruction efforts and at the national level, to give Haiti a National Housing and Habitat Policy. While it was the first time that "housing became a public institutional sector",<sup>60</sup> the UCLBP gradually came to act as an interface between the fund donors and the Haitian state, within the framework of the reconstruction effort. UCLBP officials recognize the central role played by the Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction Support Project (HNRSP) in the consolidation of the services and systems of the UCLBP, as well as that played by the partner public agencies. This strengthening process positioned the UCLBP as "the strategic unit" for providing coordination at all levels of the various government units charged with dealing with the housing and reconstruction issue: the Interministerial Committee for Territorial Planning (CIAT), the Public Enterprise for the Promotion of Social Housing (EPPLS), the National Geospatial Information Centre (CNIGS), the Haitian Institute for Statistics and Information (IHSI), the National Directorate of Water and Sanitation (DINEPA), the Haitian Electricity Company (EDH) and the Haitian National Police. The challenge of future coordination is a matter of both organization and political will at the highest levels of government, so that the delineation of responsibilities among the preceding bodies can be made quite clear.

In the opinion of the main interested parties, the reconstruction effort made it possible to "work together", to "break with the insularities of the past" and to develop a "change of paradigm" with respect to the work of coordination and cooperation with the Haitian municipalities, in which the touchiest point seems to be the continuing financial support for the base-level entities, namely the Local Technical Agencies (ATLs) and the Community Resource Centres (CRCs) created through the HNRSP.

<sup>58</sup> Haiti Reconstruction Fund, final descriptive report of the program, Strengthening of the operational capabilities of the IHRC, UNDP, undated, Reference no. MPTF, 00080016

<sup>59</sup> Source: <http://www.uclbp.gouv.ht/pages/2-mission-et-approche-d-interventions.php>

<sup>60</sup> Source: Comment from a UCLBP official.

Right within the UCLBP, the Relocation and Rehabilitation Division (DRR), in full cooperation with the UNDP, coordinated the 16/6 project, including the Rehabilitation of the Champs de Mars Zone and PREKAD, by ensuring a consistent approach in the interventions of the national and international agencies.

### **The Haitian Institute for Statistics and Information (IHSI)**

The Haitian Institute for Statistics and Information, a specialized agency of the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), is the entity responsible for collecting economic, social and socio-demographic information in Haiti. In particular, it is responsible for the population and housing census.

The four major functions that made it possible to determine the scale of the reconstruction programs in 2010/2011 and target the beneficiaries linked international operators with specialized Haitian agencies: a) enumeration of the populations and neighbourhoods affected, using the methodology of the IHSI and new developments in mapping and the family enumeration work carried out by the IOM; b) Implementation of a Housing and Neighbourhood Information System (SILQ) by strengthening the capabilities of the National Geospatial Information Centre (CNIGS); c) Organization of municipal and community Support Centres within the city halls in order to enhance the dialogue between the territorial collectivities and the communities; d) Strategic urban and regional planning by strengthening the capabilities of the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation, the Ministry of the Interior and Territorial Collectivities and the Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communications.

Within this context, the IHSI's assessment of the value of the work done to strengthen its capabilities is very positive. Both the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) assisted in strengthening both the physical structure and the technical equipment of the IHSI, which were affected by the earthquake, providing support with their technical capabilities based on their past experience collecting information related to displaced persons. The UNFPA got involved with the cartographic updating, while UN-Habitat provided liaison services between the enumeration activities and the various initiatives providing assistance to the Haitian government with respect to land title and land tenure issues. This joint effort to strengthen and restructure the operations of the IHSI made and makes it possible to support not only the work of the United Nations, but also that of all of the government and non-government players involved in the urban reconstruction process. The enumeration and mapping activities are the foundation for the relocation and reestablishment of communities in their neighbourhoods, even if the data were not yet captured in the CNIGS database for a large number of enumeration sections (SDEs).

According to the IHSI authorities met with, the benefits of the work aimed at strengthening capabilities are to be judged on two key levels: a) strengthening of the physical structure and equipment of the institution as such, an indispensable prerequisite to the continuation of its census work; and b) the development of a new culture of work and of horizontal and coordinated cooperation with the specialized (CNIGS), territorial (Communes) and central (MPEC and MICT) operators in Port-au-Prince.

### **The National Geospatial Information Centre (CNIGS)**

Within the framework of the policy related to comprehensive strengthening of the capabilities of the Haitian players involved in the implementation of the Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction Support Program (HNRSP), the CNIGS benefited from a program aimed at strengthening capabilities through training courses, equipment purchases and the provision of specialized staff to strengthen its capabilities in the use of geographic information systems (GIS). The objective was to make available the tools and technologies needed to develop the GIS products required for monitoring

and evaluation of the neighbourhood reconstruction projects, community planning and urban development. According to the CNIGS staff, the value added by the program took the form of greater inter-institutionality with the other Haitian players (IHSI in particular) and with the local territorial entities through trained technicians who will ensure retention of the gains made and the transmission of expertise. The other benefit is improvement of territorial and administrative planning and programming with the Ministry of Territorial Collectivities (MICT).

### **Ministry of the Interior and Territorial Collectivities (MICT)**

The Ministry of the Interior and Territorial Collectivities, which is the supervising authority over the communes for administrative and financial matters, benefited from certain strengthening measures in the areas of monitoring, evaluation and communication.<sup>61</sup> Within the Monitoring, Evaluation and Communication Cell, a three-person team of specialists in communication, geomatics and public policy evaluation was created for the purpose of advising and supporting the territorial entities concerned. In this context, the MICT equipped itself with a support mechanism for the creation, operationalization and monitoring of both the ATLS and the CRCs.

### **Community platforms**

According to a senior commune official, the community platforms are "extraordinary governance and accountability tools that facilitate greater inclusiveness and community participation in the management of the city". The three mayors who were met with as part of the HRF evaluation (Cit  Soleil, St. Marc and P tionville) are all of the opinion that the community platforms represent a communication channel that is central to the "new" municipal governance, which takes the form of Community Investment Plans that are approved, discussed and shared with the base-level representation provided by the community platforms, which are organized in each municipality by the Community Resource Centres. In the opinion of the council members met with, "the community platforms must be strengthened beyond their current legal standing and internal by-laws and require coaching and support in order to be able to respond to the demands of the partners in a practical manner".

Although major efforts were approved across all of the reconstruction projects with a view to bringing about effective and organized community participation, there also seems to have been a relative lack of coordination among the various models that were introduced, particularly between the projects proposed by PREKAD and those undertaken by the United Nations ("16/6" and HNRSP). In and of itself, the lack of a "unified" approach does not seem to have changed the participative character of the activities undertaken by various series of players. In the end, this diversity, like the change in priorities within the various territorial structures mobilized over time, raises the question of the sustainability of the models and methodologies proposed in order to ensure that reconstruction proceeds in a participative, open and transparent manner.

### **Micro-enterprises**

A certain number of micro-enterprises were created in the course of the implementation of the Debris and 16/6 projects in particular. Workers and foremen were given training, particularly in the area of earthquake-resistant construction. Certificates issued by the National Institute for Professional Training (INFP) not only allowed these trained individuals to participate directly in the reconstruction work, but also to turn their experience to advantage in terms of future employability.

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<sup>61</sup> Despite several attempts, the evaluation team was unable to meet with MICT officials as part of its field work.

In the same spirit, contractors acquired the rudiments of entrepreneurship ("*Improving Your Construction Company*" (ASECO)) in order to be able to provide the construction sector with the resources and tools needed to continue the work undertaken during and after the closing of the projects. Within the framework of a partnership with the Entrepreneurs du Monde association (and the 16/6 project), another contractors association, the Association des Techniciens Professionnels en Construction Moderne (ATPROCOM) familiarized itself with locally-adapted construction techniques using materials recycled from the debris. It remains to be seen how durable these entrepreneurial structures will be. In addition to this consideration, the fact of having contributed to the upgrading of the technical skills of players in the construction field no doubt helped in setting up the construction and rehabilitation jobsites in the sectors targeted by the national operators. In another sector, building on activities related to the removal of construction debris, other micro-entrepreneurs were given support to produce recycled construction materials. The processing site set up in the "Truman" location was able to produce more than 200,000 "adoquins" [cobble stones] on its own. It is unfortunate that approximately 50% of the debris that is considered recyclable would seem to have gone unused and that the "Truman" site, under the responsibility of the MPTCE, no longer seems to be operational. One of the most significant results, both socially and symbolically, has been the gradual increase in the number of women involved in demobilization and site clearing work: up to 40% of workers hired for highly labour-intensive works (Haute Intensité de Main d'Oeuvre, or HIMO) were women.

Finally, within the framework of the Development of Milk Production and Processing in Haiti project, three milk producers associations were established, structured and legally certified in order to serve three dairies that were built and three service centres that were installed for the producers, which contributes to the structuring of the livestock sector on a small scale by strengthening the organizations of cattle farmers and milk producers.

**Finding 19: HRF-funded projects generated a certain number of inter-institutional and program synergies.**

The analysis of possible synergies deals with: a) institutional synergies created by the HRF as a dynamic structure of exchanges and meetings; and b) synergies between projects/programs.

**Inter-institutional synergies**

All of the operators in the United Nations System (UNS) commit to recognizing the synergistic value of working together in the development of the proposals among UN agencies that were presented to the HRF. At the same time, this work incorporates an analysis of the potential funding available at the HRF level, which preceded prioritization of the projects – and the attendant arbitration exercises – that would be brought to the attention of the Steering Committee. The "major" proposals issuing from UNS (Debris I and II, 16/6 and HNRSP) are proposals that clearly incorporate a search for complementarities, synergies and added value in the programming and execution of complex projects incorporating various dimensions. The Southwest Haiti Sustainable Development Program<sup>62</sup> also finds that one of the principal challenges identified was "the need to achieve synergies with other UN agencies for successful implementation of the project. Discussions are underway (UNICEF, WFP, FAO) to cover social sectors such as education, health, sanitation and food security and to create other solid and strategic partnerships for the success of the program."<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> This project was closed out in June 2013.

<sup>63</sup> Southwest Haiti Sustainable Development Program.

The second type of inter-institutional synergy is that which was part of a systematic effort to promote the participation, validation and strengthening of Haitian institutions from the very beginning of the reconstruction programming, as seen earlier with the MPCE, the MICT and the MTPTC and then with the new UCLBP and the IHSI, the CNIGS and the municipal authorities concerned. The national counterparts consulted clearly highlight the efforts that played a major role in the organization and coordination of the reconstruction works related to the 16/6 and HNRSP projects, or the Debris I and II projects for that matter.

A certain number of donors of funds also mentioned the synergistic value of the HRF Steering Committee meetings. In a country where coordination among donors or between donors and the government is weak, this body was a place of dialogue that went beyond the needs of the HRF itself, up to a certain point. For example, France and the United States reported having benefited from their frequent exchanges within the HRF in order to agree to work together more closely on certain bilateral areas.

### Program synergies

The main program synergy obviously relates to the reconstruction sector. The main synergy existing among the various programs for recovery of the built environment ("Debris" I and II, 16/6, PREKAD, HNRSP) arises from the work carried out in cooperation and coordination with the responsible national authorities. The fact of having strengthened central government enumeration and mapping capabilities, having provided support for the deployment of a new structure responsible for the implementation of housing and the built environment (UCLBP) and having created a technical (ATLs) and participative decision-making (CRCs) capability at the commune level is indicative of a synergy of organizational efforts that seeks to bring about a collective taking of ownership on the part of the various Haitian bodies in terms of decision-making and coordination. However, it is unfortunate that there were limits to the synergy between these projects, under the aegis of the United Nations and PREKAD, under the aegis of the World Bank. In certain cases, the two types of projects were present in the same neighbourhoods, without any clear coordination or any sharing of methodologies, such as in the Carrefour Feuilles neighbourhood for example.

With respect to the support provided by the HRF to budget support proposals, it is important to note the similarity of interests of certain donors to work collectively in support of certain particular sectors, such as France and Spain in the education sector or in water and sanitation reform.

### 3.5 Future of the HRF

**Finding 20: Of the four possible options for the future of the HRF, the most realistic is the closing of the Secretariat as early as 2015, given that funding will expire. However, the remaining needs related to housing and urban development argue in favour of additional contributions by the donors in order to allow it to continue until 2017, the date originally planned for its closing.**

On June 30, 2014, a total of \$0.6 million remained to be allocated, along with the wait of an additional \$10 million promised by Spain. These amounts are supplemented by the \$40 million from Brazil's contribution, which had been set aside for the Artibonite 4C operation and which was recently released<sup>64</sup> but reserved for other projects in the agriculture, vocational training and health sectors.<sup>65</sup> However, it remains up to the Steering Committee to give official approval for this level of

<sup>64</sup> Source: Minutes of Steering Committee meeting 12.

<sup>65</sup> Source: Minutes of Steering Committee meeting 12, p. 6



project spending and these projects have not yet been presented. There also remains a reserve of \$16 million allocated by the Steering Committee for the Péligre transmission line project. Finally, there would also be an undetermined amount representing the interest income from the investments made by the Partner Entities with respect to the amounts paid out by the Trustee and frozen pending their payment to the Implementing Agencies.

In terms of the future of the HRF, we will examine four scenarios: closing of the HRF Secretariat in 2015, continuation of the HRF into 2017, conversion to an Investment Fund and conversion to one or more sectoral funds.

### **Option 1: Closing of the HRF Secretariat in 2015**

The planned duration of the HRF was seven years. In theory, this is not excessive in relation to the achievement of its objective of "supporting the mobilization, coordination and allocation of resources in the form of contributions to improve basic living conditions in Haiti and assisting in strengthening the capabilities of the Government of Haiti over the long term, in accordance with the Action Plan for National Recovery and Development in Haiti".<sup>66</sup>

On the other hand, donor contributions will be the determining factor for its duration. It must be recognized that none of the donors has committed to providing new funds, because they may prefer to deliver their contributions through other channels. Once the last of the funds have been allocated, in particular those from Brazil and if there are no other contributions, the Secretariat would likely cease operations in mid-2015.

However, there are indispensable tasks being carried out by the Secretariat that should continue and be taken over by another entity until the complete closing out of the projects: handling of the periodic project reports for submission to the Steering Committee, financial supervision, monitoring of the eventual restructurings of certain projects, general follow-up to ensure that the Partner Entities deliver on their commitments, mid-term and annual reports, preparation of Steering Committee meetings and follow-up on Committee decisions. Two Haitian government bodies currently have close ties with the HRF: the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation (MPCE), in its capacity as the Counterpart and the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), whose Minister serves as Chair of the Steering Committee. The evaluation is of the opinion that the residual tasks described above should be assumed by the MPCE, with the Minister of Economy and Finance retaining the position of Chair of the Steering Committee. In fact, the type of tasks described are already part of the MPCE's responsibilities.

Funding of the costs incurred by the MPCE in performing this role should be covered by a contribution from the HRF. These costs would be limited, because the tasks would be limited compared to those currently performed by the Secretariat and there would be no costs for outside technical assistance.

The Trustee should continue until all of the projects are closed out. In fact, it will have to continue assuming the following main responsibilities that are assigned to it: receiving the financial reports of the Partner Entities until close-out of the projects, preparing financial reports to the Steering Committee, where applicable requesting reimbursements of funds from the Partner Entities as directed by the Steering Committee, collecting interest income from the Partner Entities and making the final financial information related to the receipts, disbursements and balance of the fund available to the Steering Committee and the donors within 6 months following completion of all commitments and obligations within the framework of the HRF and the closing of the Fund. However, the costs for the Trustee should be minimal, given the significant reduction in its duties.

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<sup>66</sup> Source: HRF Operational Manual, p. 5, Section 2.1

The Steering Committee should continue to meet occasionally until the effective close of the projects, in particular given its mandate "to approve the progress and financial reports and mid-term reviews of the Partner Entities".

**Option 2: Continuation of the HRF as is until 2017, with an additional injection of funds by the donors.**

As explained in the preceding finding, none of the donors met with showed any interest in continuing to fund the HRF with its current mandate. Nevertheless, there continue to be urgent needs with respect to reconstruction and urban development of disadvantaged neighbourhoods.

To begin with, the Government and a large proportion of the donors feel that, in the strictest sense, the post-earthquake reconstruction period is over and that it is time to move on to massive support efforts for economic development. However, even though it may be imperative to provide as much support as possible for economic development, much still remains to be done in terms of reconstruction. Therefore, three factors argue in favour of an additional injection of funds by the donors for a continuation of the HRF into 2017.

(1) In the first place, it is necessary to continue and consolidate the programs that are underway in the poor neighbourhoods, such as Morne Hercule, Carrefour-Feuilles, Cité Soleil, etc. "Urban diagnoses and development projects" were carried out in a number of neighbourhoods as part of the Debris, HNRSP, PREKAD and 16/6 projects, using a community planning methodology. There are Community Platforms and Community Resource Centres (CRCs) in place, along with Local Technical Authorities (ATLs) in the municipalities and in certain cases, these latter are in the process of acquiring the methodologies and tools developed. These are key, but still fragile, investments and initiatives that are at risk of disappearing without major financial commitments and technical support in the targeted municipalities. These are initiatives that fit into the "Rebuilding" concept advocated in the Haiti Recovery Plan (PRDH), in that their goal is to ensure that the living environment in the disadvantaged neighbourhoods concerned is better than before the earthquake.

(2) Secondly, according to our IOM contacts, there are still approximately 85,000 people living in tents or temporary shelters. For humanitarian reasons and for reasons of development and social peace and for the sake of the good reputation of the donors and of the Government of Haiti, these people should be supported in finding definitive rehousing solutions.

(3) Thirdly, a number of observers and individuals involved in reconstruction in Haiti point out that certain rehousing solutions are only provisional and that the problems were only displaced rather than resolved. True, there are no longer any camps visible around Champ-de-Mars or in Pétienville, but some enormous squatter settlements with hundreds of thousands of inhabitants have sprung up around Port-au-Prince, including Canaan, Jérusalem, etc. Steering Committee meetings 9 and 10 saw the Canaan-Jérusalem project as a priority. The UCLBP representative pointed out that "the need to intervene in Canaan is clearly understood by everyone and inaction carries with it many risks (sanitary, urban, economic, ecological and political). Approval of this project would recognize and support a responsible urban housing policy". All of the members of the Steering Committee acknowledged the merits and urgency of this project. Therefore, it is astonishing and illogical that, when the Brazil funds were made available for projects other than the power station, this priority was not brought forward (Steering Committee meeting 12).

According to the experts, some \$150 to \$200 million would be required to assist in rehousing the 85,000 people and properly develop the new squatter settlements at the same time. Otherwise, there is a danger of a process of "shantytown-ization" of the new neighbourhoods and a deterioration in their physical, economic and social environment. The International Federation for

Human Rights (IFHR) sounds the alarm in these terms: "the situation in many disadvantaged urban and peri-urban neighbourhoods must also receive priority attention, because these are areas occupied by increasingly jeopardized and vulnerable and potentially explosive, populations".<sup>67</sup>

It is questionable, if not regrettable, that the HRF should have discontinued funding initiatives for the reconstruction/development of disadvantaged neighbourhoods in favour of relevant but classic development projects that could be funded directly by the donors. The 16/6 project was the last reconstruction project to have been funded, in September 2011 and it was only 50% funded at that, which meant that it covered only 8 of the 16 neighbourhoods planned at the start. Additional funding from Canada directly to 16/6, without going through the HRF, later made it possible to cover additional neighbourhoods (Champs de Mars).

### **Option 3: Conversion of the HRF to an Investment Fund**

This option was proposed by the Government of Haiti during the most recent Steering Committee meeting in May 2014. The Minister of Economy and Finance "indicated that the government wished to keep the HRF and convert it to an instrument for funding development of the private sector".<sup>68</sup> President Martelly, in New York on September 25 as part of the forum for partners of Haiti, on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly, also announced the creation of an Investment Fund. A number of donors expressed doubts as to the feasibility of using the HRF mechanism for this purpose. A feasibility study of the creation of an Investment Fund is underway, funded by the IDB. The great majority of the donors consulted, without commenting on the merits of an Investment Fund, take the view that, without a doubt, an entirely different mechanism should be set up and that conversion of the HRF would definitely not be the optimal solution.

### **Option 4: Conversion of the HRF to one or more sectoral funds**

Within a context where coordination among donors and between them and the government is weak, the HRF has been one of the few tools for exchanges along with the sectoral tables among the partners and it has been appreciated precisely for that reason. It also made it possible for donors to jointly fund major initiatives in the form of budget supports or projects. Therefore, there are positive mechanisms/results and acquired knowledge that it would be advantageous to preserve, or that could inspire other sectoral-type funds.

Some national programs benefit from the individual support of a number of donors, as in the case of health and education. In addition, the government and the G12+ Group, bringing together the main donors in Haiti, agree that the mixed government-donor sectoral tables must be at the centre of the coordination process. In order to give effect to this common approach, it would be advantageous to consider the creation of sectoral MDTFs, which would fund the national plans in cooperation with the sectoral tables, which could eventually also serve as a Steering Committee. As such, these would be sectoral basket funds within a Sector Wide Approach (SWAP) that have proven themselves in other developing countries. This formula would have the huge advantage of relieving the sectoral ministries concerned of an enormous waste of their time as a result of multiple solicitations by donors for dozens of individual bilateral projects. This current state of affairs contributes to further weakening an already faltering public service. Such common funds would be in complete accord with the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 2005, in particular Ownership, Alignment and Harmonization, which are currently sparsely applied by the donors in Haiti.

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<sup>67</sup> Source: International Federation for Human Rights. "Haiti. Human Security in Danger", 2012. p.15

<sup>68</sup> Source: Minutes of the Steering Committee Meeting, 12/2014, pp. 7-8.



Members of the government informed us that, for the future, they favoured direct budget supports. However, among the great majority of donors, with the exception of the IDB and the European Union, there is some reluctance to use this funding method on a large scale, based on past experience. Nevertheless, they are counting on the results of the reform of public finances that is currently underway to consider this approach more systematically. In the meantime, the intermediate formula of sectoral funds can unquestionably represent a short- and medium-term option between project-based funding and budget support and the HRF model and/or tool could be considered, taking into account the lessons learned from the latter. A number of donors indicated to us that they were sympathetic to this option, first for health and education and some of them for agriculture and water and sanitation. A number of comments made during the tenth Steering Committee meeting on February 20, 2013, where the future of the HRF was discussed, were favourable to the establishment of more targeted common funds (in particular, the World Bank, the United States, France and Finland).

## 4 Conclusions and lessons learned

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### 4.1 Conclusions

The HRF was successful in collecting a large proportion of the funds that had been promised to it during the New York international conference. However, these amounts represented only 6% of the amounts promised for reconstruction in Haiti during the New York conference in March 2010. The amounts effectively disbursed to the HRF from 2010 to 2012 represent 6% of the aid amounts effectively disbursed in Haiti by the various donors over the same period and 12.6% of the funds disbursed specifically for reconstruction.

Consequently, although there is no doubt that it was very useful, the HRF was not necessarily decisive in the reconstruction operations as a whole, given its relatively small budget and its lack of focus on post-earthquake reconstruction. The HRF did not have the latitude expected for channeling the funds based on priorities that it could have specified, because 80% of the funds were earmarked by the donors for specific sectors or projects. Some of these, particularly in the areas of debris removal and housing, were in keeping with strategic priorities related to post-earthquake needs. Others met needs that were not directly related to the earthquake, but are justified under the broad concept of "Rebuilding Haiti" proposed by the Government in the Action Plan for the Recovery and Development of Haiti.

Although the government authorities played their roles in formal terms, it was actually the donors of funds and the Partner Entities who were the drivers of decision-making with respect to the allocation of funds, in particular by the expression of preferences. The government authorities played more of an approval role than a decision-making role. The HRF's principles and governance mechanisms were only partially respected. In particular, major delays are noted in the implementation of certain projects, resulting in an undue immobilization of funds in the case of certain Partner Entities.

The projects delivered many outputs. Those related to debris and housing greatly contributed to the restoration of disaster-stricken neighbourhoods and to an appreciable reduction in the number of individuals remaining in temporary shelters. In addition, truly participative development processes were initiated in certain neighbourhoods, involving the public and community authorities. Public institutions, civil society organizations and small private enterprises were strengthened. However, it is difficult and too early, to assess the results and the sustainable impacts at this time, especially since there has been no external evaluation of the completed projects.

Much remains to be done, both to make certain results sustainable and to rehouse the 85,000 people living in tents or temporary shelters in camps. In addition, huge squatter settlements have sprung up around Port-au-Prince, which would require support in terms of urban planning and economic development. The HRF would certainly have excellent justifications for continuing into 2017 if additional funds could be found.

### 4.2 Lessons learned

The Haiti Reconstruction Fund compiled a certain number of lessons learned in the annual reports presented to the Government and donors. Some of these lessons complement certain findings presented in Part 3 of this evaluation. Others are a reasoned reflection drawing on past experience and on HRF developments over the course of its history. We also considered it relevant to briefly recall the HRF's findings before presenting a certain number of lessons learned, as identified by the evaluation team itself.

In essence, the lessons learned presented by the HRF arise from conditions at the time of their presentation. Among other things, the lessons learned listed in the annual reports and the project reports focus on the following:

- **Governance:** The value of the HRF as an independent governance structure, which allowed it to pursue its operations despite the environment of instability. The HRF continued to operate while the IHRC ceased to exist after its mandate expired. The HRF SC, Secretariat, Trustee and Partner Entities continued to operate during the "transition" period, when the GoH was beginning to implement new procedures and counterpart provisions.
- **Effectiveness:** Working through Partner Entities makes it possible to apply international standards of good practice in the areas of financial management, procurement, environmental and social safeguards, project design and monitoring and evaluation of HRF funding.
- **Efficiency:** The HRF is perceived as having one of the lowest post-disaster MDTF expense ratios (less than 5%). Reasons put forward: well-established Partner Entities, small size of the Secretariat, an effective Trustee and a clear allocation of tasks among them. Each year of implementation of the HRF saw a decrease in its operating costs, reflecting the reduced activities of the Secretariat.
- **Donor preferences:** The lessons learned drawn by the Secretariat emphasize the ambivalent nature of the preference system. On the "positive" side: the fact that the system of preferences for the use of the contributions of the donors "increased the level of confidence (on the part of the donors) that HRF funds would be used for purposes of specific interest to the donors", thus facilitating approval of the HRF contributions and (...) increasing the total amount of funding. On the "negative" side: the fact that funds were reserved "reduced the flexibility and availability of HRF funding", contrary to the "goal of strengthening ownership by the Government and alignment on government priorities".
- **Ownership through budget support and stabilization of macro-economic equilibria:** If the system of national preferences objectively reduced the Government's manoeuvring room for getting some of its proposals adopted and for validating other donor interventions, "the emphasis placed on budget supports gives the government more manoeuvring room and greater flexibility in the management of public resources". According to the HRF Secretariat, the main lesson to be drawn in this respect is that "the unprecedented amount of the budget supports paid out (in 2013-2014) through the HRF and mobilized as counterpart (for an approximate total of \$75 million = 27.6 + 21 + 27) guaranteed a high level of funding for the government budget, which contributed to balancing public finances and made it possible to stabilize the currency and the economy of the country".

The lessons learned by the evaluation team are organized around the architecture of the evaluation Report and are presented below:

#### 4.2.1 Mobilization of funding

##### **Lesson learned no. 1: A relatively weak level of mobilization of international funding in a Reconstruction Fund and the systematic expression of donor preferences reduce the Government's interest in favouring this type of tool.**

The Government of Haiti hoped to raise more money for the benefit of the HRF than it finally did. A senior Haitian official told us that the hope had been to collect \$600 million for the HRF. However, for the people involved in preparing the setting up of the HRF, the expectations were more in the range of \$300 million. The almost immediate generalization of the system of preferences on the part

of donors, while meeting legal obligations or national priorities, gradually reduced the Government's interest in favouring a funding tool that gave it less and less maneuvering room.

**Lesson learned no. 2: The strategic interest of a Reconstruction Fund for a given government is proportional to its degree of ownership and decision-making power with respect to policy directions and project selection.**

Proceeding from lesson learned no. 1, one can legitimately conceive a second lesson learned: the expansion of any system of preferences on the part of fund donors determined to make excessive use of it delegitimizes both prioritization and ownership-taking by the government of this type of funding tool for reconstruction. Based on the example provided by the HRF, the Government of Haiti gradually decided to reject any similar mechanism that would have been proposed to it ("Cholera" or "Resilience" Fund).

#### 4.2.2 Allocation and management of funding

**Lesson learned no. 3: The powerful expression of a system of preferences on the part of donors to a Reconstruction Fund raises the question of whether the Fund is focused on the strategic priorities of the moment.**

This lesson ties in with the reflections related to the implementation of the system of donor preferences and the lack of ownership-taking by the government under such circumstances. It is legitimate to wonder about the ranking of priorities determined by a given government when everything seems to be a real priority for the reconstruction effort: physical, human, urban, etc. Therefore, insofar as it is normal to question the initial absence of a focus on some of the "strategic priorities" of the HRF from its beginnings, it must also be recognized that the open expression of preferences *by default* aligns the priorities of the government with those of the donors wishing to support it, even if some of them are the expression of discussions between the donors concerned and the authorities.

#### 4.2.3 Governance of the HRF

**Lesson learned no. 4: Within the Steering Committee of a Reconstruction Fund, the use of the consensus limits questioning of the relevance and feasibility of many projects, as well as the measurement and achievement of results.**

Did the increasing adoption of a system of preferences on the part of donors arise from their desire to free themselves from the "tyranny of consensus"? Is consensus an effective tool if it makes it possible to reject the adoption of what are presented as national priorities? Does consensus have the right to stand against the implementation of normal management processes for a Fund of this nature – such as a mid-term evaluation mission to measure the results achieved by the Fund? Is consensus tantamount to giving veto power to those who wish to opt out of a clearly identified collective priority?

If there is no easy or obvious answer to these difficult questions, the experience of the HRF will have had the merit of demonstrating the limitations of the rule of consensus (or of the *reverse veto*) for both the donors and the government when it comes time to make particular choices or state national priorities.

**Lesson learned no. 5: The absence of a systematic process for taking the opinions and ideas of the beneficiaries into account limits the possibilities for a Reconstruction Fund in terms of validating program options and the progress of projects.**

Bringing the processes for validation of experience, results achieved or beneficiary opinion into general use in a reconstruction process on such a scale should be the rule rather than the exception. Tools and adapted methodologies exist in order to put the populations affected at the centre of the decisions and commitments made on behalf of the communities. At all levels of decision-making,

evaluation and monitoring, their systematization must accompany processes on as ambitious a scale as those of the reconstruction of Haiti. Their management is not only the responsibility of the Implementing Agencies or the Partner Entities, but a function that is central to a Reconstruction Fund Secretariat seeking to build on accountability, the quality of the services delivered, national ownership-taking and transparency with respect to the donors of funds. None of the HRF's lessons learned questioned the serious lack of independent monitoring mechanisms and the impact of this on the implementation and evaluation of projects underway, which also limits any questioning concerning the relevance, effectiveness or efficiency of the projects undertaken.

**Lesson learned no. 6: Within a context of weak coordination between the donors and the government, a Reconstruction Fund becomes a useful forum for exchanges between partners.**

The Steering Committee meetings were a place for dialogue among the partners, which led them to a common understanding of certain issues and of the priorities and constraints of each of them. According to a number of participants, this proved useful and brought about collaborations and co-funding outside of the HRF itself.

#### 4.2.4 Results

**Lesson learned no. 7: The lack of internal evaluation processes and capabilities on the part of a Reconstruction Fund limits measurement of the achievement of the results of the programs committed and the benefit of the lessons learned from the projects implemented.**

Within the framework of a process of implementing a program on as ambitious a scale as that of a Reconstruction Fund as in Haiti, delegation of the monitoring-evaluation functions at the time of designing the Fund to only the Partner Entities and the Implementing Agencies does not in any way provide for an external, neutral and disinterested review of the state of progress of the projects committed, measurement of the progress or results achieved or the sharing of transparent and objective information with the stakeholders in the reconstruction process. This phenomenon greatly limits the ability to get a reading on the processes, gains and efforts committed and on the identified limits and flaws inherent in any reconstruction process.

**Lesson learned no. 8: The strengthening of national and local capabilities within the framework of a reconstruction process is a strategic priority that is just as important as the programs accompanying it.**

Within a context of destruction and destabilization as powerful as the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, the strengthening of national and local capabilities is not only an orientation that is complementary to the physical or material response. It must also be a national strategic priority that is as important as the programs it accompanies.

#### Conclusions related to the lessons learned

On the whole, the lessons drawn from this evaluation exercise are more critical than those drawn by the HRF, which generally tend to highlight the "good" lessons drawn from the process, without paying too much attention to its shortcomings, except with respect to the reflection on the system of donor "preferences". In this evaluation, we have noted the questions raised – during the course of implementation – by both the Government and the Partner Entities, with respect to the excessive use by the donors of the system of preferences. If the experience of the HRF alone is not enough to commit us to declaring a "maximum threshold" for the acceptable level of preferences, there is no choice but to invite all of the stakeholders and the Partner Entities that will read this evaluation to seriously question the rules of governance and prioritization of funding surrounding this issue, which is central to the restoration of the capabilities of a sovereign state within the framework of a reconstruction process. This reflection goes hand-in-hand with the absolute necessity of considering the question of the recovery and strengthening of the state's capabilities to take charge and strategic control of the funds raised on its behalf as central.

## 5 Recommendations

### 5.1 Recommendations to the Steering Committee

**Recommendation 1: Encourage the donors to allocate additional funds targeting the continuation of strategic housing and neighbourhood development projects, for which the HRF continues unchanged until its scheduled end in 2017 (Findings 15, 17, 18 and 20).**

The HRF has demonstrated its usefulness, particularly in the areas of removal/transformation of debris, reconstruction and neighbourhood development. Lessons learned have been identified and methodologies and tools have been developed. In addition, there are recently initiated urban development processes that it would be appropriate to consolidate in cooperation with municipal authorities. Furthermore, 85,000 individuals are still living in tents or temporary shelters and squatter settlements, with no facilities having been created. Therefore, it would be advantageous for the HRF to continue until its initially-planned end date of 2017, in order to meet these needs by allocating the last of the funds available to the needs mentioned. However, in order for this to happen, new funding is required from the donors.

**Recommendation 2: In the absence of new allocations of funds by the donors, proceed with the implementation of Option 1 presented in the section entitled "Future of the HRF", including closing the Secretariat and transferring the remaining tasks to the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation and retaining the Trustee and the Steering Committee until the complete close-out of the projects (Finding 20).**

It is not a matter of closing down the HRF as such, but of adapting its structures for a gradual closing that will not become final until all of the projects are terminated. Therefore, the governing bodies, namely the Steering Committee and the Trustee, will have to continue carrying out their responsibilities until completion of the projects.

**Recommendation 3: Pay more attention to how the implementation and results of the projects compare to what was planned and require external evaluations of the completed projects (Findings 10, 17 and 18).**

Based on the minutes of the Steering Committee meetings, it would appear that it engaged in only superficial monitoring of projects underway through the succinct information provided by the Partner Entities. In addition, independent external evaluations of the completed projects have not yet been conducted. Therefore, in order to assess the results obtained and their sustainability in greater depth, it would be appropriate for the Steering Committee to pay particular attention to the implementation of independent evaluations.

### 5.2 Recommendations to the Government and the community of fund donors

**Recommendation 4: Drawing on lessons of the HRF, consider setting up sectoral MDTFs in sectors where solid national plans exist, such as health and education (Finding 20).**

Coordination among donors and between them and the government is weak in Haiti. Each donor negotiates multiple projects with the government authorities, forcing the latter to expend time and energy. In addition, the government leadership has a difficult time making the individual donors



accept consolidated sectoral investment plans. It would be more efficient for the government and the donors if the latter pooled the funds allocated to the same sector. This would allow them to negotiate and carry out monitoring functions jointly with the Government, or to delegate responsibility to a joint body. This approach would be applied until such time as the donors come to feel that the conditions have been met to provide general or sectoral budget supports.

**Recommendation 5: Within the framework of a post-disaster or post-conflict Reconstruction Fund, limit the use of expressions of preferences and require that preferences be approved by the host government (Finding 5).**

For the implementation of new MDTFs, it is recommended that donors not systematically indicate preferences for particular projects or initiatives. However, minor preferences could be tolerated in specific cases. In order to prevent any such temptation, it is recommended that any new Multi-Donor Common Fund target specific issues or sectors. Finally, it is recommended that the government authorities take full leadership responsibility and that the donors support them in this.

**Recommendation 6: For a post-earthquake HRF-type Fund, focus more closely on a limited number of priorities (Finding 6).**

The HRF is based on the Action Plan for the Recovery and Development of Haiti, whose key concept is "Rebuilding". To the extent that a Fund of this type is able to mobilize only a small portion of the funds promised (6%) and actually disbursed for reconstruction (12.6%) from 2010 to 2012, it is better not to take on too much and to focus on priorities that are directly related to post-earthquake reconstruction.

**Recommendation 7: The Steering Committee of a Reconstruction Fund must provide balanced representation for the government, the donors and the various sectors of society (Findings 10 and 11).**

The voting membership of the Steering Committee consists primarily of representatives of donors (7 of 9), with the government having 2 representatives. It would be preferable to consider equal numbers of donor and government representatives, while at the same time broadening the membership to include representatives from various sectors of society, who would become true interfaces between the programs and the public. They have had Observer status at the HRF, but have shown little interest in that function and have not played the role expected of them, probably because they were not stakeholders in the decisions.

### 5.3 Recommendations to the Secretariat and the HRF Trustee

**Recommendation 8: It would be desirable that the Trustee ask the Partner Entities to report interest income that they earned on funds immobilized with them and remit it to the Trustee, as required under the agreements (Findings 7, 8, 9 and 10).**

The funds are paid out in a single lump sum by the Trustee to the Partner Entities at their request, following approval of the projects. In certain cases, large sums lie idle with the Entities for months and years. This has reduced the Trustee's flexibility with respect to cash management. In addition, interest income generated was neither reported nor paid out to the Trustee, as required by the agreements.





## Appendix I Terms of Reference

### 1. BACKGROUND

1.1 **Context.** The devastating January 12, 2010 earthquake in Haiti generated an enormous outpouring of international support. Governments, private entities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), creditors, and multilateral agencies around the world mobilized substantial volumes of resources to support relief and recovery. Some of these contributors had the capacity and desire to manage their own resources on the ground with the Government of Haiti (GoH). Others preferred to combine their support in a multi-donor effort to help finance the reconstruction process.

1.2 In response to a March 2010 request from the GoH, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank, along with contributing donors, established a multi-donor fund called the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF or “the Fund”). The role of the HRF is to support the GoH’s post-earthquake Action Plan for the Recovery and Development of Haiti and related initiatives. At the GoH’s request, the International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank Group serves as Trustee and Secretariat for the Fund.

1.3 **Objective.** The objective of the Fund is to support the mobilization, coordination and allocation of resources in the form of contributions to improve basic living conditions in Haiti and assist in building the capacity of the GoH in the longer term consistent with Haiti’s Action Plan for Recovery and Development. To meet this objective, the HRF coordinates its activities with the Government of Haiti, and especially the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation (MPCE) as the entity designated by the GoH as the HRF counterpart. The Fund is governed by a Steering Committee that is chaired by the Minister of Economy and Finance with representation from the GOH, major donors, the Partner Entities, the Trustee, and observers from stakeholder groups. The HRF trust fund is administered by the International Development Association (IDA) as Trustee, and constitutes pooled contributions to provide grant financing for priority activities identified by the MPCE and approved by the Council of Ministers following consultation with the Prime Minister, as consistent with the GoH Recovery Plan.

1.4 **Activities.** Activities financed to achieve the objective of the Fund, include: (a) technical assistance and capacity building; (b) infrastructure investments; (c) delivery of basic services; (d) community development; (e) environmental protection and clean-up; (f) income generation activities; and (g) budget support. This can include one or more provisions to make small grants that support these activities. Other activities may be agreed by the HRF Steering Committee when consistent with the overall mandate of the Trustee.

1.5 **Financing arrangements.** The HRF is a financial intermediary fund of pooled contributions to provide grant financing for priority projects, programs and budget support for post-earthquake reconstruction and development. To date, 19 donors have entered into an Administration Agreement or arrangement with IDA as Trustee. The Trustee, at the instruction of the HRF’s Steering Committee, enters into Transfer Agreements with Partner Entities to finance HRF activities. The Trustee has no responsibility for the use of funds once transferred to the Partner Entity. Partner Entities currently include the IDB, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the UN, and the WB. Partner Entities work through one or more Implementing Agencies that are permitted by a Partner Entity’s rules and procedures to undertake reconstruction and development activities.

**1.6 Operational approach.** The HRF seeks to minimize the imposition of new procedures on Haiti's existing development framework in order to save time and resources. As such, financing requests are prepared according to the format and procedures of the HRF's counterpart (initially the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission and currently the MPCE). Similarly, the HRF relies on the Partner Entities' rules, policies and format for project preparation, supervision, financial reporting, and evaluation/monitoring.

**1.7 Financial status.** The HRF has currently mobilized US\$396 million in contributions from 19 donors of which US\$386 million has been transferred to the HRF trust fund. The Steering Committee has allocated US\$330 million for 25 activities and reserved another US\$56 million. Balance of funds available for allocation is estimated at US\$0.81 million. .

**1.8. Status at end of June 2014.** The HRF is at a crossroads. It is expected that the remaining reserved funds would be allocated to projects activities by end of 2014<sup>69</sup> and almost all the available resources would be depleted. Therefore, at a recent Steering Committee meeting held in May 28, 2014 in Port au Prince, it was observed the HRF would have to consider closing down its activities at end of December 2014 unless new responsibilities and/or new donor contribution are trusted to the Fund. The meeting decided to review the funds situation at end of November in light of (i) progress made with the ongoing preparation of projects and, (ii) recommendations from the evaluation study to be commissioned before september 2014.

**1.9 Stakeholders.** The range of stakeholders associated with the HRF includes:

- The GoH, especially the MPCE (the HRF's current counterpart) and the HRF's other key interlocutors (the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Prime Minister's Office and the Council of Ministers)
- The Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (the HRF's initial counterpart)
- The donor community (seven major donors who are represented on the Steering Committee and 12 other donors)
- The Partner Entities (the IDB, IFC, UN, and WB)
- Implementing agencies
- The Trustee
- The UN's Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTF)
- Constituencies represented by observers on the Steering Committee (local government, Haitian civil society organizations, Haitian private sector, the Diaspora, international NGOs)
- Beneficiaries of HRF-financed activities

## **2. HRF REVIEW: PURPOSE, OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE**

**2.1 Purpose.** Paragraph 6.13 of the HRF Operations Manual notes that "the Steering Committee may commission independent evaluations such as a midterm review of the portfolio and possibly other reviews that help assess the quality of implementation and results." The purpose of this final review of the first phase of the HRF is to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the HRF; as well as its value added in order to draw lessons for government and donors and to facilitate the reflections about the HRF future scheduled at the next SC meeting in November 2014.

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<sup>69</sup>The US\$56 million are reserved for the Peligre Transmission Line Project (US\$16 million) that is expected to be approved by the SC during the last 2014 quarter; and for various projects (US\$40 million) to eventually finance agriculture, health and vocational training activities currently being considered by the government.

**2.2 Objectives.** The Review will have to determine the extent to which the Fund has fulfilled its objective (mobilizing, coordinating and allocating resources to improve basic living conditions in Haiti and assisting in building the capacity of the GoH). This implies four subsets of objectives:

- How well has the HRF mobilized, coordinated and allocated resources?
- To what extent have HRF-financed activities contributed to improving basic living conditions?
- To what extent have these activities as well as the HRF's mode of operations assisted in building GOH capacity?
- What has been the value added (cost-benefits analysis), if any, of the HRF approach to reconstruction financing compared with other aid delivery mechanisms in the Haitian context?

The assessment will also help in feeding the study on the HRF's future which is being undertaken in parallel following government request<sup>70</sup> and which aims to identify options based on lessons learned and performance results.

**2.3 Scope.** In order to achieve these objectives, the scope of the MTR should cover internal operations of the Fund, the portfolio of HRF-financed activities and the Fund's management of its finances. Internal operations include the performance of the HRF's Steering Committee, Partner Entities, Trustee, Secretariat, and Implementing Agencies in fulfilling their obligations as spelled out in the HRF Operations Manual. The development impact of the overall HRF portfolio will be considered at the level of beneficiaries in the main areas of intervention of the HRF in regards to the reconstruction objectives. However, the review of individual projects development objectives will not be part of this study and will remain under the responsibility of Partner Entities and Implementing Agencies responsibilities, in accordance with their respective internal procedures and policies. The efficiency and effectiveness of the HRF's financial architecture would be reviewed with the HRF's contributors, the Trustee, the Secretariat, and the Partner Entities. The value-added of the HRF approach to reconstruction finance should be determined based on inputs from all of these stakeholders as well as a comparison with other aid delivery mechanisms, taking into account the constraints and opportunities presented by the Haitian context.

### 3. EVALUATION CRITERIA

**3.1 Fulfillment of objective and principles.** The HRF should be evaluated according to the extent to which it is achieving its objective and adhering to its key principles. These principles, as established in the Operations Manual, are:

- **Government leadership** – the governance structure and the process for approving grants will be led by the Government of Haiti as chair of the HRF's governing body
- **Strategic finance** – the HRF resources can increase flexibility by providing reconstruction finance that is not being furnished through earmarked funding from other sources
- **Standards** – the HRF and its financed activities will adhere to international standards and good practice in key areas such as financial management, procurement, poverty alleviation, good governance, environmental sustainability, and gender equity

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<sup>70</sup> The Government has expressed the wish to convert the HRF into a venture capital fund to support private sector development, with assistance from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The study report is scheduled to be available during the last 2014 quarter.

- **Build on existing capacity** – the HRF will seek to work with and finance existing successful programs including those building social capital, e.g. through community-driven development programs, and enhancing the capacity of line ministries, local governments, private enterprise, and NGOs with a proven track record
- **Good governance** – the HRF and its financed activities will enable the participation of different levels of government, civil society, the private sector, the diaspora, and development partners and promote a transparent, accountable reconstruction process
- **Speed and risk management** – the HRF will ensure the speedy and efficient delivery of its activities while managing risks to produce high-quality results.

**3.2 Reference criteria.** The consultants should propose a set of evaluation criteria and related indicators, drawing on the following:

- Aid effectiveness (OECD 2008, pp. 9-10): ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results, mutual accountability
- Development impact (IEG 2013, p. 14): the OECD/DAC Evaluation Framework for fragile states considers socio-economic development, good governance, reform of justice and security institutions, and the culture of truth, justice and reconciliation
- DAC criteria: these are the standard evaluation targets of efficiency, effectiveness, impact, relevance, and sustainability
- Organizational effectiveness: these criteria would cover HRF governance and management, administrative efficiency, monitoring and evaluation, fiduciary responsibility, communications, and reporting

Individual indicators should embody the SMART standards so that they are: Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant, and Time-bound.

## 4. KEY EVALUATION QUESTIONS

**4.1 Role of evaluation questions.** In conducting their evaluation, the review team should, at a minimum, ensure that they answer a set of key questions. These key evaluation questions are grouped according to inputs, outputs, outcomes, and impacts. Inputs to formulate answers to these questions should be collected from the stakeholders identified in Section I as well as from internal and external documents.

**4.2 Inputs.** In the HRF context, inputs refer to the value and nature of contributions that have been mobilized for the reconstruction. Key questions include:

- How well was the HRF able to follow up on pledges that were made at the March 2010 UN conference?
- How did the HRF's mobilization of resources compare with other MDTFs in terms of timeliness (the speed at which Administration Agreements were signed and resources were transferred) and value (the percentage that HRF contributions represented vis a vis overall reconstruction finance)?
- What limitations did the HRF face in mobilizing resources from both conventional and non-traditional donors and how might these be overcome?
- To what extent did HRF financing leverage additional financial resources?
- Looking forward, what opportunities exist for the HRF to mobilize additional contributions and/or serve Haiti's development needs beyond the reconstruction?

**4.3 Outputs.** For the Fund, outputs refer to the financial resources that are allocated by the Steering Committee, transferred by the Trustee, managed by the Partner Entities, and disbursed through Implementing Agencies. Some key evaluation questions are:

- How well was the Steering Committee able to respond to GOH requests for financing by making allocation decisions according to its performance standards?
- Did allocations respond to critical financing and geographic gaps in the reconstruction process?
- What was the impact of donor preferences on the ability of the HRF to achieve its objective and adhere to its principles?
- How timely were transfers by the Trustee to the Partner Entities according to its performance standard?
- What has been the efficiency of the overall grant approval process (compared to the HRF's performance standards and the performance of similar MDTFs [preferably designed to support Haiti or other countries which experienced natural disasters or civil unrests])?
- How has the HRF responded to changing circumstances and/or priorities by restructuring activities and revising funding decisions?
- How well did the Partner Entities manage HRF resources according to their rules and procedures for financial management, procurement and auditing?
- What constraints did the Implementing Agencies face in disbursing HRF resources and how might disbursement have been accelerated?
- How did the hiatus between GOH counterparts affect the HRF?
- How efficiently and effectively did the Trustee and Secretariat use their annual budget allocations (benchmarked against other MDTFs)?
- Looking forward, what options exist for improving the allocation and disbursement of HRF financing?

**4.4 Outcomes.** Concerning the HRF, outcomes are the immediate results of individual HRF-financed activities. Key evaluation questions include:

- To what extent were individual HRF-financed activities consistent with the GOH's plans and policies for reconstruction and development?
- To what extent did individual HRF-financed activities achieve their primary development objectives linked to reconstruction and disaster risks management?
- To what extent HRF-financed activities reflect a degree of coherence and synergy between them and with other development projects?
- How well did Partner Entities, working with their Implementing Agencies, monitor, evaluate and report on the interim results of their HRF-financed activities?
- How well did the key elements of the HRF governance structure (Steering Committee, GOH counterpart, Trustee, Secretariat) fulfill their roles?
- How effective has the HRF Communications Strategy been (compared to its objectives)?
- How well did the HRF perform in the areas of monitoring/evaluation and knowledge management?
- Looking forward, how could outcomes of individual HRF-financed activities be improved?

**4.5 Impact.** In the HRF operating environment, development impacts represent the longer-term consequences for reconstruction of the HRF portfolio taken as a whole as well as the Fund's mode of operation in Haiti. This analysis should primarily focus on completed or nearly-completed HRF-financed activities. Some central questions are:

- To what extent did HRF stakeholders ensure that HRF-financed activities collaborated with other reconstruction projects and programs to achieve synergistic results?
- Did the outcomes of HRF-supported activities improve the living conditions of Haitians in their target areas of operation?
- Did the HRF portfolio as well as the Fund's mode of operation contribute to building GOH capacity?
- To what extent did the HRF portfolio reflect and respect the Fund's principles?
- Can the benefits from HRF-financed activities be sustained, scaled-up and/or replicated after the activities have been completed?
- Is the HRF's lifespan realistic, too long or too short (in light of its objective)?
- Looking forward, how could the Fund improve the development impact of its portfolio and mode of operation?

## 5. METHODOLOGY

**5.1 Selection of review team.** According to best practice guidance, the mid-term review should be commissioned by and report to the Steering Committee to ensure independence and impartiality and to guard against institutional bias. In line with this principle, the Steering Committee, with support from the Secretariat, selected a firm of consultant (UNIVERSALIA s.a) in July 2013 following a competitive and transparent bidding process. Given the ToRs are substantially maintained (even though the scope is reduced), the SC will keep the selected firm and discuss required adjustment to the contract terms and conditions in line with the ToRs revisions.

**5.2 Review methodology.** The selected consultant should provide a revised detailed methodology and design for the review. This updated methodology should describe the overall approach to addressing the key evaluation questions in terms of developing evaluation criteria and indicators, gathering and analyzing information, deriving findings, and presenting conclusions with supporting evidence. At a minimum, it is expected that the revised methodology will include:

- A literature and desk review of internally and externally generated information (see Section IX on resources as a starting point)
- A portfolio analysis to review the efficiency and effectiveness of HRF-financed activities, both individually and taken as a whole, including visits to Partner Entities, implementing agencies and project sites
- Stakeholder consultations consisting of both one-on-one semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with the key stakeholders cited in Section I
- Comparative analyses of HRF performance in different areas (resource mobilization, grant approval process, speed of implementation and disbursement, etc.) vis a vis similar post-disaster and post-conflict MDTFs
- Summary analysis of lessons learned for portfolio development and implementation, the grant approval process, Fund management, and financing



The review should be designed in one phase which would consist of: a) preparation through initial discussions and literature review; b) a primary information collection through stakeholder consultations and site visits; and c) evaluation of the information in order to draw conclusions and identify lessons learned.

## 6. PRODUCTS AND SCHEDULE

6.1 **Deliverables.** The review team is expected to deliver the following products:

- Inception Report – this will be a revised version of its proposal that incorporates changes to these new ToRs. It should include the final methodology, set of criteria and indicators, and timetable for work.
- Review of HRF performance– this is described in the previous section and should be submitted in draft form for review by the Steering Committee prior to finalization.
- Final Report – this document will constitute the complete review which includes feedback from Steering Committee members, the Trustee and the Secretariat. It is to be submitted for final approval by the Steering Committee.

6.3 **Schedule.** The products should be delivered according to the following schedule:

- Inception Report due fifteen days after signing of contract
- Draft Review of HRF Performance due two months after submission of the Inception Report
- Final Report due fifteen days after receipt of feedback on Draft Review of HRF Performance

Thus, the minimum elapsed time for the assignment would be three months from the date of contract signature, not including time for feedback from SC on various drafts submitted by consultant.

## 7. WORK PLAN

7.1 **Team composition.** The consultant will mobilize the review team it retained in its initial proposal in 2013. The consultant can modify some but not all of its initial team members. In doing so, an effort should be made to maximize the use of local resources in the team in order, inter alia, to strengthen local expertise and minimize costs. The new members should get clearance from HRF and match the profiles as well as meet skills and experience required in the initial ToRs

7.2 **Review advisory group.** The Steering Committee will continue to use the established MTR Advisory Group to review deliverables. The Group includes representatives from the GOH, Donors, Partner Entities, and Secretariat.

7.4. **Budget and financing.** Based on the initial financial offer made by the consultant and approved during the recruitment process, a revised budget -taking into account the reduced scope of work and in line with the updated ToRs- should be presented by the consultant.

7.5. **Conflict of interest.** The review team must be able to undertake objective, unbiased evaluation. Therefore, each proponent must divulge any activities or connections that might lead to potential or perceived conflicts of interest, a self-assessment of whether such conflicts exist and, if so, how the entity proposes to manage these. This applies at both the corporate and individual levels. Failure to disclose such conflicts would constitute grounds for disqualification.

## 8. DISSEMINATION AND USE OF REVIEW

8.1 **Dissemination and disclosure.** The Secretariat will be responsible for receiving and disseminating draft products to the Steering Committee. In addition, the review team will maintain

a dedicated website where deliverables will be posted for review and comments by HRF stakeholders. The Secretariat will be responsible for disclosing and disseminating the final review by hard copy and via its websites.

**8.2 Use of review.** The review can be used for a number of purposes including: a) immediate improvements in the performance of the HRF for implementation by the Steering Committee, GOH counterpart, Partner Entities, Implementing Agencies, Trustee, and Secretariat; b) guidance for the future of the Fund in supporting Haitian reconstruction and development; and c) lessons for ongoing and future post-disaster and post-conflict funding mechanisms.

## 9. RESOURCES

9.1 The Steering Committee, assisted by the Secretariat, will facilitate the work of the review team, including consultations, site visits and providing access to staff and documents. The Secretariat will facilitate contacts with the Steering Committee and provide key internal documents. An initial set of documents to be consulted includes:

- HRF Operations Manual
- Administration and Transfer Agreements
- HRF Communications Strategy
- HRF websites
- Individual Project Concept Notes and project documents
- Minutes of HRF Steering Committee meetings
- External assessments of Haiti's post-earthquake reconstruction
- Annual and other reports on the performance of similar post-disaster and post-conflict multi-donor trust funds
- Local and international media reports on the HRF

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## Appendix II Minutes of the first meeting with the ASG

### Minutes

#### MEETING WITH THE ADVISORY AND SUPERVISORY GROUP EVALUATION OF THE HAITI RECONSTRUCTION FUND

Friday, September 12, 2014, 9:00 a.m. (Montreal, Canada time)

**Participants:** Marie-Hélène Adrien (Universalialia), Yvan Conoir (Universalialia), Yves Pétilion (Universalialia Consultant), Gilles Damais (IDB), Mamadou Deme (WB), Jérôme Gandin (Universalialia) Marthe Pierre (WB), Wilner Valcin (MEF).

**Absent:** Eva Tuft (MFA, Norway)

1. Brief introduction of the participants
2. Context and objectives of the evaluation

The members of the Advisory and Supervisory Group (ASG) met the previous day to prepare the start-up meeting with the evaluation team (Universalialia). They would like this evaluation to focus on two main orientations:

1. Context of the HRF: Its mission, original objectives and evolution. This context analysis requires transporting oneself back to the context of 2010.
2. The HRF's procedures: What lessons can be drawn from the application of the procedures in the operation of the HRF? This question requires analyzing the following points:
  - a. Rule of consensus in decision-making: Did obstacles arise? Blockages resulting from this rule? If so, what were they and what was the reason for them?
  - b. The issue of preferences: Did the donors express their preferences in the selection of projects and the use of HRF funds? What proportion of the HRF funding was not affected by donor preferences?
3. Messaging/communication/image conveyed by the HRF
4. What are the possible prospects for the Fund?

The ASG expects to receive specific recommendations in order to assist in making decisions pertaining to the prospects and eventual closing of the HRF in its present form. The evaluation will also serve to draw lessons that could prove useful in the future when establishing other funds.

The ASG also clarified the objectives of the evaluation. It confirmed that Objective 1 was the most important of the four objectives set out in the revised Terms of Reference. Objective 3 remains essential and unchanged. On the other hand, Objective 2, in that it concerns improvement of the living conditions of Haitians, must be limited. The ASG has more limited expectations with respect to this Objective than the other three, because it is also aware that some projects have their own internal evaluations by the Partner Entities and/or the Implementing Agencies. The ASG suggests that Universalialia look at projects whose objectives are aimed at achieving a short-term or very short-term impact. In this respect, it is preferable to look at the projects that were carried out at the very beginning of the HRF, such as the debris management project.

The ASG will amend the Terms of Reference and send Universalialia a revised version.

3. Clarifications with respect to the evaluation questions

With respect to Questions 4.2.b and 4.3.e, asking to compare the HRF with other MDTFs, the ASG suggested comparing the HRF with the MDTFs for Aceh and Nias in Indonesia and for Sudan, as well as the review carried out by Scanteam.

With respect to Question 4.3.g, the ASG expects to see a paragraph showing what becomes of the HRF's money once it has been received by the Partner Entities. In other words, it is a matter of examining the procedures while looking at the theory and the practice. Answering this question does not involve conducting a verification or audit.

With respect to Question 4.4.a, the key documents to be consulted are, first of all, the basic documents available on the website and other documents to be requested from those involved in setting up the Fund, such as Mr. Leitmann and from government representatives.

With respect to Question 4.4.b., the term "activities" within the context of the HRF refers to the projects.

With respect to Question 4.4.b., the "major development objectives" within the context of the HRF do not refer to any objective specific/proper to the HRF. There is no overall framework for results of the HRF.

#### **4. Clarifications with respect to the HRF**

The ASG stated that there is no formal governing document for the HRF and no formal agreement between the IHRC and the HRF, but rather minutes of meetings between the donors and the government and government decisions (= implementing order, which sets out the amendment to the act authorizing operation of the HRF).

The ASG indicated that the period during which there was no counterpart for the government lasted from October 2011 (end of the IHRC) to early 2013, at which time the HRF was designated as "Counterpart" of the Fund by the government.

The ASG indicated that there were two phases of HRF activity: an immediate reconstruction response and a development phase. The ASG asked that this evaluation look into the lessons to be drawn from this evolution.

The ASG asked that the question of the reasons for the lack of a willingness to continue the HRF as a common instrument of support development be examined within the context of this evaluation. The ASG recognizes that there are powerful tensions between the desire to provide development support and the desire of donors to use the funding in relation to their preferences. The ASG suggested that Universalialia identify the golden age of the HRF (based on resources available and interests). The HRF became less of a developmental instrument for both the government and the donors as soon as resources declined.

The ASG confirmed the list of donor members of the Steering Committee with contributions exceeding \$30 million (US, Canada, Spain, France, Japan, Norway, Brazil).

The ASG stated that there is no accelerated approval process in a formal procedural sense, but rather in the form of discussion and consensus at SC meetings.

The ASG indicated that information concerning management fees (Fiscal Agent, Secretariat, Partner Entities) can be found in the Trustee report. For information, the IDB committed itself, through an agreement in principle, not to charge the HRF any management fees for the execution of its projects. The management fees of the Implementing Agencies are additional and depend on the policies of each Partner Entity.

The ASG confirmed that the IFC is indeed an official Partner Entity, alongside the three other official ones (IDB, WB, UN), but that it has no projects allocated at the moment.

The ASG confirmed the study for the conversion of the HRF to an Investment Fund and will send Universalialia the Terms of Reference.

## 5. Methodology

With respect to the schedule for the evaluation, the ASG suggested the following two points:

- Beginning of the mission in Haiti: Wednesday, September 24, 2014. However, Universalialia indicated that it will be difficult for it to begin the mission on the 24th. Its preference is to begin on the 29th, given the availability of the staff involved.
- Submission of the draft final report: November 11, 2014.

The ASG suggested checking with the Partner Entities as to the existence of evaluations of the projects funded.

Universalialia proposed the following criteria for selection of the projects in the sample:

- Extent of completion
- Type of Partner Entity
- Type of intervention/sector
- Budget

## 6. Next steps

The ASG will send Universalialia a list of key individuals before the beginning of the mission. It should be noted that many of the people involved in the HRF are no longer in Haiti. Therefore, individual telephone interviews are envisaged.

Universalialia confirmed that the initial report will be sent to the ASG on Friday, September 19.

Given the dates suggested for the mission in Haiti, Universalialia will begin planning this mission in cooperation with Mr. Deme and Ms. Pierre. The mission in Haiti will include an orientation visit with Mr. Deme. Meetings with the main stakeholders (Government, Partner Entities, Implementing Agencies, Secretariat, Steering Committee, donors, etc.) and field missions to meet beneficiaries will be conducted during the course of the mission in order to collect as much information and data as possible.



## Appendix III Evaluation matrix

### Evaluation matrix

| Area of evaluation | Evaluation question  | Indicators   | Evaluation techniques and principal sources of information  |
|--------------------|--|--|---|
| 1. Inputs          | How did the HRF go about following up on promises made to the United Nations Conference in March 2010? <i>(In relation to Objective 1 of the evaluation)</i> | Degree of correlation between the HRF's strategy and the promises<br>Existence of follow-up mechanisms/tools<br>Evidence of follow-up carried out by the HRF at later conferences<br>Existence of communication among the HRF, the donors and the Government of Haiti with respect to follow-up and proactive efforts by the HRF | Review of documents:<br>Final report on the conference<br>Action Plan for Recovery and Development<br>Minutes of the subsequent conferences<br>Governing documents of the HRF<br>Minutes of the Steering Committee meetings<br>Periodic reports of the HRF<br>HRF Operational Manual<br>Secretariat Reports<br>Individual interviews:<br>Members of the Steering Committee<br>Members of the Secretariat<br>Donors<br>Members of the Haitian government<br>Former members of the IHRC<br>Discussion groups:<br>Steering Committee observers |



| Area of evaluation | Evaluation question  | Indicators   | Evaluation techniques and principal sources of information   |
|--------------------|--|--|--|
|                    | <p>How does the HRF's mobilization of resources compare to that of other Multi-Donor Trust Funds in terms of rapidity (how quickly Administrative Agreements are signed and resources are transferred) and value (the HRF contributions as a percentage of the total reconstruction funding)? <i>(In relation to Objectives 1 and 4 of the evaluation)</i></p> | <p>Comparison between the HRF and other Multi-Donor Trust Funds with respect to the evolution of the value and rapidity of the mobilization of resources</p>             | <p>Review of documents:<br/>                     Action Plan for Recovery and Development<br/>                     HRF Operational Manual<br/>                     Operational manuals of other MDTFs<br/>                     Evaluation Reports of other MDTFs<br/>                     HRF Financial reports<br/>                     Minutes of the Steering Committee meetings<br/>                     Administrative Agreements between Trustee and Donors<br/>                     Individual interviews:<br/>                     Members of the Trustee<br/>                     Members of the Secretariat<br/>                     Donors<br/>                     Managers of Multi-Donor Trust Funds</p> |
|                    | <p>What limitations did the HRF face in mobilizing resources from both conventional and non-traditional donors and how were these difficulties overcome? <i>(In relation to Objectives 1 and 4 of the evaluation)</i></p>  | <p>Evidence of limitations related to the mobilization of resources<br/>                     Existence of mechanisms/tools introduced to overcome these difficulties</p> | <p>Review of documents:<br/>                     HRF Operational Manual<br/>                     HRF Financial reports<br/>                     Minutes of the Steering Committee meetings<br/>                     Individual interviews:<br/>                     Members of the Trustee<br/>                     Members of the Steering Committee<br/>                     Members of the Secretariat<br/>                     Conventional donors and non-traditional donors<br/>                     Members of the Haitian government<br/>                     Former members of the IHRC<br/>                     Discussion groups:<br/>                     Steering Committee observers</p>                 |

| Area of evaluation | Evaluation question  | Indicators  | Evaluation techniques and principal sources of information  |
|--------------------|--|---|---|
|                    | To what extent did the HRF funding facilitate the mobilization of additional financial resources? <i>(In relation to Objectives 1 and 4 of the evaluation)</i>   | Existence of additional financial resources<br>Existence of mechanisms/tools applied to mobilize additional financial resources<br>Evidence of the influence of HRF funding on the mobilization of additional financial resources and the decisions of donors | Review of documents:<br>HRF Operational Manual<br>HRF Financial reports<br>Minutes of the Steering Committee meetings<br>Data on aid flows to Haiti compiled by OECD DAC.<br>Individual interviews:<br>Members of the Trustee<br>Members of the Steering Committee<br>Members of the Secretariat<br>Donors<br>Members of the Haitian government<br>Former members of the IHRC<br>Discussion groups:<br>Steering Committee observers |
|                    | With respect to the future, what opportunities are there for the HRF to mobilize additional contributions and/or serve Haiti's post-reconstruction development needs? <i>(In relation to Objectives 1 and 4 of the evaluation)</i> | Performance indicators in the handling of the funding dossiers.   | Review of documents:<br>HRF Annual Reports<br>Minutes of the Steering Committee meetings<br>Tables tracking the performance indicators for the processing of funding requests<br>Individual interviews:<br>Members of the Trustee<br>Members of the Steering Committee<br>Members of the Secretariat<br>Donors<br>Members of the Haitian government<br>Discussion groups:<br>Steering Committee observers                           |

| Area of evaluation | Evaluation question  | Indicators   | Evaluation techniques and principal sources of information  |
|--------------------|--|--|---|
| 2. Outputs         | To what extent was the Steering Committee able to respond to the requests by the Haitian government to make allocation decisions in compliance with its performance standards? <i>(In relation to Objective 1 of the evaluation)</i> | Degree of correspondence between the requests of the Haitian government and the decisions/allocation of the Steering Committee<br><br>Level of satisfaction of the Haitian counterpart                             | Review of documents:<br>HRF Operational Manual<br>HRF Annual Reports<br>HRF Financial reports<br>Minutes of the Steering Committee meetings<br>Individual interviews:<br>Members of the Steering Committee<br>Members of the Secretariat<br>Members of the Haitian government<br>Members of the former IHRC<br>Discussion groups:<br>Steering Committee observers   |
|                    | Did the allocations respond to the critical funding and geographic imbalances in the reconstruction process? <i>(In relation to Objectives 1 and 2 of the evaluation)</i>  | Degree of correspondence between the allocations and the critical funding<br><br>Degree of correspondence between the regions targeted by the projects and the regions affected/Existence of geographic imbalances | Review of documents:<br>Action Plan for Recovery and Development<br>HRF Operational Manual<br>HRF Annual Reports<br>HRF Financial reports<br>Minutes of the Steering Committee meetings<br>Evaluation Reports of the HRF-funded projects<br>Map of HRF Interventions<br>Individual interviews:<br>Members of the Steering Committee<br>Members of the Secretariat<br>Members of the Haitian government<br>Members of the former IHRC<br>Members of Partner Entities<br>Members of Implementing Agencies<br>Discussion groups:<br>Steering Committee observers |

| Area of evaluation | Evaluation question  | Indicators   | Evaluation techniques and principal sources of information   |
|--------------------|--|--|--|
|                    | <p>What was the impact of donor preferences on the HRF's ability to meet its objectives and abide by its principles? <i>(In relation to Objective 1 of the evaluation)</i></p>                 | <p>Evidence of impacts of donor preferences on the HRF's results</p>   | <p>Review of documents:<br/>                     HRF Operational Manual<br/>                     HRF Annual Reports<br/>                     HRF Financial reports<br/>                     Minutes of the Steering Committee meetings<br/>                     Evaluation Reports of the HRF-funded projects<br/>                     Individual interviews:<br/>                     Members of the Steering Committee<br/>                     Members of the Secretariat<br/>                     Members of the Haitian government<br/>                     Donors<br/>                     Discussion groups:<br/>                     Steering Committee observers</p>                                  |
|                    | <p>Were the transfers from the Trustee to the Partner Entities executed in a timely manner, as defined in the performance standards? <i>(In relation to Objective 1 of the evaluation)</i></p> | <p>Degree of compliance with the established deadlines and performance standards<br/>                     Existence of delays in the transfers</p> | <p>Review of documents:<br/>                     HRF Operational Manual<br/>                     Contribution agreements between the HRF and the Partner Entities<br/>                     HRF Annual Reports<br/>                     HRF Financial reports<br/>                     Minutes of the Steering Committee meetings<br/>                     Individual interviews:<br/>                     Members of the Trustee<br/>                     Members of the Steering Committee<br/>                     Members of the Secretariat<br/>                     Members of the Partner Entities<br/>                     Discussion groups:<br/>                     Steering Committee observers</p> |

| Area of evaluation | Evaluation question   | Indicators  | Evaluation techniques and principal sources of information   |
|--------------------|---|---|--|
|                    | <p>How effective was the general grant approval process (compared to the HRF's performance standards and those of similar Multi-Donor Trust Funds [preferably targeting Haiti or other countries affected by natural disasters or having experienced serious internal conflicts])? <i>(In relation to Objectives 1 and 4 of the evaluation)</i></p> | <p>Differential between the planned and actual duration of the approval process</p> <p>Existence of delays caused by the approval process</p> <p>The HRF's justifications for the delays incurred compared to its performance standards</p> | <p>Review of documents:<br/>                     HRF Operational Manual<br/>                     Operational Manual of other MDTFs<br/>                     Evaluation Reports of other MDTFs<br/>                     Contribution agreements between the HRF and the Partner Entities<br/>                     HRF Annual Reports<br/>                     HRF Financial reports<br/>                     Minutes of the Steering Committee meetings<br/>                     Individual interviews:<br/>                     Members of the Trustee<br/>                     Members of the Steering Committee<br/>                     Members of the Secretariat<br/>                     Members of the Partner Entities<br/>                     Discussion groups:<br/>                     Steering Committee observers</p> |
|                    | <p>How did the HRF respond to changes in circumstances and/or priorities by restructuring activities and revising funding decisions? <i>(In relation to Objective 1 of the evaluation)</i></p>  | <p>Existence of "changes in circumstances and/or priorities" for the HRF</p> <p>Existence of project restructurings aimed at responding to new demands and revising the use of funds.</p>   | <p>Review of documents:<br/>                     HRF Operational Manual<br/>                     HRF Annual Reports<br/>                     HRF Financial reports<br/>                     Minutes of the Steering Committee meetings<br/>                     Individual interviews:<br/>                     Members of the Trustee<br/>                     Members of the Steering Committee<br/>                     Members of the Secretariat<br/>                     Members of the former IHRC<br/>                     Members of the Haitian government<br/>                     Discussion groups:<br/>                     Steering Committee observers</p>   |

| Area of evaluation | Evaluation question   | Indicators  | Evaluation techniques and principal sources of information  |
|--------------------|---|---|---|
|                    | <p>To what extent did the Partner Entities manage the HRF's resources in accordance with their rules and procedures for financial management, procurement and auditing? <i>(In relation to Objective 1 of the evaluation)</i></p> | <p>Quality of the management of the HRF's resources by the Partner Entities</p> <p>Evidence of defects in the management of the HRF's resources by the Partner Entities</p> | <p>Review of documents:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>HRF Operational Manual</li> <li>Manual of rules and procedures of the Partner Entities</li> <li>Contribution agreements between the Partner Entities and the Implementing Agencies</li> <li>HRF Annual Reports</li> <li>HRF Financial reports</li> <li>Minutes of the Steering Committee meetings</li> </ul> <p>Individual interviews:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Members of the Partner Entities</li> <li>Members of Implementing Agencies</li> <li>Members of the Trustee</li> <li>Members of the Steering Committee</li> <li>Members of the Secretariat</li> </ul> <p>Discussion groups:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Steering Committee observers</li> </ul> |

| Area of evaluation | Evaluation question   | Indicators  | Evaluation techniques and principal sources of information   |
|--------------------|---|---|--|
|                    | <p>What constraints did the Implementing Agencies encounter in the disbursement of the HRF's resources and how could the disbursement have been accelerated? <i>(In relation to Objectives 1 and 4 of the evaluation)</i></p> | <p>Evidence of constraints on disbursements<br/>Existence of discrepancies between contractual and actual disbursements</p> | <p>Review of documents:<br/>HRF Operational Manual<br/>Agreements concluded between the Implementing Agencies and the Partner Entities<br/>HRF Annual Reports<br/>HRF Financial reports<br/>Minutes of the Steering Committee meetings<br/>Reports of the Partner Entities and the Implementing Agencies<br/>Individual interviews:<br/>Members of the Implementing Agencies<br/>Members of the Partner Entities<br/>Members of the Trustee<br/>Members of the Steering Committee<br/>Members of the Secretariat<br/>Discussion groups:<br/>Steering Committee observers</p> |



| Area of evaluation | Evaluation question  | Indicators  | Evaluation techniques and principal sources of information  |
|--------------------|--|---|---|
|                    | <p>How did the absence of a Government counterpart for a certain period of time affect the activities of the HRF? <i>(In relation to Objective 1 of the evaluation)</i></p>  | <p>Existence of difficulties caused by the absence of a Government counterpart<br/>Extent of the impact of this absence on activities</p>                         | <p>Review of documents:<br/>HRF Operational Manual<br/>HRF Annual Reports<br/>HRF Financial reports<br/>Minutes of the Steering Committee meetings<br/>Individual interviews:<br/>Members of the Steering Committee<br/>Members of the Secretariat<br/>Members of the former IHRC<br/>Members of the Haitian government<br/>Members of the Partner Entities<br/>Members of the Trustee<br/>Donors<br/>Discussion groups:<br/>Steering Committee observers</p>       |
|                    | <p>To what extent did the Trustee and the Secretariat use their annual budget allocations effectively and efficiently (compared to other Multi-Donor Trust Funds)? <i>(In relation to Objective 1 of the evaluation)</i></p> | <p>Quality of the management and use of the annual budget allocations by the Trustee and the Secretariat<br/>Positive/negative balance in the annual budgets.</p> | <p>Review of documents:<br/>HRF Financial reports<br/>Minutes of the Steering Committee meetings<br/>HRF Annual Reports<br/>HRF Operational Manual<br/>Operational Manual of other MDTFs<br/>Evaluation Reports of other MDTFs<br/>Individual interviews:<br/>Members of the Trustee<br/>Members of the Secretariat<br/>Members of the Steering Committee<br/>Managers of other Multi-Donor Trust Funds<br/>Discussion groups:<br/>Steering Committee observers</p> |

| Area of evaluation | Evaluation question   | Indicators   | Evaluation techniques and principal sources of information   |
|--------------------|---|--|--|
|                    | Looking to the future, what options are available for improving the allocation and disbursement of HRF funding? <i>(In relation to Objectives 1 and 4 of the evaluation)</i>                                    | N/A  | Review of documents:<br>HRF Operational Manual<br>HRF Annual Reports<br>HRF Financial reports<br>Minutes of the Steering Committee meetings<br>Individual interviews:<br>Members of the Steering Committee<br>Members of the Secretariat<br>Members of the former IHRC<br>Members of the Implementing Agencies<br>Members of the Partner Entities<br>Members of the Trustee<br>Members of the Haitian government<br>Donors<br>Discussion groups:<br>Steering Committee observers |
| 3.Results          | To what extent were the activities funded by the HRF consistent with the plans and policies of the Haitian government for reconstruction and development? <i>(In relation to Objective 1 of the evaluation)</i> | Degree to which the activities and funding were consistent with the priorities and plans of the Haitian government | Review of documents:<br>Action Plan for Recovery and Development<br>Strategic plan for the development of Haiti<br>HRF Operational Manual<br>HRF Annual Reports<br>HRF Financial reports<br>Minutes of the Steering Committee meetings<br>Individual interviews:<br>Members of the Haitian government<br>Members of the Steering Committee<br>Members of the Secretariat<br>Donors<br>Discussion groups:<br>Steering Committee observers   |

| Area of evaluation | Evaluation question  | Indicators   | Evaluation techniques and principal sources of information   |
|--------------------|--|--|--|
|                    | <p>To what extent did the activities funded by the HRF achieve their major development objectives with respect to reconstruction and disaster risk management? <i>(In relation to Objective 2 of the evaluation)</i></p> | <p>Evidence of results demonstrating improvement in basic living conditions for Haitians</p> | <p>Review of documents:<br/>                     HRF Annual Reports<br/>                     Minutes of the Steering Committee meetings<br/>                     Reports of the HRF-funded projects<br/>                     Action Plan for Recovery and Development<br/>                     Strategic plan for the development of Haiti<br/>                     Individual interviews:<br/>                     Members of the Steering Committee<br/>                     Members of the Secretariat<br/>                     Members of the former IHRC<br/>                     Members of the Implementing Agencies<br/>                     Members of the Partner Entities<br/>                     Donors<br/>                     Discussion groups:<br/>                     Beneficiaries of HRF-funded projects<br/>                     Steering Committee observers</p> |

| Area of evaluation | Evaluation question   | Indicators   | Evaluation techniques and principal sources of information   |
|--------------------|---|--|--|
|                    | <p>To what extent is there consistency and synergy among the activities funded by the HRF and between them and other development projects outside of the HRF? <i>(In relation to Objectives 1 and 4 of the evaluation)</i></p>                              | <p>Degree of consistency and synergy of the HRF's activities with other development projects in Haiti</p> <p>Degree of satisfaction of stakeholders with respect to the consistency of the Fund with other development projects</p>  | <p>Review of documents:<br/>                     HRF Operational Manual<br/>                     HRF Annual Reports<br/>                     HRF Financial reports<br/>                     Minutes of the Steering Committee meetings<br/>                     Funding agreements</p> <p>Individual interviews:<br/>                     Members of the Steering Committee<br/>                     Members of the Secretariat<br/>                     Members of the Partner Entities<br/>                     Members of the Trustee<br/>                     Donors<br/>                     Members of the Haitian government</p> <p>Discussion groups:<br/>                     Steering Committee observers</p>  |
|                    | <p>How did the Partner Entities, working with their Implementing Agencies, go about monitoring, evaluating and producing reports on the interim results of their HRF-funded activities? <i>(In relation to Objectives 1, 2 and 3 of the evaluation)</i></p> | <p>Existence of mechanisms/tools mobilized to monitor, evaluate and produce reports</p> <p>Quality of the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms</p> <p>Timeliness of the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms</p> <p>Frequency/regularity of the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms</p> | <p>Review of documents:<br/>                     Monitoring reports of the Partner Entities<br/>                     Evaluation Reports of the HRF-funded projects<br/>                     Final reports of the projects<br/>                     HRF Operational Manual<br/>                     HRF Annual Reports<br/>                     Minutes of the Steering Committee meetings</p> <p>Individual interviews:<br/>                     Members of the Partner Entities<br/>                     Members of the Implementing Agencies<br/>                     Members of the Steering Committee<br/>                     Members of the Secretariat</p> <p>Discussion groups:<br/>                     Steering Committee observers<br/>                     Beneficiaries</p> |

| Area of evaluation | Evaluation question  | Indicators  | Evaluation techniques and principal sources of information  |
|--------------------|--|---|---|
|                    | <p>How well did the main components of the HRF governance structure (Steering Committee, Haitian Government Counterpart, Trustee, Secretariat) fulfil their roles? <i>(In relation to Objective 1 of the evaluation)</i></p> | <p>Degree of success of the roles performed by the main components of the governance structure.</p> | <p>Review of documents:<br/>                     HRF Operational Manual<br/>                     Semi-annual bulletins of the HRF<br/>                     HRF Annual Reports<br/>                     Minutes of the Steering Committee meetings<br/>                     Media reports/communications or other independent reports<br/>                     Individual interviews:<br/>                     Members of the Steering Committee<br/>                     Members of the Secretariat<br/>                     Members of the Trustee<br/>                     Members of the Haitian government<br/>                     Members of the Implementing Agencies<br/>                     Members of the Partner Entities<br/>                     Donors<br/>                     Discussion groups:<br/>                     Steering Committee observers</p> |

| Area of evaluation | Evaluation question  | Indicators                       | Evaluation techniques and principal sources of information   |
|--------------------|--|----------------------------------|--|
|                    | <p>To what extent was the HRF's Communication Strategy effective (compared to its objectives)? <i>(In relation to Objective 1 of the evaluation)</i></p> | <p>Level of results obtained</p> | <p>Review of documents:<br/>                     Communication strategy and communication reports<br/>                     HRF Operational Manual<br/>                     HRF Annual Reports<br/>                     HRF Financial reports<br/>                     Minutes of the Steering Committee meetings<br/>                     Individual interviews:<br/>                     External/media observers<br/>                     Members of the Steering Committee<br/>                     Members of the Secretariat<br/>                     Members of the former IHRC<br/>                     Members of the Implementing Agencies<br/>                     Members of the Partner Entities<br/>                     Members of the Trustee<br/>                     Donors<br/>                     Independent international cooperation observers<br/>                     Discussion groups:<br/>                     Steering Committee observers<br/>                     Beneficiaries</p> |

| Area of evaluation | Evaluation question   | Indicators  | Evaluation techniques and principal sources of information  |
|--------------------|---|---|---|
|                    | How well did the HRF function in areas such as monitoring, evaluation and knowledge management? <i>(In relation to Objective 1 of the evaluation)</i>     | Existence of mechanisms for monitoring, evaluation and knowledge management by the HRF<br>Quality of the mechanisms | Review of documents:<br>HRF Operational Manual<br>HRF Annual Reports<br>HRF Financial reports<br>Minutes of the Steering Committee meetings<br>Monitoring reports and other M&E tools<br>Possible knowledge management reports<br>Individual interviews:<br>Members of the Steering Committee<br>Members of the Secretariat<br>Discussion groups:<br>Steering Committee observers |
|                    | Looking to the future, how could the results of each activity funded by the HRF be improved? <i>(In relation to Objectives 1 and 4 of the evaluation)</i> | N/A   | Individual interviews:<br>Members of the Steering Committee<br>Members of the Secretariat<br>Members of the Implementing Agencies<br>Members of the Partner Entities<br>Donors<br>Discussion groups:<br>Steering Committee observers<br>Beneficiaries of HRF-funded projects  |



| Area of evaluation | Evaluation question   | Indicators  | Evaluation techniques and principal sources of information   |
|--------------------|---|---|--|
| Impacts            | To what extent did the HRF-funded activities contribute to generating other financial synergies with other organizations or donors of funds?<br><i>(In relation to Objectives 1, 2 and 3 of the evaluation)</i> | Level of cooperation of the HRF stakeholders with other projects/programs<br>Existence of co-funding carried out with specific donors | Review of documents:<br>HRF Operational Manual<br>HRF Annual Reports<br>HRF Financial reports<br>Minutes of the Steering Committee meetings<br>Individual interviews:<br>Members of the Steering Committee<br>Members of the Secretariat<br>Members of the former IHRC<br>Members of the Implementing Agencies<br>Members of the Partner Entities<br>Members of the Trustee<br>Members of the Haitian government<br>Donors<br>Discussion groups:<br>Steering Committee observers |

| Area of evaluation | Evaluation question  | Indicators   | Evaluation techniques and principal sources of information   |
|--------------------|--|--|--|
|                    | <p>Did the HRF portfolio and the method of operation of the Fund contribute to strengthening the capabilities of the Haitian government? <i>(In relation to Objective 3 of the evaluation)</i></p> | <p>Evidence of results demonstrating strengthening of the capabilities of the Haitian government</p> <p>Perceptions on the part of members of the Haitian government</p> <p>Existence in the project/HRF reports of results related to the strengthening of capabilities</p> | <p>Review of documents:<br/>                     HRF Operational Manual<br/>                     HRF Annual Reports<br/>                     HRF Financial reports<br/>                     Minutes of the Steering Committee meetings<br/>                     Recovery and Development Plan<br/>                     Project reports</p> <p>Individual interviews:<br/>                     Members of the Haitian government<br/>                     Members of the Steering Committee<br/>                     Members of the Secretariat<br/>                     Members of the former IHRC<br/>                     Members of the Implementing Agencies<br/>                     Members of the Partner Entities</p> <p>Independent international cooperation observers</p> <p>Discussion groups:<br/>                     Steering Committee observers</p> |

| Area of evaluation | Evaluation question  | Indicators   | Evaluation techniques and principal sources of information   |
|--------------------|--|--|--|
|                    | <p>To what extent does the HRF portfolio reflect and respect the principles of the Fund? <i>(In relation to Objective 1 of the evaluation)</i></p> | <p>Degree of consistency between the HRF portfolio and the principles of the Fund<br/>Existence of deviations from or non-compliance with the principles</p> | <p>Review of documents:<br/>Governing documents of the HRF<br/>HRF Operational Manual<br/>HRF Annual Reports<br/>HRF Financial reports<br/>Minutes of the Steering Committee meetings<br/>Reports of the projects funded<br/>Individual interviews:<br/>Members of the Steering Committee<br/>Members of the Haitian government<br/>Members of the Secretariat<br/>Members of the former IHRC<br/>Members of the Implementing Agencies<br/>Members of the Partner Entities<br/>Members of the Trustee<br/>Donors<br/>Independent international cooperation observers<br/>Discussion groups:<br/>Steering Committee observers<br/>Beneficiaries</p> |

| Area of evaluation | Evaluation question  | Indicators  | Evaluation techniques and principal sources of information   |
|--------------------|--|---|--|
|                    | <p>Can the benefits of the HRF-funded activities be sustained, improved and/or replicated after the activities have been completed? <i>(In relation to Objectives 2 and 3 of the evaluation)</i></p> | <p>Existence of mechanisms reinforcing the existence of the activities (e.g.: additional funding, level of appropriation)</p> | <p>Review of documents:<br/>                     HRF Operational Manual<br/>                     HRF Annual Reports<br/>                     HRF Financial reports<br/>                     Minutes of the Steering Committee meetings<br/>                     Reports of the projects funded<br/>                     Individual interviews:<br/>                     Members of the Steering Committee<br/>                     Members of the Haitian government<br/>                     Members of the Secretariat<br/>                     Members of the Implementing Agencies<br/>                     Members of the Partner Entities<br/>                     Members of the Trustee<br/>                     Donors<br/>                     Independent international cooperation observers<br/>                     Discussion groups:<br/>                     Steering Committee observers<br/>                     Beneficiaries of HRF-funded projects</p> |

| Area of evaluation | Evaluation question  | Indicators  | Evaluation techniques and principal sources of information  |
|--------------------|--|---|---|
|                    | <p>Is the planned duration of the HRF too long or too short (taking into account its objectives)? <i>(In relation to Objectives 1 and 4 of the evaluation)</i></p>                       | <p>Stakeholder perceptions with respect to the operating procedure of the HRF and its planned duration</p> <p>Measures of the time needed to complete all of the projects underway in the portfolio</p> | <p>Review of documents:<br/>                     HRF Operational Manual<br/>                     HRF Annual Reports<br/>                     HRF Financial reports<br/>                     Minutes of the Steering Committee meetings</p> <p>Individual interviews:<br/>                     Members of the Steering Committee<br/>                     Members of the Secretariat<br/>                     Members of the Haitian government<br/>                     Members of the Implementing Agencies<br/>                     Members of the Partner Entities<br/>                     Members of the Trustee<br/>                     Donors<br/>                     Independent international cooperation observers</p> <p>Discussion groups:<br/>                     Steering Committee observers<br/>                     Beneficiaries</p> |
|                    | <p>Looking to the future, how can the Fund improve the development impact of its portfolio and its method of operation? <i>(In relation to Objectives 1 and 4 of the evaluation)</i></p> | <p>N/A</p>  | <p>Individual interviews:<br/>                     Members of the Steering Committee<br/>                     Members of the Secretariat<br/>                     Members of the Haitian government<br/>                     Members of the Implementing Agencies<br/>                     Members of the Partner Entities<br/>                     Members of the Trustee<br/>                     Donors<br/>                     Independent international cooperation observers</p> <p>Discussion groups:<br/>                     Steering Committee observers<br/>                     Beneficiaries</p>  |

## Appendix IV Sources of Information for Each Evaluation Question

| Evaluation Scope | Evaluation Questions | Document Review | HRF Steering Committee | HRF Secretariat | HRF Trustee | Partner Entities | Implementation Agencies | GoH | IHRC | Donors | Other MDTFs Managers | SC Observers | Media | Independent Observers | Beneficiaries |
|------------------|----------------------|-----------------|------------------------|-----------------|-------------|------------------|-------------------------|-----|------|--------|----------------------|--------------|-------|-----------------------|---------------|
| 1. Intrants      | 1.1.                 | x               | x                      | x               |             |                  |                         | x   | x    | x      |                      | x            |       |                       |               |
|                  | 1.2.                 | x               | x                      | x               | x           |                  |                         |     |      | x      | x                    | x            |       |                       |               |
|                  | 1.3.                 | x               | x                      | x               | x           |                  |                         | x   | x    | x      |                      | x            |       |                       |               |
|                  | 1.4.                 | x               | x                      | x               | x           |                  |                         | x   | x    | x      |                      | x            |       |                       |               |
|                  | 1.5.                 | x               | x                      | x               |             |                  |                         | x   |      | x      |                      | x            |       |                       |               |
| 2. Extrants      | 2.1.                 | x               | x                      | x               |             |                  |                         | x   | x    |        |                      | x            |       |                       |               |
|                  | 2.2.                 | x               | x                      | x               |             | x                | x                       | x   | x    |        |                      | x            |       |                       |               |
|                  | 2.3.                 | x               | x                      | x               |             |                  |                         | x   |      | x      |                      | x            |       |                       |               |
|                  | 2.4.                 | x               | x                      | x               | x           | x                |                         |     |      |        |                      | x            |       |                       |               |
|                  | 2.5.                 | x               | x                      | x               | x           | x                |                         |     |      |        |                      | x            |       |                       |               |
|                  | 2.6.                 | x               | x                      | x               | x           |                  |                         | x   | x    |        |                      | x            |       |                       |               |
|                  | 2.7.                 | x               | x                      | x               | x           | x                | x                       |     |      |        |                      | x            |       |                       |               |
|                  | 2.8.                 | x               | x                      | x               | x           | x                | x                       |     |      |        |                      | x            |       |                       |               |
|                  | 2.9.                 | x               | x                      | x               | x           | x                | x                       | x   | x    | x      |                      |              | x     |                       |               |
|                  | 2.10.                | x               | x                      | x               | x           |                  |                         |     |      |        | x                    | x            |       |                       |               |
|                  | 2.11.                | x               | x                      | x               | x           | x                | x                       | x   | x    | x      |                      | x            |       |                       |               |
| 3. Résultats     | 3.1.                 | x               | x                      | x               |             |                  |                         | x   |      | x      |                      | x            |       |                       |               |
|                  | 3.2.                 | x               | x                      | x               |             | x                | x                       |     | x    | x      |                      | x            |       |                       |               |
|                  | 3.3.                 | x               | x                      | x               | x           | x                |                         | x   |      | x      |                      | x            |       |                       |               |
|                  | 3.4.                 | x               | x                      | x               |             | x                | x                       |     |      |        |                      | x            |       |                       | x             |
|                  | 3.5.                 | x               | x                      | x               | x           | x                | x                       | x   |      | x      |                      | x            |       |                       |               |

Evaluation of the Haiti Reconstruction Fund


| Evaluation Scope | Evaluation Questions | Dpocument Review | HRF Steering Committee | HRF Secretariat | HRF Trustee | Partner Entities | Implementation Agencies | GoH | IHRC | Donors | Other MDTF's Managers | SC Observers | Media | Independant Observers | Beneficiaries |
|------------------|----------------------|------------------|------------------------|-----------------|-------------|------------------|-------------------------|-----|------|--------|-----------------------|--------------|-------|-----------------------|---------------|
|                  | 3.6.                 | x                | x                      | x               | x           | x                | x                       |     | x    |        |                       | x            | x     | x                     | x             |
|                  | 3.7.                 | x                | x                      | x               |             |                  |                         |     |      |        |                       | x            |       |                       |               |
|                  | 3.8.                 | x                | x                      | x               |             | x                | x                       |     |      | x      |                       | x            |       |                       |               |
| 4. Impacts       | 4.1.                 | x                | x                      | x               | x           | x                | x                       | x   | x    | x      |                       | x            |       |                       |               |
|                  | 4.2.                 | x                | x                      | x               | x           | x                | x                       | x   |      | x      |                       | x            |       | x                     | x             |
|                  | 4.3.                 | x                | x                      | x               |             | x                | x                       | x   | x    |        |                       | x            |       |                       |               |
|                  | 4.4.                 | x                | x                      | x               | x           | x                | x                       | x   | x    | x      |                       | x            |       | x                     | x             |
|                  | 4.5.                 | x                | x                      | x               | x           | x                | x                       | x   |      | x      |                       | x            |       | x                     | x             |
|                  | 4.6.                 | x                | x                      | x               | x           | x                | x                       | x   |      | x      |                       | x            |       | x                     | x             |
|                  | 4.7.                 | x                | x                      | x               | x           | x                | x                       | x   |      |        |                       | x            |       | x                     | x             |

# Appendix V Partner Entity Disbursement Details (2014)



## Annex II – Partner Entity Disbursement Details

In USD millions







## Appendix VI Outputs of the HRF-funded Debris and Housing projects as of June 30, 2014

| A. REMOVAL AND PROCESSING OF DEBRIS   |   |
|---|---|
| Debris Management Project<br>\$17 million, United Nations Agencies                                  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 378,358 m<sup>3</sup> of debris removed</li> <li>• 26,585.48 m<sup>3</sup> of aggregate delivered to the reconstruction partners</li> </ul>  |
| Demolition and Debris Removal with Heavy Equipment Project<br>\$25 million, United Nations Agencies | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 536,179 m<sup>3</sup> of debris removed within the context of this project (85.8% of the target)</li> <li>• 8,613 m<sup>3</sup> recycled in situ by the ILO and 4,770 m<sup>3</sup> brought to Truman or reused in unprocessed form for work fill projects. The ILO is continuing the in situ recycling at the Haut-Turgeon macro-recycling site.</li> </ul>                           |
| Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction Project in Port-au-Prince, \$65 million, World Bank        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 6,420 m<sup>3</sup> of debris removed</li> </ul>   |
| B. HOUSES BUILT, REBUILT, REHABILITATED   |   |
| Debris Management Project<br>\$17 million, United Nations Agencies                                  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 9 dwellings built (demonstration of the use of recycled debris)</li> </ul>   |
| Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction Project in Port-au-Prince, \$65 million, World Bank        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1,198 houses rebuilt/rehabilitated</li> <li>• 160 latrines built</li> </ul>  |
| 16 Neighbourhoods/16 Camps<br>\$30 million, United Nations Agencies                                 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 108 houses rebuilt</li> <li>• 1,400 houses repaired</li> <li>• 4,807 houses technically evaluated</li> </ul>   |
| C. RELOCATION GRANTS  |   |
| Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction Project in Port-au-Prince, \$65 million, World Bank        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 12,765 families assisted</li> <li>• 1,251 households benefited from rebuilt houses</li> </ul>  |
| 16 Neighbourhoods/16 Camps<br>\$30 million, United Nations Agencies                                 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 5,411 families received grants and 84% (16/6) of the families still live in their homes after relocation</li> </ul>  |
| D. PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURES/COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT   |   |
| Debris Management Project<br>\$17 million, United Nations Agencies                                  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 6 area plans (by area) were developed and validated by the community and the key partners of the project. The neighbourhoods in question are: Lelio-Morne à tuf, St. Gérard, Desprez, Carrefour-Feuilles, Fort-Mercredi and Sanatorium.</li> <li>• Urban Diagnosis and Land Use Planning: Carrefour-Feuilles – Neighbourhoods of Descayettes, Saieh, Sanatorium and Savane-</li> </ul> |

|   |  |
|---|--|
|   | Pistaches, Cité Neuf and Fort-Mercredi.  |
| Demolition and Debris Removal with Heavy Equipment Project<br>\$25 million, United Nations Agencies | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Creation of 6 community platforms (the three other platforms in Pétionville were created as part of the 16/6 project)</li> <li>• Participative development and validation of urban development plans for the nine intervention neighbourhoods</li> <li>• Use of unprocessed and recycled debris</li> </ul>  |
| Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction Project in Port-au-Prince, \$65 million, World Bank        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2 community centres established in Simond Pele and Nazon</li> </ul>   |
| Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction Project, \$25 million, World Bank                          | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Micro-zoning and risk management <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mapping and inventory carried out for 2,505 Enumeration Areas</li> <li>• SILQ (Housing and Neighbourhood Information System) platform set up and gradually adopted for use by the various players (UCBLP)</li> </ul> </li> <li>2. Strengthening of risk management and development planning capabilities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Creation of 10 ATLS (Local Technical Agencies) that are operational in ten municipalities and that have begun preparing Local Development Plans</li> <li>• 11 Community Resource Centres have been created in 11 municipalities of Port-au-Prince</li> </ul> </li> <li>3. Haitian Institute for Statistics and Information building repaired, renovated and equipped</li> </ol>  |
| 16 Neighbourhoods/16 Camps<br>\$30 million, United Nations Agencies                                 | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. A total of 50 camps shut down: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 7 large camps and 17 small camps shut down (16/6)</li> <li>• 11 large camps and 15 small camps shut down (Champ de Mars)</li> <li>• All of the public spaces freed up were rehabilitated</li> </ul> </li> <li>2. Community Platforms <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 8 community platforms created</li> <li>• 9 small community projects</li> <li>• 24 training courses given to members</li> <li>• 3 plots of land identified for community centres</li> </ul> </li> <li>3. Water/Electricity <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Rehabilitation/reconstruction of 11 community water kiosks and sanitation works in 5 neighbourhoods; connection of standpipes underway</li> </ul> </li> <li>4. Roads <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 3.6 km of roads rehabilitated and 3.2 km of sidewalks built</li> <li>• 4.2 km of gutters built and 0.5 km of drainage</li> <li>• 1 km of footpaths built</li> </ul> </li> </ol> |
| Disaster Risk Reduction in the South Department, \$8 million, United Nations Agencies               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 730 linear metres of drainage canal (430 and 300, respectively, in Torbeck and Coteaux)</li> <li>• 1,300 hectares of land reforested with tree species; 1,320 linear metres of riverbank protected by gabions to reduce disaster risk in riverfront communities</li> <li>• 13,949 metres of ravines and water retention dikes built</li> </ul>  |

|  |   |
|--|---|
|  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 30,550 metres of irrigation and drainage canals cleaned</li> <li>• 144,000 vitroplant banana suckers distributed to farmers to increase food security</li> </ul>   |
| Earthquake Prevention Plan for the North of Haiti, \$10 million, United Nations Agencies         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Micro-zoning in Cap Haïtien and Ouanaminthe currently underway</li> <li>• Geotechnical testing and works underway in Fort Liberté and Port de Paix</li> </ul>  |
| <b>E. TRAINING/EMPLOYMENT</b>  |   |
| Debris Management Project \$17 million, United Nations Agencies                                  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A total of 588 contractors received technical support in business management, allowing them to enhance their ability to implement and monitor projects</li> <li>• Training to strengthen the capabilities of the community leaders (10 opinion leaders, 3 ASECs and CASECs)</li> </ul> |
| Demolition and Debris Removal with Heavy Equipment Project \$25 million, United Nations Agencies | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 16, 163 people benefited from the HIMO activities, including 6,106 women (50.8% of the project target and 37.8% of the total)</li> <li>• 807 persons employed (101% of the planned 800) in debris recycling and other initiatives</li> </ul>   |
| Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction Project, \$25 million, World Bank                       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Training of ATL and CRC members and Ministry of the Interior staff in risk management, local planning, etc.</li> </ul>   |



## Appendix VII List of Findings

- Finding 1: THE HRF has received 78% of the pledges made by donors at the United Nations conference in March 2010. Overall, the HRF has followed up on pledges made. However, these represent only 6% of all financing pledged specifically for reconstruction during the New York conference.
- Finding 2: There is no evidence that the HRF has contributed to mobilizing additional financial resources for Haiti in response to the earthquake. Instead, the traditional donors chose, to divide their contribution between the HRF and their usual channels, reserving a larger share for these channels. Meanwhile, the HRF may have prompted some small “non-traditional donors” to contribute to financing Haiti’s reconstruction. It certainly facilitated the use of their contributions by offering them a practical and appealing tool. The HRF mobilized a proportion of contributions relatively similar to other MDTFs.
- Finding 3: Barely two-and-a-half years after the fund was set up, HRF fund donors quickly demonstrated their intention to no longer contribute additional funds to the HRF.
- Finding 4: The HRF claims that it has had a “significant lever effect” on invested resources by attracting additional resources. The reality is less ideal and requires a readjustment of the positions proposed by the Fund.
- Finding 5: Donors’ preferencing for the allocation of their contributions has run counter to a number of the HRF’s basic principles, reduced the Fund’s flexibility and contributed to tying up financing. This practice varies among MDTFs. For example, the ACEH Fund in Indonesia did not accept preferencing, while funds implemented in Iraq did.
- Finding 6: HRF-financed projects come under the four ‘rebuilding’ themes defined by the Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti. However, because this plan has a wide range of objectives, HRF-financed projects are also highly diversified, if not scattered.
- Finding 7: Overall, the grant approval process has proven efficient, even though there have been significant delays related to disbursements by the Partner Entities to their Implementing Agencies. The HRF compares favourably to other MDTFs in the efficiency of the contribution approval process.
- Finding 8: The Partner Entities have played a useful role within the context of a country whose earthquake contributed to significantly weakening government institutions. A de facto relative complementarity was established among the Entities. The United Nations moved more swiftly in getting projects approved and implemented. The World Bank and particularly the IDB, acted more slowly, having planned or undertaken few “post-emergency” projects ,and also having prioritized use of their own substantial budgets.
- Finding 9: The HRF has continued to prudently manage its workforce and its administrative costs, which represent 1.4% of project allocations. Partner Entities’ costs represent 3% of allocations, to which 11% to 15% of Implementing Agencies’ management expenses is added.

- Finding 10: Generally speaking, the main components of the HRF governance structure fulfilled their roles. Nevertheless, the Steering Committee could have spelled out the priorities for the Fund and more closely monitored the results of the projects. The Trustee and the Secretariat generally fulfilled their responsibilities with diligence, to the satisfaction of the other members of the HRF structure. A formal but minimal involvement of the government authorities was observed.
- Finding 11: Taken as a whole, the 6 HRF principles were only partially respected.
- Finding 12: Management of the monitoring, evaluation and knowledge management mechanisms did not function optimally.
- Finding 13: Unfortunately, the Input Tracking System (ITS) for collecting the impressions, comments and/or suggestions of the beneficiaries targeted by the HRF's projects did not see the light of day.
- Finding 14: The termination of the IHRC and the lengthy delay before the Government named a government counterpart to the HRF gave rise to uncertainty and handicapped the operation of the HRF for almost a year and mortgaged its future as a collective funding instrument. The donors and the HRF Secretariat conducted active negotiations with the government to find a solution acceptable to the parties.
- Finding 15: Changes in the environment of certain projects were not followed by rapid restructuring, which resulted in the blocking of funds by some Partner Entities. The end of the so-called "humanitarian" period brought with it changes in the nature of the projects being funded while there were still unsatisfied major needs in the post-earthquake reconstruction projects (housing and urban development).
- Finding 16: The HRF communication effort did not achieve most of its desired objectives, thanks to the limited resources allocated and its lack of clarity.
- Finding 17: Overall, the HRF-funded activities had varying levels of performance. Some projects innovated and achieved a large proportion of their objectives, while others can simply not be assessed because of delays at start-up, belated preparation or the lack of an evaluation. The sustainability of some results is in question, in particular in the area of urban development, because of the absence of additional funding.
- Finding 18: The implementation of ambitious reconstruction projects through HRF funding has made possible the strengthening – as it did the creation – of Haitian capabilities necessary for reconstruction, disaster risk management and the organization of housing and neighbourhood development.
- Finding 19: HRF-funded projects generated a certain number of inter-institutional and program synergies.
- Finding 20: Of the four possible options for the future of the HRF, the most realistic is the closing of the Secretariat as early as 2015, given that funding will expire. However, the remaining needs related to housing and urban development argue in favour of additional contributions by the donors in order to allow it to continue until 2017, the date originally planned for its closing.

## Appendix VIII List of Recommendations

- Recommendation 1: Encourage the donors to allocate additional funds targeting the continuation of strategic housing and neighbourhood development projects, for which the HRF continues unchanged until its scheduled end in 2017 (Findings 15, 17, 18 and 20).
- Recommendation 2: In the absence of new allocations of funds by the donors, proceed with the implementation of Option 1 presented in the section entitled " Future of the HRF", including closing the Secretariat and transferring the remaining tasks to the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation and retaining the Trustee and the Steering Committee until the complete close-out of the projects (Finding 20).
- Recommendation 3: Pay more attention to how the implementation and results of the projects compare to what was planned and require external evaluations of the completed projects (Findings 10, 17 and 18).
- Recommendation 4: Drawing on lessons of the HRF, consider setting up sectoral MDTFs in sectors where solid national plans exist, such as health and education (Finding 20).
- Recommendation 5: Within the framework of a post-disaster or post-conflict Reconstruction Fund, limit the use of expressions of preferences and require that preferences be approved by the host government (Finding 5).
- Recommendation 6: For a post-earthquake HRF-type Fund, focus more closely on a limited number of priorities (Finding 6).
- Recommendation 7: The Steering Committee of a Reconstruction Fund must provide balanced representation for the government, the donors and the various sectors of society (Findings 10 and 11).
- Recommendation 8: It would be desirable that the Trustee ask the Partner Entities to report interest income that they earned on funds immobilized with them and remit it to the Trustee, as required under the agreements (Findings 7, 8, 9 and 10).





## Appendix IX List of People Interviewed

| Last Name, First name       | Title - Organization  | Interview channel          |
|-----------------------------|---|----------------------------|
| ADAMS, Tom                  | Haïti Special Coordinator, U.S. Department of State                     | Phone Call                 |
| ALWHATI, Ali                | Urban specialist and Disaster Risk Management, World Bank               | Face to face               |
| ARISTOR, Jonas              | Secretary of the Community Platform of Morne-Hercule                    | Face to face               |
| AZAOLA, Olga                | Program Manager, Spanish Agency for International Cooperation (AECID)   | Face to face               |
| BEAULIÈRE, Éric             | Town/Neighborhood (Petion-Ville)  | Focus Group                |
| BARREL, Achedou             | Administrator, St Marc Municipality                                     | Focus Group                |
| BARTON-DOCK, Mary           | Special Envoy, World Bank   | Face to face               |
| BAZIN, Henri                | Former Minister of Finance MEF  | Face to face               |
| BEAUPLAN, Bob               | Debris Management Expert  | Face to face               |
| BELIZAIRE, Clément          | Deputy Manager. UCLBP   | Face to face               |
| BELLERIVE, Jean Max         | Former Prime Minister of Haïti .  | Face to face               |
| BÉRARD, Isabelle            | Former Program Manager for Haïti. MAECD. Canada                         | Phone Call                 |
| BERTRAND, Robenson          | Assistant manager CRC   | Focus Group                |
| BIEN-AIMÉ, Jacques          | Director , Monitoring and Evaluation. BMPAD                             | Face to face               |
| BLANCO, Sergio              | Urban Planner, United Nations Human Settlements Program (UN HABITAT)    | Face to Face / Focus Group |
| BONARD, Marie               | Chief of Mission, Environment, InterAmerican Bank of Development (IDB)  | Face to face               |
| BONENFANT, Michel           | Director UNOPS Haïti  | Face to Face               |
| BOURDEAU GRIMARD, Bertrovna | HRF Communication Officer, World Bank                                   | Face to face               |
| BOUTROUE, Joël              | Norway Representative in Haiti  | Face to face               |
| BRUTUS, Yvanka Jacqueline   | Mayor of Pétion-Ville   | Focus Group                |
| BRUTUS, Patrick             | General Director of Petionville Municipality                            | Focus Group                |
| CADET, Charles              | Public Finance Reform Coordinator MEF                                   | Face to face               |
| CALIXTE MANOUCHKA, Barbara  | Project Manager , UNDP  | Face to face               |
| CALIXTE, Emmanuel           | Coordination Officer Office of the Resident Coordinator, United Nations | Face to Face / Focus Group |
| CAPELLE-MANUEL, Sandrine    | Haïti Program Coordinator, UN HABITAT                                   | Face to face               |
| CAMERON, Heather            | Program Director for Haïti and the Dominican Republic. Canada           | Face to Face               |
| CARRIER, Adeline            | Project Manager – 16 / 6  | Face to face               |
| CHARLES, Wanick             | Statistician, UNDP. 16/6 Project  | Face to face               |

| Last Name, First name   | Title - Organization   | Interview channel |
|-------------------------|--|-------------------|
| CHARLES-PIERRE, Fronck  | Assistant Coordinator , MICT   | Focus Group       |
| CHERILUS, Jimmy         | Town/Neighborhood (Port-au-Prince)   | Focus Group       |
| SCIARRA, Rita           | Chief of Unit a.i., UNDP   | Face to face      |
| COLBEAU, Delphine       | Specialist Coordinator , UNDP  | Face to face      |
| CORIDAN, Wadley         | Town / Neighborhood (Port-au-Prince, CHF Representative)   | Focus Group       |
| DAMAIS, Gilles          | Chief of Operations Haiti, InterAmerican Bank of Development                                       | Face to Face      |
| DANIEL, Manuela         | Program Manager, Entrepreneurs du Monde  | Face to Face      |
| DAVID, Odnell           | Director, UCLBP  | Focus Group       |
| De CAEN, Sophie         | Senior Country DirectorUNDP  | Face to Face      |
| De CLERK, Peter         | USG Deputy Special Representative, UN  | Face to Face      |
| DEME, Mamadou           | Program Manager,HRF, World Bank  | Face to Face      |
| DERISIER, Obenne        | Liaison Officer, UNDP. 16/6 Project  | Face to Face      |
| DERYCE, Emmanuelle      | Program Manager, IOM   | Face to Face      |
| DÉSINOR, Olivia Sybille | Transportation Specialist , InterAmerican Bank of Development (IDB)                                | Face to Face      |
| DESROCHES, Rosny        | Director, Initiative Société civile  | Face to Face      |
| DUPUIS, Sylvie          | Business Development and Vocational Training Specialist, ILO                                       | Face to Face      |
| DUQUESNE, Pierre        | French Reconstruction Ambassador , Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France                             | Telephone         |
| DUTRA, Aniel            | Advisor, Embassy of Brazil in Haiti  | Face to Face      |
| DUVAL, Frantz           | Editor in Chief Nouvelliste newspaper  | Face to Face      |
| EBERT, Peltrop          | A/D DATDLR, MPCE   | Focus Group       |
| EDMOND, Berdine         | Communication Officer, World Bank (former HRF Communication Officer)                               | Face to Face      |
| ERROL ETIENNE, Pierre   | General Director, MEF  | Face to Face      |
| ESPÉRANCE, Pierre       | Director, RNDDH  | Face to Face      |
| EUGÈNE, Enold           | Town/Neighborhood  | Focus Group       |
| EUGÈNE, Jacquelin       | Project Manager, CECI-Haiti  | Face to Face      |
| EVENO, Daniel, Fils     | Town/Neighborhood (Moravia, Carrefour Feuilles, Port-au-Prince)                                    | Focus Group       |
| EWALD, Anouk            | Education Specialist, InterAmerican Bank of Development (IDB)                                      | Face to Face      |
| FLECHER, Réginal        | Community Mobilizer  | Focus Group       |
| GAZON, Bénédicte        | Director, Agence Française de Développement  | Face to Face      |
| GEORGES, Patrick        | Project Assistant CRC, IOM   | Focus Group       |
| GOODSTEIN, Grégoire     | Chief of Mission, IOM Haïti  | Face to Face      |
| GRANDPIERRE, Claude     | Special Advisor to the Minister, Ministère de la Planification et de la coopération externe (MPCE) | Face to Face      |

| Last Name, First name       | Title - Organization  | Interview channel |
|-----------------------------|---|-------------------|
| GUENTHER, Dirk              | Observer, Steering Committe. Welt Hunger Hilfe                                    | Face to Face      |
| GUERRIER, Nathalie          | Town / Neighborhood   | Focus Group       |
| GUYPSY, Michel              | Director, CECI - Haïti  | Face to Face      |
| HORLINE, Julien             | Administrative Assistant (ATL)  | Focus Group       |
| IMAI, Tatsuya               | Attaché, Embassy of Japan in Haiti  | Face to Face      |
| INOUE, Rie                  | Attaché, Embassy of Japan   | Face to Face      |
| ISEMOND, Ghislaine          | Town / Neighborhood (Port-au-Prince, CHF Representative)                          | Focus Group       |
| JADOTTE, Evans              | Resident Economist, World Bank  | Face to Face      |
| JEAN-BAPTISTE, Jacqueline   | Town / Neighborhood (Petion-Ville)  | Focus Group       |
| JEAN MARIE, Marie Carmelle  | Minister of Economy and Finances  | Face to Face      |
| JEAN, Clervil               | Town / Neighborhood (Savanne Pistache)  | Focus Group       |
| JEAN RONY, Eugène           | Mayor, St Marc Municipality   | Focus Group       |
| JEAN, Yves-Robert           | Former General Director, MPCE   | Face to Face      |
| JEUNE, Lucson               | President Association pour Sauver les enfants de la Délinquance –ASSEDEL          | Face to Face      |
| JOLIFILS, Renal             | Mayor of Cité Soleil  | Focus Group       |
| JOSEPH, Dady Clotilde       | Town / Neighborhood   | Focus Group       |
| JOSEPH, Kendi               | Member of Nerette Community Platform  | Telephone         |
| JOSEPH, Jameson             | Town / Neighborhood (Carrefour Feuille)   | Focus Group       |
| KEANE, Michelle             | Lead Country Officer, World Bank  | Telephone         |
| KIM, Maria                  | Private Sector Development Specialist, World Bank (former HRF Operations Officer) | Face to Face      |
| LAGUERRE, Dave-Ansy         | Director, Business Services Center  | Face to Face      |
| LALEAU, Marie France        | Director of the Economic Studies Bureau, Ministry of Economy and Finance          | Face to Face      |
| LE CORPS, Michael           | Director, BMPAD   | Face to Face      |
| LEITMANN, Joseph            | Former HRF Program Manager – World Bank   | Telephone         |
| LÉON, Léandre               | Municipal Plateform, Cité Soleil  | Focus Group       |
| LE PAPE, Vincent            | Chief of Cooperation, MAECD, Canadian Embassy                                     | Face to Face      |
| LOUIS, Obenson              | Community Mozilization Officer / 16/6   | Face to Face      |
| MAGNAT, Julien              | Coordinator – ILO - Haiti   | Face to Face      |
| MALENFANT, Michel           | Manager, UNOPS  | Telephone         |
| MASSENA, Mathilde           | President of @PROCOM  | Face to Face      |
| MASSENA, Yvenson            | Team Leader Cash for Work Débris I et II  | Face to Face      |
| MATTHIEUSSENT ROMAIN, Sarah | Water and Sanitation Senior Specialist, InterAmerician Development Bank (IDB)     | Face to Face      |
| MENARD, Patrick             | Advisor, Security Officer, Virtual Defense and Development International (VDDI)   | Face to Face      |

| Last Name, First name     | Title - Organization   | Interview channel |
|---------------------------|--|-------------------|
| MÉTELLUS, Alfred          | Former Secretary of State – Finance – MEF, Haitian Government                                    | Telephone         |
| MÉTELLUS, Evens           | Entrepreneur in Debris Crushing  | Face to Face      |
| MICHELOT, Pierre          | External Cooperation Director (MPCE)   | Face to Face      |
| NADON, Claude             | Program Manager, UNOPS   | Telephone         |
| NDIKUMANA, Déo            | Operations Coordinator in Haïti, World Bank.   | Face to Face      |
| NINO PEREZ, Javier        | Head of Delegation   | Face to Face      |
| OCTAVE, Roberson          | Town / Neighborhood (Carrefour Feuille)  | Focus Group       |
| OHLER, Frits M.           | Resident Representative - FAO  | Face to Face      |
| OSORIO, Diego             | Former Operations Officer, HRF   | Face to Face      |
| PETIOTE, Ruben            | Community Mobilizer, Cité Soleil   | Focus Group       |
| PIARD, Bobby Emm          | General Director, CNIGS  | Focus Group       |
| PIERRE-LOUIS, Guerrio     | Town / Neighborhood (Petion-Ville)   | Focus Group       |
| PRÉSUMÉ, Michel           | Secretary of State – Planning, MPCE – Government of Haïti.                                       | Face to Face      |
| RENOIS, Clarens           | Independent Journalist   | Face to Face      |
| RAMANANTOANINA, Patrick   | Education Specialist, World Bank   | Face to Face      |
| RICHARD, Innocent Junior  | Community Mobilizer Officer CAR, CECI-Haiti  | Face to Face      |
| ROBINSON                  | Town/Neighborhood (Carrefour Feuille, Environment and Promotion of Agriculture Commission, CEPA) | Face to Face      |
| RODRIGUEZ ARCE, Ma Carmen | General Coordinator, Embassy of Spain in Haïti   | Face to Face      |
| ROMAIN, Emmanuel          | Vice-président of @PROCOM  | Face to Face      |
| SAINT-LOUIS, Vastie       | Lawyer Cité Soleil (ATL)   | Groupe focus      |
| SAINT-NATUS, Jude         | Coordinator Assistant, UN-HABITAT  | Groupe focus      |
| SCALORBI, Massimo         | Representative, Union Européenne   | Face to Face      |
| ST-VIL, Jean Genet        | Médecins Sans Frontières   | Groupe focus      |
| SÉNÉCHAL, Vilot           | Town/Neighborhood  | Groupe focus      |
| SILDOR, Pierre-François   | Director, Centre de Coopération Haïti-Canada (CCHC)  | Face to Face      |
| SIMEON, Patrick           | Manager, CRC   | Groupe focus      |
| STANGU, Darius            | HRF Trustee, World Bank  | Face to Face      |
| TAMURA, Katsuyoshi        | Ambassador of Japan in Haiti   | Face to Face      |
| TEIXEIRA, Claudio         | Program Director, Technical Cooperation Center, Embassy of Brazil                                | Face to Face      |
| TROCHER, Alain            | Manager, IOM   | Face to Face      |
| THYS, Pierre Kénol        | Energy Specialist. IDB   | Face to Face      |
| VALCIN, Wilner            | Chief of Staff. MEF  | Face to Face      |
| VERRET, Gabriel           | Former Executive Director, IHRC  | Face to Face      |
| VICIERE, Samuel           | Concrete Blocks and Adoquin Entrepreneur   | Face to Face      |

| Last Name, First name | Title - Organization                                  | Interview channel |
|-----------------------|---|-------------------|
| VIXAMAR, Arnaud       | Community Mobilization Officer 16/6.                  | Face to Face      |
| WADDLE, Roberts       | Coordination and Aid Effectiveness, Embassy of Canada | Face to Face      |
| WENSON, Salomon       | Engineer, VRD, ATL                                    | Focus Group       |



## Appendix X List of Documents Consulted (French)

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- HRF Transfer Agreement between the World Bank and WB (2010) Transfer Agreement – Haïti reconstruction found (HRF) trust found (MTO No. 069016), 11 Pages.
- Ministère de l'Education Nationale et de la formation professionnelle (2012) Protocole D'entente entre l'insttut national de formation professionnelle (INFP) et le bureau international du travail (BIT), 5 Pages.
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### **Site Internet du FRH**












## Appendix XI Portfolio Review

|   | Emergency Development Policy Operation - WB  | Debris 1 - UN   | Debris 2 - UN  | Budget support - WB   | Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction (PREKAD) - WB   | Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction - UN (HNRSP)  | 16 neighbourhoods /6 camps - UN   | Reconstruction of the Education Sector - IDB  | Disaster Risk Reduction in the South Department - UN   | Points of comparison   |
|---|--|---|--|---|--|--|---|---|--|--|
| <b>Proxy questions</b>  | <p><b>Documents used for the analysis:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Implementation completion and results Evaluation Report – IDA-H6090 TF-97532, March 2012</li> <li>-Program document – Emergency Development Policy Operation (Budget Support), July 2010</li> </ul> | <p><b>Documents used for the analysis:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Final descriptive report of the Debris Management program to assist the return of the populations affected by the earthquake in six neighbourhoods of Port-au Prince to their homes (Debris 1), September 2013</li> <li>-Debris 1 program document, December 2010</li> </ul> | <p><b>Documents used for the analysis:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Final descriptive report on the progress of the Debris Management program, Phase II, September 2013</li> <li>-Project document Debris – Phase II</li> </ul>                   | <p><b>Documents used for the analysis:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Program document – Economic Reconstruction and Growth Development Policy Credit, May 2013</li> <li>-Implementation Status &amp; Results: Economic Reconstruction and Growth Development Policy Credit (P127208), May 2014</li> <li>-Supervision mission: Donation to the Economic Reconstruction and Growth Development Policy Credit (briefing book), May 2014</li> </ul> | <p><b>Documents used for the analysis:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Implementation Status &amp; Results Report: Port-au-Prince Neighborhood Housing Reconstruction (P125805), June 2014</li> <li>-Haiti Reconstruction Fund: Status Update as of July 2014 (PREKAD)</li> <li>-Supervision mission PREKAD and PRODEPUR (briefing book), December 2013</li> <li>-Project document – Emergency reconstruction project for disadvantaged neighbourhoods in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area (PREKAD), May 2011</li> </ul> | <p><b>Documents used for the analysis:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Annual descriptive report on the progress of the Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction Support Program (HNRSP), December 2013</li> <li>-Evaluation of the Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction Support Program, 2013</li> <li>-Program document – Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction Support Program, July 2011</li> </ul> | <p><b>Documents used for the analysis:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Annual descriptive report on progress of the program: 16 neighbourhoods/ 6 Camps project and Champs de Mars project, December 2013</li> <li>-Program document: Rehabilitation of 16 neighbourhoods and voluntary return of families from six associated camps, September 2011</li> </ul> | <p><b>Documents used for the analysis:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Education Reform Project: Status Update as of June 30, 2014</li> </ul>   | <p><b>Documents used for the analysis:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Project document: Reduction of the vulnerability of populations and infrastructures in the South Department,</li> <li>-Final descriptive report of the program, 2013</li> </ul> |  |
| <b>What are the general characteristics of the HRF portfolio?</b> | <p><b>Execution period:</b> 08/2010 – 09/2011</p> <p><b>Sector:</b> Reconstruction funding transparency</p> <p><b>Contributions:</b> USD 25 million</p> <p><b>Implementation partners:</b> Ministry of Economy and</p>   | <p><b>Execution period:</b> 12/2010 – 06/2013</p> <p><b>Sector:</b> Debris management</p> <p><b>Contributions:</b> USD 16.95 million</p> <p><b>Participating organizations:</b> ILO, UN-HABITAT, MTPTC, MPCI, PAP town council, Pétienville town council, Delmas town council</p>   | <p><b>Execution period:</b> 06/2011 – 06/2013</p> <p><b>Sector:</b> Debris management</p> <p><b>Contributions:</b> USD 25 million</p> <p><b>Participating organizations:</b> UNDP, ILO, UN-Habitat</p> <p><b>Implementation partners:</b> MTPTC / Port-au-Prince</p> | <p><b>Execution period:</b> 08/2013 – 06/2014</p> <p><b>Sector:</b> budget support (economic development and growth policy)</p> <p><b>Contributions:</b> USD 20 million</p> <p><b>Implementation partners:</b> MEF, EDH GENERAL DIRECTORATE, CNMP, CSC/CA, ULCC</p> <p><b>Geographic location:</b> Haiti</p>  | <p><b>Execution period:</b> 07/2011 – 06/2015</p> <p><b>Sector:</b> housing</p> <p><b>Contributions:</b> USD 65 million</p> <p><b>Implementation partners:</b> Bureau of Monetization of Development Aid Programs (BMPAD)</p> <p><b>Geographic location:</b> Port-au-Prince, Haiti</p> <p><b>Compliance with</b></p>   | <p><b>Execution period:</b> 08/2011 – still underway</p> <p><b>Sector:</b> Housing (preparation for reconstruction)</p> <p><b>Contributions:</b> USD 25 million</p> <p><b>Participating organizations:</b> IOM, UN-Habitat, UNDP, UNFPA</p> <p><b>Implementation partners:</b> MPCE,</p>   | <p><b>Execution period:</b> 09/2011 – still underway</p> <p><b>Sector:</b> Housing and infrastructures</p> <p><b>Contributions:</b> USD 30 million</p> <p><b>Participating organizations:</b> UNDP, UNOPS, IOM, ILO</p> <p><b>Implementation partners:</b></p>  | <p><b>Execution period:</b> 07/2011 – 06/2015</p> <p><b>Sector:</b> Education</p> <p><b>Contributions:</b> USD 18.7 million (from the HRF, but the project has a total value of 250 million.</p> <p><b>Implementation partners:</b> Ministry of</p> | <p><b>Execution period:</b> 01/2011 – 04/2012</p> <p><b>Sector:</b> Disaster risk reduction – Agriculture, watersheds</p> <p><b>Contributions:</b> USD 8 million</p> <p><b>Participating organizations:</b> UNDP, FAO</p> <p><b>Implementation partners:</b></p>       | <p>There were numerous delays in implementation of the projects. These delays were in many cases attributed to a lack of local capabilities, particularly in financial management, to high staff turnover in the</p> |



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|--|---|---|--|--|--|--|---|---|--|---|
|  | <p>Finance</p> <p><b>Geographic location:</b> Haiti</p> <p><b>Compliance with timelines:</b> As mentioned in the Implementation completion and results Evaluation Report produced by the World Bank, an election campaign began in November 2010 and ended in May 2011 with the election of a new president, whose government did not take office</p> | <p><b>Implementation partners:</b> ILO, UN-HABITAT, UNOPS, MTPTC, PEJEFE, CRAD, FH, GTIH, UJAPH, FONHEDECO, EPT, CEPHAPE, EDM.</p> <p><b>Geographic location:</b> Port-au-Prince, Delmas, Martissant</p> <p><b>Compliance with timelines:</b> The initial duration of the project was 12 months, but there was an extension to June 2013, in particular due to delays in the execution of the project. According to the final project report, "in the beginning, numerous difficulties slowed the launching of the project, among others, the</p> | <p>town council / Pétionville town council / Delmas town council / Carrefour town council</p> <p>International NGOs: CHF International; J/P Haitian Relief Organization; Viva Rio</p> <p>GOAL, Cordaid, Emergency Architects Foundation</p> <p><b>Geographic location:</b> Port-au-Prince</p> <p><b>Compliance with timelines:</b> As noted in the final report, "numerous difficulties slowed and posed challenges for the implementation of this project, in particular, the security situation in a number of intervention zones, such as Fort National and Bel Air."</p> | <p><b>Compliance with timelines:</b> no data</p> | <p><b>timelines:</b> There were numerous delays in the implementation of the project over the course of the first two years due to a lack of guidelines for housing reconstruction. The Housing and Public Building Construction Unit (UCLBP) developed a housing policy and guidelines for housing reconstruction. According to the latest <i>Implementation Status and Results Report</i> (June 2014), this facilitated progress in the implementation of the housing construction component. Because of these delays, the project may be extended for an additional year.</p> | <p>MICT, MTPTC, CNIGS, IHSI</p> <p><b>Geographic location:</b> Haiti, Artibonite (Saint-Marc), North (Cap-Haitien), West (Port-au-Prince), South (Les Cayes), South-East (Jacmel)</p> <p><b>Delays:</b> According to the latest annual report, some delays were noted within the project, in particular due to administrative constraints. The high staff turnover in the ministries also caused delays because more training than anticipated was required before</p> | <p>Haitian government, local authorities, town councils of Pétionville, Tabarre, Port-au-Prince, UCLBP, MTPTC, Primature.</p> <p><b>Geographic location:</b> Port-au-Prince</p> <p><b>Delays:</b> The initial duration of the project was 24 months, but it is still underway. According to the latest annual descriptive report for the project, certain external factors caused delays/difficulties in the execution of the project. For example, it was more difficult than expected to track down the houses or neighbourhoods of beneficiaries who no longer remembered their addresses.</p> | <p>Education and Professional Training; Fund for Economic and Social Assistance (FAES); Program Coordination Unit; Technical Execution Unit (UTE) (only the FAES and the Program Coordination Unit receive funds from the HRF).</p> <p><b>Geographic location:</b> Haiti</p> <p><b>Delays:</b> According to information collected during interviews with representatives of the IDB, there were delays in the disbursement of the funds because the IDB can only disburse the</p> | <p><b>Government:</b> Ministries of Environment, Planning, Agriculture; Town councils of Chantal, Les Cayes and Coteaux.</p> <p><b>Private sector/National NGOs:</b> GIPPN and KPP of Port à Piment, MOPROPS in Port Salut</p> <p><b>International organizations:</b> MLFM, OXFAM ITALIA, CATIE, GRET</p> <p><b>Geographic location:</b> Haiti / South Department (Aquin- St Louis du Sud hydrographic zone,</p> | <p>government and to a lack of clarity regarding the roles and responsibilities for reconstruction within the government.</p> |

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|--|--|---|--|--|--|--|--|---|---|---|
|  | until October 2011. During this period, government activities slowed down, which negatively affected implementation of the project and caused some delays. | applications for demolition permits, identification of the owners, unfamiliarity with the laws and procedures in effect under Haitian law, the number of players participating in the project and the status of "pilot project" along with a "learn by doing" approach."  |  |  |  | beginning operational activities. The limited capacity to absorb the funds allocated to the beneficiary municipalities also occasioned certain delays. Due to these delays, the latest annual report proposes an extension to December 2014.   | In addition, some of the houses available were not up to the required standards and the owners were not always available to sign the contract, etc. As well, the data provided by the MTPTC on the houses to be repaired were obsolete and other evaluations that had not been planned for were required. Land-ownership issues also caused delays in implementation of the project. | funds once the government meets its financial management prerequisites. Also, there were numerous delays in procurement. The project was due to be completed in June 2013 but was given an extension to June 2015. <b>To date, 43.58% of the funds have been disbursed.</b> | Tiburon -Port-Salut hydrographic zone, Cavaillon watershed, Les Cayes watershed).   |   |
| What types of outputs are produced by the HRF portfolio? | Financial and technical assistance to the Ministry of Economy and Finance.   | Creation of 23 enterprises and training of 588 contractors; development of 6 urban plans (for each of the targeted zones); recruitment of staff and materials to carry out the works; preparation of urban diagnoses translated into Creole to facilitate access to the local populations; development of manuals and | Implementation of a national debris management strategy; creation of teams to carry out the work (demolition, clean-up, transportation of debris, recycling); coordination among the players for clearing of debris; opening of 2 crushing sites (one in Trutier for non-recyclable debris and one on Truman Boulevard | Financial and technical assistance to the Ministry of Economy and Finance. | Clearing of debris; repair and reconstruction de houses; improvement and extension of the basic infrastructure of the communities (roads, sidewalks, drainage ditches and canals, management of solid waste, water-supply systems and sanitation systems; construction of community reconstruction centres (CRCs); preparation of urban restructuring plans at the | training to national capabilities for building inventory; production of maps and reports on the building inventory; population census in the target zones; development of databases containing building inventory and census information; creation of a network of users and producers of geographical information; strengthening of | Awarding of rent subsidies; reconstruction of 136 houses; reconstruction of infrastructures in 16 neighbourhoods (14 water-supply infrastructures, 3,241 m of sidewalks, 500 m of retaining walls, 4,000 m of roads, 4,215 m of gutters, 974 m of paths; 2,709 m of drainage canals; 500 solar street  | Construction of 7 schools (underway); distribution of 103,000 school kits; training of 920 teachers (underway); granting of subsidies to students; construction of technical and professional teaching and training centres (TVET) and development of management            | Creation de 3,600 jobs; 1,400 hectares of land reforested; 110,000 metres of irrigation and drainage canals cleaned; 9,389 cubic metres of water retention dikes built; training of 52 producer-facilitators, training and certification of agronomists; training of technical managers | Types of outputs often mentioned: debris removal; repair/reconstruction of housing; community development plans; repair of service infrastructures in the affected communities; training of workers and contractors; creation of micro- |

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|--|--|--|--|---|--|--|---|---|--|--|
|  |  | technical sheets on the management and recycling of debris; training to strengthen the capabilities of community leaders.  | in Port-au-Prince for recyclable debris); 4 urban diagnoses; preparation of development and restructuring plans for 9 neighbourhoods; training of 330 contractors and workers in recycling techniques and training of 407 individuals in enterprise management; creation of 6 community platforms. |   | neighbourhood level and of maps of natural hazards, preparation of studies and of urban development and housing strategies; strengthening of the capabilities of public agencies and town councils.  | user capabilities; strengthening of the MITC's monitoring and evaluation capabilities; training of engineers and technical staff of the ATLS; creation of platforms for coordination of neighbourhood reconstruction; strengthening of the MPCE's strategic planning capabilities. | lamps); boundary delineations, community plans and risk prevention plans prepared for 16 neighbourhoods; creation of SMEs for reconstruction; training of 509 workers and foremen; distribution of 10,000 school kits in 45 schools in the target neighbourhoods. | models; studies on reform of the education sector.  | to strengthen capabilities in watershed management, etc.   | enterprises; strengthening of the capabilities of the government reconstruction apparatus.   |
| To what extent did the HRF-funded projects achieve their objectives? |   |   |   |    |   |   |    | <b>Insufficient information to draw conclusions on the achievement of results</b>   | <b>Insufficient information to draw conclusions on the achievement of results</b>  |  |
|  | According to the Project Completion and Results Evaluation Report, "the objective of the proposed operation is to improve accountability and transparency in the management of public resources within | The project "had as its main objective supporting the safe return of displaced families through the rehabilitation of disaster-stricken neighbourhoods by implementing a system of recycling, removal and processing of debris." The results expected from the | "The joint Debris II program (UNDP, UN-Habitat, ILO and Haitian government) has as its main objective supporting the safe return of displaced families through the rehabilitation of disaster-stricken neighbourhoods by implementing a system of recycling, removal                               | The objective of the project is to increase transparency and efficiency in the management of public resources providing support for reconstruction and institutional consolidation in the long term. More specifically, the project aims to improve (i) the management of public finances through better budget execution and | According to the project document, the development objective of the proposed PREKAD project is to "facilitate the return to their communities of the residents of certain neighbourhoods in Port-au-Prince which were seriously affected by the earthquake, by assisting them in repairing and/or rebuilding their houses and by | The main objective of the project is to provide the government and its partners with tools to assist in the coordination of housing and neighbourhood reconstruction efforts.<br><br>As mentioned above, an annual report and an   | The overall objective of the project is the "Rehabilitation of 16 neighbourhoods to improve living conditions through community participation."<br><br>The objectives and the progress toward them are:   | The project components funded by HRF contributions are aimed at achieving the following objectives:<br><br>1. Developing education infrastructures: The contracts for construction of the 7 schools | The expected results are as follows:<br>1. Sustainable development of spaces in the Aquin-Saint Louis du Sud (upstream and downstream) and Tiburon-Port Salut hydrographic zones and in the Cavillon and Les Cayes watersheds (downstream) | Much progress was made in the removal and recycling of debris as well as in the construction of service infrastructures in the affected communities. However, construction and repair of dwellings was more difficult, |









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|--|--|---|--|---|--|--|---|--|--|--|
|  | <p>the context of reconstruction of the country. It will thus make it possible to strengthen the government's capabilities to manage public resources effectively and transparently. More specifically, the operation supports the following measures: a) increasing the transparency of budget transfers to the electricity sector, b) reinstating budget controls and the external and internal audit processes, c) improving application of the law on declaration of assets and d) strengthening the regulations on procurement of public services and improving transparency in government contracting practices. "</p> | <p>project were:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The removal, recycling and reuse of 162,000 cubic metres of debris in six zones in Port au Prince, Delmas and Martissant: 378,358 m<sup>3</sup> of debris were removed, or 2.3 times the goal.</li> <li>Creation of jobs for 2,100 individuals in the disaster-stricken communities: 8,200 individuals were employed, or 3.9 times the goal.</li> </ol> <p>In addition, the final report on the project mentions that "the recycling of debris anticipated during the planning of the project was achieved, with the production of over 200,000 cobblestones and 7,942 paving stones, thus rehabilitating 7 passageways in the Carrefour Feuilles zone " and that "9 dwellings were built using recycled debris, in</p> | <p>and processing of debris." More specifically, the project aimed at:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Removing and managing at least 625,000 cubic metres of debris: Objective 85.8% achieved (536,179 m<sup>3</sup> of debris were removed). According to the final report, this variance was due to high transportation costs.</li> <li>3,000 individuals (40% women) are benefiting from income-generating activities through "Cash for Production": Objective 538.8% achieved, given that 16,163 jobs were created in demolition and debris clearing work, 38% of them taken by women. The final report also notes that the methodology used (cash for production) favoured results-oriented management</li> </ol> | <p>workforce management; (ii) the institutional framework and capabilities for public procurement; and (iii) governance and performance in the electricity sector.</p> <p>The May 2014 ISR report considers the progress toward the results to be unsatisfactory. The memorandum on the supervision mission that took place in March 2014 provides the explanation for this poor performance.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Management of public finances: During implementation of the project, the SYSGEP information system was replaced with SID. However, the World Bank notes that SID "is not operational at this stage and is only an information system on public investments rather than a management tool for public investment. In its current state, SID cannot be used to monitor public investment expenditures and still less to present the results of quarterly execution reports on the investment budget funded through the</li> </ol> | <p>improving the infrastructure and basic community services."</p> <p>The project is aimed at achieving three immediate results:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Debris removal and repair of dwellings: 857 of 1,154 m<sup>3</sup> were removed; 1,526 of 4,000 dwellings were built or repaired. As mentioned above, there were numerous delays in the implementation of this component, but progress has been made recently thanks to the implementation of guidelines on housing.</li> <li>Repair and extension of infrastructures in the communities: three of four community reconstruction centres were established; 53 infrastructures (roads, lights, stairs, public spaces, drainage systems, etc.) were repaired/built. However, it is difficult to see the progress toward results because the target indicator has still not been</li> </ol> | <p>external evaluation of the project were published at the start of 2014. According to these documents, the project objectives and the progress toward them are:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Providing data to facilitate reconstruction (i.e., on buildings, population, land status, infrastructures, social services): The latest annual report confirms that over the course of the project, the buildings of the statistics institute (IHSI) were renovated and equipped. In addition, methodologies for the collection of housing and population data were developed, as well as databases. However, there seem to have been problems with respect to the training of IHSI staff in data collection, given the high staff turnover at this institution.</li> </ol> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The displaced individuals in six camps associated with the 16 target neighbourhoods found a medium-term housing solution: 1 of 2 performance indicators reached its target.</li> <li>Return to the 16 neighbourhoods of origin is facilitated by the restoration of the supply of quality housing: 1 of 6 performance indicators reached its goal. Most of the other indicators are not on track to reach their targets.</li> <li>Better rehabilitation of 16 target neighbourhoods is promoted on the basis of the priorities of their residents: 8 of 20 performance indicators reached their targets. 2 indicators showed considerable progress toward</li> </ol> | <p>funded by the HRF were awarded to a firm, but construction is taking much longer than anticipated because of delays in the procurement process. They should be ready in 2015.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Improving the quality of education: 103,000 school kits were distributed, as well as 24,954 uniforms and 76,396 textbooks. Supervisory visits were carried out in 18 schools. 920 teachers are currently receiving training.</li> <li>Improving access to education: An average of 56,000 students received grants each school year.</li> <li>Increasing opportunities for technical and professional training (TVET): Construction for</li> </ol> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Providing technical and financial support to the agricultural sector for protection of the environment and for increasing food security</li> <li>Developing navigation tools at the local level for the development and management of the Aquin-Saint Louis du Sud hydrographic zone</li> <li>Strengthening the capabilities of the national and local bodies in charge of the management and development of watersheds and of disaster risk management</li> </ol> <p>There are certain problems with the results matrix that prevent the measurement of progress toward the objectives. For example, 7 of 15 indicators have no target. Thus, in the case of a number of objectives it is impossible to know whether or not they have been</p> | <p>in particular because of the land-ownership situation. The lack of capacity and organization within the government made it more difficult to implement projects and achieve results. This, along with the high staff turnover, also hampered institutional strengthening of the government.</p> <p>It should be noted that, for certain projects, the lack of target and reference indicators prevented the measurement of progress toward achieving the results.</p> |

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|--|---|---|--|--|---|---|--|---|---|----------------------|
|  | Of seven performance indicators, 4 were achieved, 2 partially achieved and 1 not achieved. For example, the project was intended to publish financial data, but they were always released late; there were also certain delays in the submission of audits; finally, the project did not achieve its objective with regard to regulations and improved transparency in procurement. According to the Project Completion and Results Evaluation Report, the project's performance in achieving results was Moderately Satisfactory. The final report on the project was validated by the IEG, which confirms that the project was moderately satisfactory. | collaboration with Entrepreneurs du Monde (EdM)". | because the employees were paid on the basis of volume of debris removed/managed rather than by the day, which increased the productivity of the workers.<br><br>3. Preparation of urban development plans for intervention zones: objective 100% achieved. However, based on information drawn from interviews in the field, these plans were not implemented to any great extent and the local communities took little ownership of them. YVES, CAN YOU CONFIRM?<br><br>4. 800 employed in intervention zones for crushing, recycling and rehabilitation of debris: objective 101% achieved.<br><br>5. 800 contractors benefit from support to small enterprises: objective 142% achieved. | Treasury account, as set out in the Agreement."<br>2. Procurement: Progress is unsatisfactory because only 11 of the 19 ministries have submitted an annual procurement plan to the National Procurement Commission (CNMP) for the year 2013-2014. In addition, there is not enough information to determine whether the calls for tenders signed after March 31, 2013 were awarded after non-competitive tendering or after standard calls for tenders.<br>3. Governance/performance of the electricity sector: the financial performance of Électricité d'Haïti deteriorated and is unsustainable. In addition, of the 500 meters that were to be installed for the major clients, only 48 were installed and work properly. | determined.<br><br>3. Strengthening of institutional capabilities: four of four urban community plans were developed.<br><br>All in all, the ISR produced by the Bank in June 2014 deems the progress in implementation of the project to be Moderately Satisfactory. This shows that there has been progress in recent months because in December 2013 the project was given a grade of Moderately Unsatisfactory. | This would seem to be the reason that the project failed to achieve its objectives with respect to the building inventory and the census.<br>2. Developing a geographical information system on housing and neighbourhoods to facilitate reconstruction: The latest annual report on the project indicates that the system has been developed and is operational but the capacity for using it varies among the players. According to the evaluation of the HNRSP, the operation of the SILQ and the processes for validation, exchanges and network-sharing (ATLs, user forums) still need much work. In addition, the evaluation notes that the tools and instruments of the HNRSP were still not well known among potential users. | achieving results, while six failed to make good progress. 4 indicators will only be measured at the end of the project.<br>4. Haitian players are given support in order to complete reconstruction in Haiti by applying the 16 neighbourhoods model: 6 of 6 indicators achieved their targets.<br><br>It should be noted that the lack of progress toward achieving results could be attributed to the fact that the project received less funding than anticipated. In fact, a number of the activities seem to have been carried out in only 8 neighbourhoods (although a number of infrastructures were nevertheless developed in the | the TVET training will get underway at the end of 2014. The call for tenders for development of a management model for the TVET centres will be issued soon.<br>5. Strengthening governance in the education system: A study on reform of the education sector was to start in 2014. However, little progress has been made on this component, with only 10% of the funds having been disbursed.<br><br>It should be noted that it is difficult to measure the progress toward results because the Project Status Reports include neither the target indicators nor the reference indicators. | achieved. It should also be noted that a number of indicators that do have a target did not reach it. For example, in the case of result no. 1, only two of four indicators showed that the objective had been met. |                      |



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|--|---|---------------|---------------|---------------------|--|---|--|--|--|----------------------|
|  |   |               |               |                     |  | <p>3. Strengthening the MICT to support the municipalities and the communes to supervise the reconstruction programs: According to the latest annual report, the capabilities of the Ministry of the Interior and Territorial Collectivities (MICT) were strengthened, but the collectivities do not always have staff trained to coordinate reconstruction. During the mission in the field, the interlocutors gave the project a positive appraisal. In particular, the ATIs and the CRCs are new structures that facilitate greater community participation in the preparation of technical and participative diagnoses and of community development plans.</p> <p>4. Strengthening of the capabilities of the MPCE to direct and coordinate</p> | <p>16 neighbourhoods).<br/><br/>However, the beneficiaries encountered during the field mission expressed appreciation for the work carried out as part of the 16/6 project. In particular, they stated that real changes were seen in the living conditions of owners now living in earthquake-and hurricane-resistant homes. In addition, the beneficiaries state that the jobs created under the project gave the population earnings for a one-year period with which to meet their needs.</p> |  |  |                      |









|  | Emergency Development Policy Operation - WB | Debris 1 - UN | Debris 2 - UN | Budget support - WB | Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction (PREKAD) - WB | Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction - UN (HNRSP)   | 16 neighbourhoods /6 camps - UN | Reconstruction of the Education Sector - IDB | Disaster Risk Reduction in the South Department - UN | Points of comparison |
|--|---|---------------|---------------|---------------------|--|---|---------------------------------|--|--|----------------------|
|  |   |               |               |                     |  | <p>preparation of strategic reconstruction plans: strengthening of the capabilities of the municipalities to contribute to strategic planning for their territories. Progress was made toward achieving this, but continued efforts are necessary if the municipalities are to be able to participate in the reconstruction planning. According to the evaluation, the development of community plans and of participative planning depends on the agreements between the MPCE and IBI DAA, a firm involved in preparing community plans. The MPCE must take initiatives to allow collectivities to acquire data to advance municipal planning.</p> |                                 |  |  |                      |

|   | Emergency Development Policy Operation - WB   | Debris 1 - UN   | Debris 2 - UN   | Budget support - WB  | Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction (PREKAD) - WB   | Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction - UN (HNRSP)   | 16 neighbourhoods /6 camps - UN  | Reconstruction of the Education Sector - IDB  | Disaster Risk Reduction in the South Department - UN   | Points of comparison  |
|---|---|---|---|--|--|---|--|---|--|---|
| Planning and approval phases: How does the HRF evaluate the quality of its projects?                        | This process is standard for all of the projects. I think that this has to do with the IHRC. However, Ms. Keane mentioned that the IHRC review process was not optimal. It might be an idea to dig a little deeper here.              | This process is standard for all of the projects. I think that this has to do with the IHRC. However, Ms. Keane mentioned that the IHRC review process was not optimal. It might be an idea to dig a little deeper here.  | This process is standard for all of the projects. I think that this has to do with the IHRC. However, Ms. Keane mentioned that the IHRC review process was not optimal. It might be an idea to dig a little deeper here.                        | This process is standard for all of the projects. I think that this has to do with the IHRC. However, Ms. Keane mentioned that the IHRC review process was not optimal. It might be an idea to dig a little deeper here.   | This process is standard for all of the projects. I think that this has to do with the IHRC. However, Ms. Keane mentioned that the IHRC review process was not optimal. It might be an idea to dig a little deeper here. For this project in particular, an environmental assessment was carried out in order to inform the design.    | This process is standard for all of the projects. I think that this has to do with the IHRC. However, Ms. Keane mentioned that the IHRC review process was not optimal. It might be an idea to dig a little deeper here.                                      | This process is standard for all of the projects. I think that this has to do with the IHRC. However, Ms. Keane mentioned that the IHRC review process was not optimal. It might be an idea to dig a little deeper here.                             | This process is standard for all of the projects. I think that this has to do with the IHRC. However, Ms. Keane mentioned that the IHRC review process was not optimal. It might be an idea to dig a little deeper here.        | This process is standard for all of the projects. I think that this has to do with the IHRC. However, Ms. Keane mentioned that the IHRC review process was not optimal. It might be an idea to dig a little deeper here. It should be noted that for this project there are problems with the quality of the design of the results matrix used for monitoring. | Process standard for all of the projects.   |
| Project execution: What management activities are carried out by HRF staff during execution of the project? |    |    |    |   |   |    |   | <b>Insufficient information to draw conclusions on management of the project</b>  |   |   |
|   | "The Bank monitored the execution of the program through periodic supervision missions, as well as by the presence in the field of an economist from the Bank and the preparation of progress reports for the Ministry of Economy and | <b>Management of the project (M&amp;E):</b> According to the project document, the "Steering Committee will be responsible for general monitoring of the project and will meet each quarter. The project teams of the agencies (UNDP, UN-HABITAT, ILO) will conduct regular field visits in order | <b>Management of the project (M&amp;E):</b> The monitoring and evaluation process follows the same model as in the Debris 1 project. -For the Debris 2 project, quarterly reports on progress toward results were produced. In addition, annual | According to the project document, "Monitoring and evaluation will be the responsibility of the public authorities, in order to strengthen their capabilities and those of the institutions. The MEF is the body charged with coordinating and carrying out the activities and reforms foreseen under the terms of the proposed donor contribution and set out in the Policy | The BMPAD is the entity responsible for management of the project, which, according to the latest ISR, has improved in recent months. The M&E tools for the project include: "(i) a reference survey, to be conducted in the first six months after activation of the project, in order to evaluate the impact of the proposed project | According to the project document, technical coordination for the Program will be provided by the Technical Monitoring Committee. This committee, led by the Technical Secretariat, will bring together the government and UN leaders of each component. This | According to the project document, "The National Steering Committee (CNP) will have general responsibility for the results of the program and for its strategic coordination. The CNP will thus take charge of supervision, of providing a strategic | <i>Project Status Reports</i> documenting the execution of outputs were completed approximately every three to six months. However, these files are very brief and do not provide information on how the project was managed as | According to the project document, the project Steering Committee was to meet twice a year to oversee its management. Quarterly and annual reports were produced, as well as a final report on the project. However, as indicated above, problems related  | In general, the projects are equipped with established procedures for management of the projects, including monitoring and evaluation. For all of the projects, quarterly and annual monitoring reports are |











|  | Emergency Development Policy Operation - WB   | Debris 1 - UN   | Debris 2 - UN  | Budget support - WB  | Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction (PREKAD) - WB   | Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction - UN (HNRSP)   | 16 neighbourhoods /6 camps - UN  | Reconstruction of the Education Sector - IDB   | Disaster Risk Reduction in the South Department - UN  | Points of comparison  |
|--|---|---|--|--|--|---|--|--|---|---|
|  | <p>Finance and for the Prime Minister." The final report on the project notes in particular that the first missions identified a lack of progress toward the results, making possible an intervention with the Implementing Agency to rectify the situation. As a result, better progress was noted in the subsequent missions.</p> <p>As with any other World Bank project, Implementation Status and Results reports (ISR) were completed every six months and an Implementation Completion Report was completed at the end of the project.</p> | <p>to be able to report on the progress of the work and the difficulties encountered. In addition, there will also be quarterly progress reports on the project prepared on the basis of monthly technical and financial reports provided by the implementation partners".</p> <p>For this project, quarterly reports on progress toward results were produced. In addition, annual progress reports were produced. The UNDP also performed financial audits for 2011 and 2012.</p> | <p>progress reports were also produced.</p> <p>The UNDP also performed a financial audit for 2011 and another one will be carried out for 2012 and 2013.</p> | <p>Development Letter (Appendix 1). Sectoral progress will be directly overseen by the competent entities concerned, but will also benefit from indirect monitoring by the MEF. A supervisory commission, under the direction of the MEF was created to facilitate coordination and the MEF will be charged with reporting on the progress achieved in relation to indicators of expected results mentioned in the result metrics matrix (Appendix 2). These easy to track indicators deal in particular with the presentation of reports on budget execution, the number of public accounts opened with the Central Bank, the presentation of procurement plans of the sectoral ministries to the CNMP and the use by the EDH of meter readings in the payment of FPE invoices and its billing of priority clients.</p> <p>"</p> <p>As with any project funded by the World Bank, ISRs are completed periodically in order to document the progress toward the expected results. There is also evidence showing</p> | <p>on its direct beneficiaries in terms of access to housing and basic infrastructures. In addition to the more traditional survey conducted to collect data, additional survey tools will be used to measure the satisfaction of beneficiaries and the capacity of the beneficiary groups, (ii) semi-annual technical audits, submitted within 120 days following the end of the six-month period being evaluated, (iii) a mid-term review, which will include a qualitative evaluation by the beneficiary as well as an evaluation of the effectiveness of the various control mechanisms applied in all phases of the project (financial and social components) and (iv) a final evaluation of the project, which will return to the reference survey and the qualitative evaluation by the beneficiary carried out as part of the mid-term review."</p> <p>In its role as a Partner Entity, the World Bank</p> | <p>committee will meet monthly. Its purpose is to provide coordination and monitoring of the general implementation of the Program and, more specifically:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•To provide advice and strategic guidelines for the implementation of the Program and its components;</li> <li>• To analyze the coordination needs and put mechanisms in place for coordination and for the promotion of synergies;</li> <li>• To carry out monitoring and evaluation of progress and accomplishments, with support from the Technical Secretariat."</li> </ul> <p>Quarterly and annual reports documenting the progress toward achieving results are available for this project.</p> | <p>orientation for implementation of the program and of adopting the joint Program Document, the work plan. and the annual budgets.</p> <p>The CNP consists of the following members:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The representation of the Haitian government;</li> <li>• The Resident Coordinator of the UNS or any person designated by him;</li> <li>• The representation of the local government and local players.'</li> </ul> <p>A monitoring and evaluation specialist will be assigned to the Steering Committee and will work on information management, ensure informed decision-making and provide support for the accountability, reorientation and adjustment</p> | <p>such. In the documents we received, there is no information on how the HRF contributions for the project will be managed.</p> | <p>to the quality of the results matrix suggest that the monitoring process was not optimal.</p> <p>With respect to administration, the final report on the project indicates that "the disbursement process for the partners at the level of the UNDP finance section sometimes caused frustrations because the officials of the partner institutions did not understand the procedures to be followed despite basic training sessions they received to help them adapt better."</p> | <p>available. For certain projects, including those of the World Bank, supervision missions were conducted by the Partner Entity.</p> |

|  | Emergency Development Policy Operation - WB | Debris 1 - UN | Debris 2 - UN | Budget support - WB  | Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction (PREKAD) - WB  | Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction - UN (HNRSP) | 16 neighbourhoods /6 camps - UN  | Reconstruction of the Education Sector - IDB | Disaster Risk Reduction in the South Department - UN | Points of comparison |
|--|---|---------------|---------------|--|---|---|--|--|--|----------------------|
|  |   |               |               | <p>that a supervision mission was carried out by the World Bank in March 2014 in order to document progress toward achieving the project results and enter into agreements with the stakeholders to correct the problems identified.</p> | <p>regularly carried out supervision missions in order to ensure that the project is properly managed. For example, in 2013 the Bank carried out six supervision missions regarding PREKAD. Among other things, these missions made it possible to quickly identify the problems related to the environment and to resettlement of the beneficiaries. In addition, every six months the Bank produces <i>Implementation Status &amp; Results</i> reports, which document the progress toward achieving the results.</p> |   | <p>functions necessary for the activities.”</p> <p>Quarterly and annual reports documenting the progress toward achieving results are available.</p> <p>However, there are certain contradictions in the final report that suggest that management was not optimal from the point of view of M&amp;E. The narrative of the final report presents a positive performance that does not take into consideration the performance indicators and targets of the matrix. For example, the narrative comments positively that the project operationalized two value chains. However, the target for this indicator is 10 value chains and no explanation is given for this</p> |  |  |                      |

|  | Emergency Development Policy Operation - WB   | Debris 1 - UN   | Debris 2 - UN   | Budget support - WB  | Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction (PREKAD) - WB   | Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction - UN (HNRSP)   | 16 neighbourhoods /6 camps - UN   | Reconstruction of the Education Sector - IDB  | Disaster Risk Reduction in the South Department - UN  | Points of comparison  |
|--|---|---|---|--|--|---|---|---|---|---|
|  |   |   |   |  |  |   | variance. This raises the question of whether the analysis of performance was taken into consideration in decision-making for the project. For this reason, the colour yellow is suggested.   |   |   |   |
| Were the beneficiaries and local players involved in the design and implementation of the project? |    |    |    |   |   |    |    | Insufficient information to draw conclusions on the involvement of the beneficiaries.   |    |   |
|  | The project was developed and implemented in close cooperation with the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF). Among other things, it was responsible for the coordination and execution of the activities and reforms and it was also charged with monitoring progress toward achieving the results. | According to the Project Document, community participation "is in fact the cornerstone of the project: the debris management plans at the zone level will be prepared with the active participation of the communities. They will serve as a basis for the communities to plan, implement, monitor and evaluate the debris clearing, disposal, recycling and reuse activities." A project | "Through community planning that allows direct involvement of the public in the choices and decisions to be made in connection with the improvement of living conditions in the neighbourhoods, UN-Habitat created urban development plans for nine neighbourhoods in the intervention zones by | As with other World Bank budget support projects, this project was developed and implemented in close cooperation with the partner, namely, the MEF. | The project document stipulates that the entities to be involved in implementation of the project are the beneficiary families, community organizations, municipalities, project management contractors, government agencies, etc. Community reconstruction centres (CRCs) were to be set up in the neighbourhoods and open to the entire community for consultations and training. The ISR does | It is not clear whether the beneficiaries and the local players participated in the design of the project as such, but there is every indication that the project seeks to involve the beneficiaries in their development through a participative approach. For example, result no. 4 states that "the capabilities of the municipalities are strengthened to | According to the latest annual report, "the primary objective of the 16/6 project is to initiate a process of neighbourhood rehabilitation through active community participation to allow the habitants of insecure neighbourhoods to regain their dignity (...) In order to achieve this objective, | As mentioned above, the <i>Project Status Reports</i> do not provide any information on the involvement of the beneficiaries in the design and implementation of the project. | According to the program document, "the project will favour a participative approach to decision-making and to the execution and implementation of the activities. The Haitian government and the Territorial Collectivities will be involved in the execution of the project so as to ensure ownership-taking at both the national and local | In general, the beneficiaries were involved in the design and implementation of the projects. |

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|--|---|--|--|---------------------|---|---|--|--|--|----------------------|
|  |   | <p>steering committee was also to be set up to carry out supervision and quality control for the project. In particular, this committee is responsible for consensus-based management decisions. Among other things, the project steering committee was to include a principal beneficiary whose function was to ensure project implementation from the point of view of the beneficiaries.</p> <p>The Final Report on the project confirms that community platforms were set up to facilitate the involvement of members of the community in the urban planning and other components of the project. The beneficiaries were also involved in implementation of the project in that many members of the community were employed in the clearing and recycling of debris.</p> | <p>promoting the use of unprocessed or recycled debris in the implementation of the projects. In order to structure this participation and coordinate activities in the field, community platforms were created." In all, six platforms were created and training workshops were organized to develop their capabilities.</p> <p>As part of the project, a participative urban diagnosis was carried out and a number of workshops were organized with the community in the form of focus groups. The conclusions reached in these workshops helped define the broad orientations for development of each neighbourhood.</p> |                     | <p>not provide a detailed analysis of how the beneficiaries were actually involved in the implementation of the project, but there are indications that the CRCs were set up and that certain decisions related to reconstruction were taken with the support of the community.</p> | <p>contribute to the strategic planning for their respective territories, to mobilize and coordinate local players for the execution of strategic urban projects and to better manage the urban built environment."</p> <p>The information collected during the mission and included in the final report on the project mentions that the development and community plans were developed with the participation of the players concerned.</p> | <p>eight community platforms were created. This structure providing representation for each neighbourhood facilitated the identification of needs and the prioritization of public investments and key interventions in the community (...) This identification process was carried out through discussions within "the consensus-building space". In addition, these platforms carried out numerous small projects in the neighbourhoods that they themselves identified, drew up and submitted to the project for validation. This demonstrates a certain degree of leadership, confidence and empowerment of this structure within the community.</p> |  | <p>levels as well as the sustainability of the results." Based on the final report, it is possible to conclude that the beneficiaries and local players were significantly involved in the implementation of the project, but it is not clear whether they were involved in the decision-making.</p> |                      |

|   | Emergency Development Policy Operation - WB  | Debris 1 - UN   | Debris 2 - UN  | Budget support - WB   | Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction (PREKAD) - WB | Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction - UN (HNRSP) | 16 neighbourhoods /6 camps - UN  | Reconstruction of the Education Sector - IDB   | Disaster Risk Reduction in the South Department - UN | Points of comparison |
|---|--|---|--|---|--|---|--|--|--|----------------------|
|   |  |   |  |   |  |   | Finally, the creation of the three (3) community centres in the Jalousie, Nerette and Morne Hercule neighbourhoods fit in with a perspective of assisting the platforms in better establishing their authority at the community level by having a work space." |  |  |                      |
| Project execution phase: Upon completion, do the HRF-funded projects suggest that sufficient progress was made toward the results and that there were sufficient contributions to learning? | <br>The final report on this project includes a section on lessons learned. One of the most important lessons is the need to provide technical support to the government to ensure the proper functioning of institutions after a natural disaster. However, any institutional reform in such a context carries a | <br>This project is unique in that there has never really been a similar project on such a scale that documents the lessons learned in the removal and recycling of debris. According to the final report on the project, "a Lessons Learned exercise was carried out by the UNDP and four products were developed: (i) a general introduction to Debris Management ("The Tip of the | <br>See the information for debris 1 because the same lessons learned were drawn from the two projects. | Not applicable. This project has just ended and the implementation completion and results Evaluation Report is not yet available. | Not applicable: this project is still underway         | Not applicable: this project is still underway        | Not applicable: this project is still underway   | <br>According to the final report on the project, "A special program evaluation mission was carried out between May 28 and June 9, 2012 by an independent firm, the "International Law and Policy Institute - ILPI." Its report is available and can be shared by authorized UNDP personnel at any time."<br><br>A number of joint evaluation |  |                      |

|   | Emergency Development Policy Operation - WB   | Debris 1 - UN  | Debris 2 - UN  | Budget support - WB  | Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction (PREKAD) - WB                             | Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction - UN (HNRSP)                                 | 16 neighbourhoods /6 camps - UN  | Reconstruction of the Education Sector - IDB                                       | Disaster Risk Reduction in the South Department - UN  | Points of comparison |
|---|---|--|--|--|--|---|--|--|---|----------------------|
|   | high risk and the proposed reform program must be simple.                           | Iceberg"); (ii) a technical manual on Debris Management; (iii) a roster of experts on debris management; and (iv)a collection of documents and templates that other debris management projects can use." The UNDP also worked with Gary Victor, a well-known Haitian writer, to prepare a work entitled "Collier de débris" [debris necklace] that gathers together the accounts of participants in the project.<br><br>It should also be noted that an independent evaluation of the results will also be commissioned by the UNDP. |  |  |  |   |  |  | missions with the UNDP and Norway were also cited. However, we did not have access to any of these evaluations. |                      |
| Is there evidence of the sustainability of the project? |  |   |  | Insufficient information to draw conclusions on the sustainability of the project. | Insufficient information to draw conclusions on the sustainability of the project. |  | Insufficient information to draw conclusions on the sustainability of the project. | Insufficient information to draw conclusions on the sustainability of the project. | Insufficient information to draw conclusions on the sustainability of the project.                              |                      |

|  | <b>Emergency Development Policy Operation - WB</b>  | <b>Debris 1 - UN</b>   | <b>Debris 2 - UN</b>                     | <b>Budget support - WB</b>   | <b>Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction (PREKAD) - WB</b>   | <b>Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction - UN (HNRSP)</b>   | <b>16 neighbourhoods /6 camps - UN</b>   | <b>Reconstruction of the Education Sector - IDB</b>  | <b>Disaster Risk Reduction in the South Department - UN</b>  | <b>Points of comparison</b>   |
|--|---|--|--|--|---|--|--|--|--|---|
|  | <p>In principle, the project should be sustainable because the Emergency Development Policy Operation contributes to the strengthening of a Haitian institution. However, as mentioned in the final report on the project, “the repercussions at the institutional level are still limited and problems remain in this area. For example, only 50% of members of the judiciary and 35% of the members of the legislative body submitted their declaration of assets for the 2010-2011 fiscal year.”</p> | <p>The Debris 1 project paved the way for the Debris 2 project. Contacts interviewed in the field also stated that the lessons learned from these projects were applied in the clearing and recycling of debris in Léogane. To this extent, it is possible to conclude that the sustainability of the project was good.</p> <p>The project also aimed at boosting economic activity through the creation of jobs and enterprises in debris management. In all, 588 contractors were given technical support to strengthen their capabilities. The project also created and strengthened 23 enterprises. In the final report, the analysis of the strengthening of capabilities is brief and it is difficult to determine with certainty to what extent the project contributed to the strengthening of capabilities and to</p> | <p>See the explanation for Debris 1.</p> | <p>There is not enough information in the available monitoring reports to draw conclusions on the sustainability of the project.</p> | <p>Measures were taken during design of the project to ensure its sustainability. As mentioned in the project document, “the sustainability of the activities funded by the PREKAD project must be evaluated in the overall context of Haiti as a fragile state. Many of these emergency and post-disaster recovery activities (such as the removal of demolition wastes) are in and of themselves ad hoc actions. The repair and reconstruction of houses will be closely supervised to ensure compliance with earthquake resistance standards and other standards for the disaster resistance of buildings. The close collaboration with the CDQ, which will translate into participative methods of investment in community infrastructures, should reduce the risk of negligence in building maintenance, thus increasing the prospects for long-term viability of the project. In addition, the knowledge and capabilities will be</p> | <p>A major component of the project is the strengthening of Haitian institutions, which should in principle favour sustainability of the project. The latest annual report notes that the capabilities of the partner institutions (IHSI; CNIGS; MICT; MPCE) were in fact strengthened.</p> <p>The mid-term review notes that the HNRSP’s commitment to strengthening institutional capabilities is visible and that it should be able to carry it over to reconstruction and to the overall housing and development policy. However, certain factors (in particular high staff turnover) resulted in delays and, as mentioned in the evaluation, “much work will remain to be done after completion of the HNRSP (...) to ensure the permanence of this strengthening”.</p> | <p>The information available is insufficient to draw conclusions on the sustainability of the project.</p> | <p>The Project Status reports do not provide information on the sustainability of the project.</p> | <p>In order to ensure its sustainability, the project aimed to “strengthen the capabilities of the national and local bodies in charge of the management and development of watersheds and of disaster risk management” (outcome no.4). However, the two indicators to measure the level of achievement of these results do not include data for either the target or the result achieved. It is thus impossible to draw conclusions on the sustainability of the project.</p> | <p>The projects tried as much as possible to strengthen capabilities at the national and community level in order to ensure the sustainability of the projects. However, the high staff turnover in the national government, the lack of capacity (in particular, financial) and the lack of organization among the players could compromise the sustainability of the projects.</p> <p>It was not possible with the information available, to carry out a thorough analysis of the sustainability of the projects.</p> |

|   | Emergency Development Policy Operation - WB | Debris 1 - UN  | Debris 2 - UN   | Budget support - WB                      | Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction (PREKAD) - WB   | Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction - UN (HNRSP)  | 16 neighbourhoods /6 camps - UN   | Reconstruction of the Education Sector - IDB   | Disaster Risk Reduction in the South Department - UN                                      | Points of comparison |
|---|---|--|---|--|--|--|---|--|---|----------------------|
|   |   | the sustainability of the intervention. However, beneficiaries encountered during the mission in the field said that, while the jobs created allowed them to meet their needs during the course of the project, once it was over they ended up back at square one in terms of their living conditions. |   |  | transferred to the population, which will gain experience in the areas of program design, implementation, evaluation and management of community infrastructures. In addition, the capabilities of the BMPAD will be strengthened through the recruitment of additional staff, in particular engineers and community planning specialists, which will allow it to carry out similar projects in the future.”<br><br>However, the issue of sustainability is not really dealt with in the monitoring reports, so the information is insufficient to draw conclusions. | Indeed, the contacts interviewed during the mission in the field mentioned that the existence of the structures set up by the HNRSP is threatened in a context where the ATLS and the CRCs should largely facilitate the implementation of the community development plans. However, the town councils do not have sufficient financial resources to support the salaries for the structures and the implementation of the community plans developed. Indeed, the evaluation states that an increase in community resources is fundamental to ensuring the sustainability of the results of the HNRSP. |   |  |   |                      |
| Did the project have an impact on the public? | Criterion not applicable to this project    | <b>Insufficient information to draw conclusions on the sustainability of the project.</b>  | <b>Insufficient information to draw conclusions on the sustainability of the project.</b> | Criterion not applicable to this project | Not applicable: this project is still underway   | Not applicable: this project is still underway   | <b>Insufficient information to draw conclusions on the sustainability of the project.</b> | Not applicable: this project is still underway | <b>Insufficient information to draw conclusions on the sustainability of the project.</b> |                      |



|  | Emergency Development Policy Operation - WB | Debris 1 - UN   | Debris 2 - UN   | Budget support - WB | Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction (PREKAD) - WB | Housing and Neighbourhood Reconstruction - UN (HNRSP) | 16 neighbourhoods /6 camps - UN  | Reconstruction of the Education Sector - IDB | Disaster Risk Reduction in the South Department - UN                       | Points of comparison  |
|--|---|---|---|---------------------|--|---|--|--|--|---|
|  |   | The final narrative report on the project does not include any analysis of the impacts of the project. However, it provides a few examples that suggest that the project did have an impact on the public. For example, one woman states that the construction of passageways facilitates movements of the residents within her neighbourhood and in particular of children on their way to school. As mentioned above, an independent evaluation of the project will soon be commissioned by the UNDP and should provide more information on the impacts of the debris program (debris 1 and 2). | The final report does not provide sufficient information to draw conclusions as to whether the project had an impact. As mentioned for Debris 1, the UNDP will conduct an evaluation to document the impacts of the debris program. |                     |  |   | It is still too early to measure the impacts the project had because it is still underway. However, it seems to have had certain positive impacts. For example, the final report states that many construction materials were purchased from local companies, thus helping to revive economic activity in the target neighbourhoods. As mentioned above, some beneficiaries interviewed also noted changes in their living conditions, in particular in terms of access to better housing. |  | The final report provides no data on any impacts the project may have had. | It was not possible, based on the information available, to carry out a thorough analysis of the impact the projects had on the public. |

## Appendix XII Comparisons among MDTFs

| Questions  | The Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Indonesia   | The Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Sudan   | The Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Iraq  | The Multi-Donor Trust Fund for East Timor   |
|--|--|--|--|---|
| Background information   | The Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Indonesia was set up in 2005.   | The Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Sudan, established in 2005, consists of two funds: 1) the National Multi-Donor Fund (MDTF-N), aimed at the reconstruction and development of the states located in northern Sudan; 2) the Multi-Donor Fund for South Sudan (MDTF-SS), which supports the autonomous government of South Sudan in reconstruction and development programs.   | The Reconstruction Fund for Iraq was created in 2004. It consists of two funds: the World Bank Iraq Trust Fund (WB ITF) and the United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund (UNDG ITF). The funds are administered separately but share a common structure, which in principle must facilitate coordination between them.   | The World Bank administered the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for East Timor (TFET), which was created in December 1999. The Consolidated Fund for East Timor (CFET), established in 2000 and administered by the United Nations, will not be covered in the analysis below due to a lack of information on its performance in the documentation reviewed. |
| Question 1.2.: How does the mobilization of the HRF's resources compare with that of the other Multi-Donor Trust Funds in terms of rapidity (the rapidity with which Administrative Agreements are signed and resources transferred) and value (the percentage the HRF's contributions represent of the total reconstruction funding)? (In relation to Objectives 1 and 4 of the evaluation) | <p><b>Value:</b><br/>Of the \$9 billion that the stakeholders committed to disbursing between 2005 and 2009 for rehabilitation and reconstruction in Indonesia after the 2004 tsunami, \$3.5 billion came from bilateral and multilateral donors. During the same period, \$537 million were dedicated to the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Indonesia, representing 6% of the total contributions and 15% of the contributions from bilateral and multilateral donors.</p> <p>The proportion of contributions going to the Fund differed significantly among the donors. The UN and the European Union channeled all or almost all of their funding to this fund, while the contributions from certain bilateral donors such as the United States, Japan and Australia were marginal.</p> <p><b>Rapidity of contributions:</b><br/>The donors committed quickly to making financial contributions to the fund, but there were numerous delays in the signing of the agreements because the donors had included a number of special clauses that</p> | <p><b>Value:</b><br/>The donors committed to contributing \$611.3 million to these two funds during the 2005-2007 period. For this same period, the donors committed to contributing a total of \$2 billion for recovery and reconstruction in Sudan.</p> <p><b>Rapidity of contributions:</b><br/>When the MDTF was launched, the contributions of the donors were made very promptly. However, in 2006, their contributions were made late because they were reluctant to build up the funds because of delays in disbursements. However, the administrator of the funds could not sign grant agreements if the funding was not present in the accounts. Thus, delays in depositing the contributions because of the slow pace of disbursements negatively affected the operation of the MDTF.</p> | <p><b>Value:</b><br/>The donors committed to contributing about \$25 billion between 2004 and 2007 for the reconstruction of Iraq. In August 2006, \$1.57 billion had been deposited in the two funds, or about 6% of the total funding for reconstruction in Iraq. \$454 million were deposited in the fund administered by the World Bank and \$1.1 billion in the UN-administered fund.</p> <p><b>Rapidity of contributions:</b><br/>The contributions of the donors to the two funds came in very quickly. About 60% of the promised funds had already been paid in within about two months after the start-up of the funds. However, the donors stopped contributing to the World Bank fund toward the end of 2005 because of how slowly the Bank was disbursing funds.</p> | <p><b>Value:</b><br/>The value of the TFET for 2000-2002 was \$177.6 million, accounting for about half of the total contributions for reconstruction in East Timor during the same period.</p> <p><b>Rapidity of contributions:</b><br/>The contributions of the donors were made quickly.</p>   |

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|   | <p>had to be approved by the World Bank's lawyers in Indonesia. The Secretariat therefore had to draft numerous legal clauses that had not been anticipated, which caused delays in the launching of the funds. The process later improved and contributions were made much more quickly.</p>   |   |   |   |
| <p>Question 2.5.: How effective was the general grant approval process? (relative to the performance standards of the HRF and those of similar multi-donor trust funds [preferably targeting Haiti or other states suffering from natural disasters or having experienced serious internal conflicts])? (In relation to Objectives 1 and 4 of the evaluation)</p> | <p>The manual for the Fund specified an approximately 45-day period between submission of the concept note and signing of the grant agreement. The criteria required that the concept note for a project be first of all examined by a review group to ensure its quality and then approved by the Steering Committee. The same procedure was then to be followed for the "appraisal document".</p> <p>However, it took an average of <b>111 days</b> for the project agreements to be signed (about 3.7 months). These delays were mainly attributed to quality control. Some partners did not have the expertise required to design projects meeting the quality standards required by the review group and had to revise their project design. However, it was demonstrated that this contributed to achieving better results.</p> | <p>The document consulted does not provide qualitative data on the time elapsed before approval of a grant. However, the average time between design of the project and disbursement of the funds to the Implementing Agencies was about 18 months.</p> <p>The complexity of the World Bank's procedures and the lack of familiarity with them on the part of the government partly explain the slow pace of the process.</p> <p>The UN agencies could also, at the request of the government, serve as implementing entities. In order to facilitate the efficiency of the Fund, the UN agencies could follow their own procedures for financial management and procurement. However, a new fraud policy at the World Bank resulted in numerous negotiations between the World Bank and the UN, which delayed the signing of the grant agreements.</p> | <p><b>WB ITF:</b></p> <p>For this Fund, projects were developed by the ministries and then submitted to the <i>Iraqi Strategic Review Board</i> in order to ensure that they were in keeping with the national priorities. After that, the World Bank evaluated the project to approve it and, if it was approved, entered into negotiations with the recipient to sign the grant agreement. This process took an average of between 8 and 10 months.</p> <p><b>UNDG-ITF:</b></p> <p>For this Fund, projects were identified by the UN agencies and the Iraqi ministries. They went before a number of committees, including a Cluster Group Review, a Sector Working Group Review and the Iraqi Strategic Review Board, which ensured that the projects were in keeping with the national priorities. Final approval was given by the UNDG ITF Steering Committee. The document does not specify how many months could elapse on average before projects were approved, but it notes that in December 2004 55 projects had already been approved. However, the document mentions that there were certain delays in the process caused by a lack of efficiency on the part of the Iraqi bodies (in particular the ISRB).</p> <p>It should be noted that the UNDG ITF Secretariat set up an accelerated approval process for urgent projects that could not wait for approval by the Steering Committee. However, the document does not mention whether this process was effective and how many projects it was used to approve.</p> | <p>The document consulted indicates that the TFET was an efficient mechanism for the approval and implementation of projects. According to the procedures, project approval was supposed to take five weeks. In actuality, however, the average was 3.8 months.</p> |

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| <p>Question 2.10.: How effectively and efficiently did the Trustee and the Secretariat use their annual budget allocations (compared to other Multi-Donor Trust Funds)? (In relation to Objective 1 of the evaluation)</p> | <p>The manual for the Fund specified that funds were to be disbursed within the five days following signing of the grant agreement. On average, the process took 29 days.</p> <p>Given that the Implementing Agencies were largely government bodies, the deposits had to be made in the public accounts. In many cases, the government bodies took longer than expected to create accounts. The new national system for management of public finances, introduced in 2005 to combat corruption, is seen as having caused delays. However, this problem was resolved and the average wait time between signing of the agreements and disbursements went from 65-70 days to 2-10 days.</p> | <p>The fact that the World Bank used the national budget systems caused delays in the disbursement of funds because these systems were not always ready to receive the funds.</p> <p>Disbursements for the two funds proceeded slowly. By way of example:</p> <p><b>MDTF-N</b><br/>As of September 30, 2006, MDTF-N had signed agreements with a total value of 40 million, of which 12 million had been disbursed, for a disbursement ratio of about 30%.</p> <p><b>MDTF-SS</b><br/>As of September 30, 2006, grant agreements with a total value of 106 million had been signed. Of this amount, 39.7 million had been disbursed, for a disbursement ratio of about 37%.</p> | <p><b>WB ITF:</b><br/>There were numerous delays in the disbursement of funds and the execution of projects. The disbursement ratio was about 15%. There were many reasons for these delays.</p> <p>The World Bank grants funds to government bodies that execute projects themselves and use the national financial systems to disburse the funds. By doing so, it strengthens the capacity of the member country in the areas of financial management, procurement, project execution, etc.</p> <p>First of all, the World Bank had not had any contacts with the Iraqi government for over 25 years; as a result, numerous efforts were required to renew its relationships with the various ministries. In addition, because of the high levels of insecurity, corruption and staff turnover within the Iraqi public sector, strengthening government capabilities required more efforts and resources than had been anticipated.</p> | <p>There do not appear to have been major delays in the disbursement of funds.</p> |
|  | <p>NGOs implementing projects were required to follow the World Bank's financial procedures, which in their view were complex and time-consuming.</p> <p>As of June 30, 2006, the total budget of the 12 active projects was 288 million, with 146 having been disbursed, for a disbursement ratio of about 51%.</p>  |  | <p><b>UNDG ITF</b><br/>Although there were certain delays attributed to the complexity of the situation in Iraq and some problems in terms of the structure of the Fund, the performance of the UNDG ITF was superior to that of the World Bank. For example, the disbursement ratio for UNDG ITF funds was 64%, compared to 15% for the World Bank. This success can be attributed to a number of endogenous and exogenous factors.</p> <p>Among other things, the UNDG ITF was not dependent on the public sector for disbursement of its funds. Instead, it paid them out directly to the national and international companies, the consultants and the NGOs. Another factor that contributed to the good performance of the UNDG</p>  |  |

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|  |  |  | <p>ITF is that the Implementing Agencies could use their own rules and procedures, which minimized bureaucratic activity. According to the document, this is not standard procedure, because normally, for other multi-donor trust funds, the UN agencies must follow the World Bank's procedures.</p> <p>Finally, the relationships that the UN had maintained in Iraq since the Gulf War (1991) favoured a better performance by the Fund.</p>   |   |
| <p>Were there delays in the execution of projects?</p>   | <p>The document does not really mention whether there were delays in the execution of projects but seems to conclude that the performance of the Fund and of the Secretariat was generally satisfactory.</p>   | <p>The government authorities were the principal implementing entities. The lack of capabilities of the government authorities in both the northern and southern regions caused numerous delays in the execution of projects. The high level of insecurity in the country was also considered a factor.</p>  | <p>(See cell above)</p>  | <p>According to the document consulted, the implementation of the projects was effective.</p>   |
| <p>What are the main lessons learned from the Fund in terms of mechanisms, governance, procedures and rules? In other words, were the rules/principles/procedures followed? If not, why not? (explanatory factors)</p> | <p>The structure of the Fund consists of a Steering Committee that gives votes to six government representatives, to the donors contributing over \$10 million and to two representatives of civil society. There are also a number of observers who do not have a vote.</p> <p>It appears that all of the meetings were held and that all of the players were involved. Unlike in other countries where the capabilities of the state are weaker, a better organization of the governmental apparatus in Indonesia contributed to the smooth functioning of the governance structures of the Fund.</p> <p><b>Personnel:</b><br/>The World Bank already had a major program in Indonesia, with about 200 professional-level employees. The World Bank also had a country director who lived Indonesia. The Country Director of the World Bank in Indonesia was very pro-active in the mobilization of resources and other aspects, which would seem to have contributed in part to the</p> | <p>The two funds have a common structure but operate independently. This structure includes a Sudanese consortium and a supervisory committee, as well as two technical secretariats administered by the World Bank. The structure worked relatively well and the stakeholders met as planned. However, it was not effective for resolving the delays in the execution of projects.</p> <p>The World Bank was strongly criticized by the donors and the government for its management of the two funds. The procedures used by the Bank were complicated and the Bank was not flexible. One part of the problem of poor management was the fact that there was a shortage of Bank staff working on the funds and that a number of important employees were</p> | <p>Although the two funds used different procedures for the approval and execution of projects, they operated under one and the same structure in order to facilitate better coordination.</p> <p>The two funds were governed by 4 entities: (i) the Iraqi Strategic Review Board, (ii) the Donors Committee, (iii) the Facility Coordination Committee, (iv) the Technical Secretariat. In addition, the UNDG ITF had a Steering Committee for approval of projects. According to the document consulted, these entities did not meet with the agreed-upon frequency, which contributed in particular to a lack of coordination and strategic orientation.</p> <p>Because of the high level of insecurity in Iraq, management of the funds was carried out from Amman, Jordan and the Technical Secretariat was eliminated because it had been concluded that it would have been too difficult for it to carry out its work from outside the country. This affected the functioning of the funds. In addition, the fact that the funds were managed from outside the country made</p> | <p>The World Bank was the Trustee of the Fund, but the activities were managed by both the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. The latter could use its own procedures because they were similar to those of the World Bank. The procedures used were uniform and facilitated the approval process and project execution.</p> <p>The structure consisted of a donors committee that approved the work programs of the two banks. The projects were implemented by the government thanks to support provided by the Project Implementation Units (PMU).</p> |

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|   | <p>success of the Fund. The Director had many connections in the government and could solve problems as soon as they arose.</p> <p>However, there were certain problems in terms of human resources that would appear to have hampered the efficiency of the Secretariat, in particular the fact that its staff consisted mainly of external consultants who had little familiarity with the World Bank's procedures.</p> | <p>based outside the country. This caused problems in the implementation of procedures, instruments and strategies. Because most of the World Bank staff working on the funds was not in country, the Secretariat's ability to participate in the dialogue and to settle problems was limited. As a result, there were numerous delays in decision-making.</p> | <p>accounting and control of funds much more difficult.</p>   |   |
| <p>Is there evidence of influence/pressure/preferences exerted by the Donors to target use of the Fund?</p> | <p>The document indicates that a number of donors made certain contributions to the Fund in order to have a vote within the Steering Committee, while most of their contributions in Indonesia were made outside the Fund. However, the document does not really elaborate on the type of pressure that would have been exerted by the donors.</p>  | <p>The document consulted does not explore this aspect.</p>  | <p>The UNDG ITF allowed the earmarking of funds contributed while the WB ITF did not, but the latter did allow donors to indicate certain preferences for the allocation of the funds. 89% of the funds allocated to the UNDG ITF were earmarked, while 67% of the WB ITF funds indicated a certain preference on the part of the donors. The document does not mention what kinds of preferences or pressures were exerted by the donors, but it mentions that the possibility of earmarking could be one of the reasons the UNDG ITF received far more contributions than the WB ITF.</p> | <p>The document consulted does not explore this aspect.</p> |

\*Source: Scanteam/Norway (2007) "Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds: Country Study Appendices".